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INTRODUCTION
Roe v. Wade' famously holds that fetuses are not persons within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment prior to birth.2 Roe also
holds, however, that states have a "compelling" interest in fetal life
once the fetus is viable,3 that is, "potentially able to live outside the
mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid."4 Before viability, a woman
may obtain an abortion whenever she and her doctor conclude it
would be in her best interest.5 After viability, a state may "regulate,
and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropri-
ate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother."6 Thus, the general rule that states may protect viable fetal
life through abortion bans and regulations is subject to a constitu-
tional life-or-health exception to which state laws must conform.
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 Id. at 158.
3 Id. at 163.
4 Id. at 160.
5 Id. at 164.
6 Id. at 165.
526 [VOL. 85:2
ROE'S LIFE-OR-HEALTH EXCEPTION
Much depends, therefore, on what the life-or-health exception
means. As formulated in Roe, the exception turns out to be deeply
ambiguous in rationale and scope. The exception could be shaped in
accordance with self-defense principles, on the theory that the state's
interest in viable fetal life should yield to the woman's right to self-
preservation.7 On that understanding, the exception would apply
only when a doctor reasonably believes that continued pregnancy
would put the mother in grave danger of death or serious injury.
Alternatively, the life-or-health exception could stem from ajudgment
that the state's interest in viable fetal life-while strong enough to
require a woman to accept the ordinary burdens of becoming a
mother-must yield when, in addition, continued pregnancy would
pose greater risks to her life or health than an abortion.8 On that
understanding, the exception would apply whenever, in a doctor's
good-faith judgment, the abortion is relatively safer for the mother than
pregnancy, because its overall health risks are believed to be smaller.
These competing interpretations of the life-or-health exception9
have very different practical implications. The self-defense approach
would rarely block the application of a ban on postviability abortions
because very few pregnancies nowadays pose grave dangers of death
or serious health impairment that can only be avoided by abortion.10
7 See Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and
Payment for Organs, 120 I-IARv. L. REv. 1813, 1816 (2007) ("Roe v. Wade and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey secure not just a previability right to
abortion as reproductive choice, but also a separate postviability right to abortion as
medical self-defense when pregnancy threatens a woman's life." (footnotes omitted)).
8 SeeJack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291,
294 (2007) (describing "two different rights to abortion"-"a woman's right not to be
forced by the state to become a mother and thus to take on the responsibilities of
parenthood" and "a woman's right not to be forced by the state to bear children at
risk to her life or health").
9 The constitutionally mandated life-or-health exception can also be character-
ized as a second abortion right, over and above the right to an elective abortion. See
supra notes 7-8. A proponent of the self-defense interpretation might call this the
right to a life-or-health-preserving abortion, while a proponent of the relative-safety
interpretation would prefer to call it the right to a therapeutic abortion. In light of
this Article's descriptive character, I have chosen to refer throughout to the life-or-
health exception, rather than to speak in terms of a second abortion right.
10 I include in the term "abortion" any deliberate termination of pregnancy that
poses grave danger to the life of the fetus, even if done in a manner (such as induced
labor or C-section) chosen to maximize the viable fetus's chance of survival. Some
doctors contend that it is never necessary, in order to preserve maternal life, to per-
form an abortion in the narrower sense of a procedure intended to kill the fetus and
thereby end the pregnancy. They acknowledge, however, that premature termination
of pregnancy by methods that do not involve direct killing of the fetus (but are likely
to result in fetal death) is sometimes necessary to preserve maternal life or health.
2010] 527
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By contrast, the relative-safety approach would apply in the far more
frequent situations in which pregnancy and childbirth are believed to
pose marginally greater risks to the mother's physical or mental
health than a postviability abortion would." Those increased health
risks need not be likely to occur, nor need they involve severe health
impairment.12 All that is required is that the increased health risks
could lead a doctor, focusing exclusively on what is best for the pregnant
woman's health, without regard to the life of the fetus, to recommend that
she have an abortion.1 3
The two approaches would also generate different results in the
other major setting in which the postviability life-or-health exception
applies: state regulation of abortion methods that seeks to maximize
the chances that the viable fetus will survive an abortion and receive
appropriate neonatal care.' 4 Consider, for example, a hypothetical
statute requiring that postviability abortions be performed by induc-
ing premature labor-a method that is quite safe for most women,
and that (unlike the standard late-term "dilation and evacuation"
(D&E) method) often enables viable fetuses to be born alive.' 5 Under
the self-defense approach, the statute would be constitutional, pro-
vided it contained a life-or-health exception for the subset of cases in
which inducing labor would be dangerous to the mother. Under the
relative-safety approach, the statute would be unconstitutional on its
face, because although induced labor is very safe, it is generally
accepted that the standard (and fetal-lethal) D&E method has even
lower risks, and hence is relatively saferi6
See, e.g., Interview by Priests for Life with Dr. George Isajiw, former president of Cath-
olic Med. Ass'n, 1998, available at http://www.priestsforlife.org/media/interview
isajiw.htm.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 204-06.
12 See infra text accompanying note 182.
13 See infra text accompanying note 182.
14 As Part III.C explains, after Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), Roe's life-or-health exception also applies to previability
abortion regulations. In the previability context, the most important applications of
the life-or-health exception are (1) to medical-emergency provisions that excuse doc-
tors from compliance with otherwise applicable abortion regulations, and (2) to
restrictions on abortion methods. Although this Article's primary focus is on the
application of Roe's life-or-health exception to postviability abortions and abortion
methods, Parts III and IV also discuss the exception's application to previability state
abortion regulations.
15 The D&E method involves dismembering the fetus and removing it in pieces.
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 135-36 (2007).
16 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 926 (2000) (describing studies showing
that D&E is safer than "the next safest" procedure, induced labor).
ROE'S LIFE-OR-HEALTH EXCEPTION
The Supreme Court has never definitively embraced either the
self-defense or relative-safety interpretation of the life-or-health excep-
tion. This Article does not address the central normative question
(which approach should the Court adopt), in the conviction that the
foundation for an informed debate on that question should be a thor-
ough and rigorous descriptive analysis of the Court's decisions dealing
with the life-or-health exception. To the best of my knowledge, no
other commentator has undertaken the close reading and in-depth
analysis of the Court's cases dealing with the life-or-health exception
that this Article presents.17
In brief, that analysis demonstrates that the Court has vacillated
between-and at times straddled-these two approaches, without ever
offering anything resembling a reasoned explanation for its actions.
Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton,18 left the life-or-health
exception undefined and ambiguous-thereby enabling pro-life audi-
ences to view it through self-defense eyes and pro-choice audiences to
see it with relative-safety ones.19 In Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists,20 the Court implicitly endorsed an absolu-
tist version of the relative-safety interpretation. In Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,21 the Court implicitly rejected
Thornburgh and introduced a new (but ambiguous) phrase-"signifi-
cant health risks" 2 2-to describe the circumstances that must be cov-
ered by the health exception. In Stenberg v. Carhart,23 the Court
reverted to the relative-safety interpretation (albeit a more moderate
version than it had posited in Thornburgh).24 Most recently, in Gonza-
les v. Carhart,25 the Court implicitly endorsed a version of the self-
defense approach 26-but did so in a half-hearted manner that sends
only a muted signal to lower courts and legislatures.
Although this Article is primarily descriptive, it does make one
normative claim: that the Supreme Court's failure to explain the life-
17 The most extensive analysis of which I am aware is presented in Gail Glidewell,
"Partial Birth" Abortion and the Health Exception: Protecting Maternal Health or Risking Abor-
tion on Demand?, 28 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1089 (2001).
18 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
19 See infra Part I.D.
20 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
21 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
22 Id. at 880 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and SouterJJ.).
23 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
24 Id. at 934-35.
25 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
26 See id. at 164.
20101 529
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
or-health exception's rationale and scope is utterly irresponsible.2 7 In
Casey, the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy
solemnly declared that "[1] iberty must not be extinguished for want of
a line that is clear,"28 and that, unlike legislatures, courts "mustjustify
the lines we draw."29 When it comes to the life-or-health exception,
the Court has neither drawn clear lines nor justified them. The lib-
eral, pro-Roe Justices have tried to have it both ways, intimating that
postviability abortions are rare, yet supporting the relative-safety
approach that makes them routinely available. The conservative, anti-
RoeJustices have angrily objected to the relative-safety approach, yet
neglected even to articulate, much less make the case for, the obvious
self-defense alternative. The one point on which they all apparently
agree is that the less said about Roe's life-or-health exception, the
better.
This abdication of the Court's basic responsibility to say what the
law is-particularly when the Court itself has made that law-has
received little attention or criticism. How has the Court gotten away
with it? In part, I surmise, because the Court's failure to decide has
been almost as good as outright victory from the pro-choice stand-
point favored by elite, professional, and media opinion. The law in
action tilts decisively toward the relative-safety interpretation. Twenty-
one of the thirty-six states with a postviability ban in force simply track
the language of Roe's life-or-health exception;30 the other fifteen use
27 Cf Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 249,
271 (2009) (criticizing the Court's failure to articulate a nonconclusory rationale for
the rule that the right to elective abortion continues until viability).
28 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (joint opin-
ion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
29 Id. at 870.
30 Postviability prohibitions that make an exception for abortions "necessary to
preserve the woman's life or health," or words to that effect, include Aiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 36-2301.01 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-705 (1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 123464-123468 (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-602(b) (1990); FLA.
STAT. § 390.0111(1) (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141(c) (2009); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 510/5 (1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 311.780 (LexisNexis 1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.4(A) (2001); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598 (1993); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-209 (West
2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(3) (West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.030 (West
1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-329 (1984); OaA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-732 (1997); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-41-20(c) (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-23A-5 (1973); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-15-201 (c) (3) (West 1989); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.02.110 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.15 (2001). California's statutory exception is arguably broader than Roe
requires, because it allows a postviability abortion unless "[i]n the good faith medical
judgment of the physician, continuation of the pregnancy posed no risk to life or
health of the pregnant woman." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123468.
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more restrictive language suggesting a self-defense interpretation.3 1
(Fourteen states have no prohibition on postviability abortions in
force, either because they have no postviability statutes, or because
their postviability statutes contains no health exceptions, and thus are
plainly unconstitutional under Roe.32) Absent an unambiguous
endorsement of the self-defense approach by the Supreme Court, the
lower federal courts are likely to interpret all these statutes in accor-
dance with the relative-safety interpretation. I base this prediction on
three considerations: (1) the established practice of interpreting stat-
utes, where reasonably possible, to avoid constitutional questions;33
31 Alabama, Kansas, and Pennsylvania require a "substantial and irreversible
impairment of a major bodily function." ALA. CODE §§ 26-22-1 to -5 (1997); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-6703(a) (1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211(b) (1) (West 1984).
Indiana requires a "substantial permanent impairment of the life or physical health"
of the woman. IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1(a) (3) (c) (1997). Massachusetts and North
Dakota require a "substantial risk of grave impairment of her physical or mental
health." MAsS. GEN. LAws ch. 112, § 12M (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04
(1979). Montana requires "a risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a
major bodily function." MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109(4) (2005). Nevada and North
Carolina require a "substantial risk" that continuance of the pregnancy would endan-
ger the woman's life or "gravely impair" her physical or mental health. NEv. REV.
STAT. § 442.250 (West 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(b) (1997). New Mexico
requires that the procedure is necessary to preserve the life of a woman, or to prevent
great bodily harm to a woman, because of physical disorder, illness, or injury. N.M.
STAT. §§ 30-5A-1 to -5 (2000). Ohio requires a "serious risk of the substantial and
irreversible impairment of a major bodily function." OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.16(J) (LexisNexis 2002). Texas requires a "substantial risk of serious impair-
ment" to her physical or mental health. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 170.002(b)(2) (Vernon 1998). Utah requires "serious risk of substantial and irre-
versible impairment of a major bodily function." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
302(3) (b) (i) (B) (2009). Virginia requires that the pregnancy be likely to result in the
woman's death or "substantially and irremediably impair" her physical or mental
health, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74(b) (2009), and Wyoming requires that the woman be
in "imminent peril that substantially endangers her life or health," Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-6-102 (1957). The Ohio and Utah statutes have been declared unconstitutional
by lower federal courts on other grounds. See Women's Med. Prof'I Corp. v. Voi-
novich, 130 F.3d 187, 210 (6th Cir. 1997);Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1118,
(10th Cir. 1996).
32 The Delaware, Idaho, Michigan, New York, and Rhode Island postviability stat-
utes make an exception only for the life of the mother. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 1790(a)(1) (1995); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-608(3) (1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.323 (1979); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.05(3) (McKinney 1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
23-5(a) (1975). Nine states (Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and West Virginia) have no laws prohibiting
postviability abortions.
33 See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (discussing the "canon of
constitutional doubt," which permits courts to construe statutes to avoid constitu-
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(2) the Supreme Court's admonition to lower courts to follow
Supreme Court precedent even if the Court's own later cases make it
likely that the Court will overrule that precedent;S4 and (3) the fact
that, as this Article will show, the Court's decisions supporting the rel-
ative-safety interpretation have been clearer and more emphatic than
its decisions supporting the self-defense interpretation.3 5
A similar pattern holds when it comes to state statutes requiring
that postviability abortions use the method most likely to spare the life
of the fetus. Although some of these statutes contain life-or-health
exceptions that could be construed in self-defense terms,3 6 others
apply whenever compliance would subject the mother to increased
health risks.3 7 In some cases, the relative-safety language of the statute
represents a legislative attempt to comply with the Supreme Court's
decisions in Colautti v. Franklin38 and Thornburgh-rulings that have
since been undermined, but not openly overruled.3 9
tional questions unless "the saving construction" is plainly contrary to legislative
intent).
34 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow
the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions.").
35 See infra Part I.B.4.
36 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 26-22-1 to -5 (1997) (requiring doctors to use the abor-
tion method most likely to save the fetus unless it poses a significantly greater risk of
the woman's death or of a "substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily
function" as compared with other available methods); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.16(J) (LexisNexis 2002) (same); 18 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 3211(b) (1) (West
1984) (same).
37 See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2301.01 (2000) (requiring a doctor to use
the abortion method most likely to save the life of the fetus unless the method poses a
greater risk to the woman's life or health than another available method); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-16-701 to -707 (1985) (same); FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(4) (1999) (requiring
a doctor to take measures to save the fetus, except that "the woman's life and health
shall constitute an overriding and superior consideration to the concern for the life
and health of a fetus when such concerns are in conflict").
38 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
39 For example, the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Colautti required doctors to
use the abortion method most likely to save the fetus "'so long as a different tech-
nique would not be necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother."'
Id. at 381 n.1 (quoting 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6605(a) (West 1977) (repealed 1982)).
After that provision was held unconstitutional on vagueness grounds in Colaulti, id. at
400-01, the Pennsylvania legislature adopted a broader exception that applied when-
ever the fetus-saving method "'would present a significantly greater medical risk to
the life or health of the pregnant woman.'" Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768 (1986) (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3210
(1982)), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
[VOL. 85.2532
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What does all this mean in practice? Although reliable data are
unavailable, the evidence suggests that there may well be five thou-
sand (or more) postviability abortions per year in the United States. 40
Most of these abortions do not involve serious threats to the woman's
life or health, and hence would be unlawful under state laws that
incorporated the self-defense version of the life-or-health exception.
Moreover, in the subset of pregnancies that do involve a serious threat
to maternal health, there is usually an abortion method that is safe for
the woman and that would preserve whatever chance of survival the
viable fetus has.41 But rather than perform postviability abortions
using techniques that maximize the chances that viable fetuses will
survive, abortion doctors employ techniques calculated to ensure fetal
death.4 2 Under the relative-safety approach, these practices are fre-
quently defensible: so long as a doctor believes in good faith that the
safest abortion technique for the mother is one that entails fetal death,
(1992). Subsequently, some states adopted even broader exceptions that apply when-
ever the fetus-saving method poses "a greater risk to the woman's life or health." E.g.,
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.030 (West 1979); see also supra note 37 (citing statutes).
40 According to the Guttmacher Institute, only about 1.1% of the roughly 1.21
million abortions performed each year occur at or beyond twenty-one weeks gesta-
tional age. See GUT-MACHER INST., FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES
1 (2008), available at http://www.guttnacher.org/pubs/fbinduced abortion.pdf.
This works out to over 13,000 abortions per year performed at or beyond twenty-one
weeks; however, some of these abortions occur just prior to viability (a status that nor-
mally attaches at around twenty-three weeks). Unfortunately, neither the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) nor the Guttmacher Institute disaggregates
the data for abortions after twenty weeks. For both legal and practical reasons, I
would expect that a substantial percentage of post-twentieth week abortions occur
prior to viability. Consistent with that expecation, a 1996 Guttmacher Institute study
estimated that in 1992 (when there were an estimated total of more than 1.5 million
abortions) about 63% of post-twentieth week abortions occurred in weeks 21 or 22,
and the remaining 37% in week 23 or later. See Guttmacher Inst., The Limitations of
U.S. Statistics on Abortion (Jan. 1997), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ibl4.html.
Applying those percentages to the 2008 estimate of 13,300 post-twentieth week abor-
tions yields in excess of 4900 post-viability abortions.
41 Writing shortly after Roe was decided, Laurence Tribe observed that "[s]ince
the procedures for removal of a viable fetus typically present the same risks to the
woman whether the fetus is saved or destroyed, it seems questionable that the Court
actually intended to mandate a choice in favor of the latter." Laurence H. Tribe,
Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4
n.24 (1973) (citation omitted). Intended or not, that has been one effect of the
Court's Delphic pronouncements concerning the life-or-health exception.
42 As already noted, the standard D&E method is almost inevitably fatal to the
fetus. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. In addition, abortion doctors rou-
tinely administer pre-abortion lethal fetal injections as part of their standard late-term
abortion protocol. See David J. Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v Carhart and the
Future of Abortion Law, 2007 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 31.
2010] 533
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the health exception applies. Under the self-defense approach, that
would rarely if ever be true: so long as the fetus-sparing technique is
safe for the mother, the health exception would not apply.
In sum, the Supreme Court's long-running game of hide-the-ball
has created a regime in which thousands of viable fetuses are killed
each year even though their deaths are not justifiable on self-defense
grounds. Whether that result is ultimately right or wrong, surely the
Court should not impose it on the nation without explanation.
I. ROE'S AMBIGUOUS PosTVIABILrTY HEALTH EXCEPTION
The first order of business is to take a close look at Justice Black-
mun's brief and elliptical treatment of the constitutional life-or-health
exception in Roe. Here are the two key passages (the second purports
merely "[t]o summarize and to repeat" the first 43 but adds an impor-
tant qualification):
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so
because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful
life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal
life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications.
If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may
go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it
is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.44
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its
interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate,
and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appro-
priate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health
of the mother.45
A. The Prima Facie Case for the Self-Defense Interpretation
At first blush, these formulations seem clearly grounded in self-
defense principles. The most natural reading of the phrase "necessary
to preserve the life or health of the mother" is "necessary to avoid the
loss of the mother's life or health."4 6 This is the language of self-pres-
ervation, the raison d'etre of self-defense.
43 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
44 Id. at 163-64.
45 Id. at 164-65.
46 A typical dictionary definition of "preserve" is "to keep from harm, damage,
danger, evil, etc.; to protect; save." WEBsTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DicrioN-
ARY 1423 (2d ed. 1979).
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Moreover, self-defense law is preeminently concerned with when
an actor should be able to claim that self-preservation justifies the use
of deadly force (that is, force likely to cause death or serious bodily
harm) against another human being.4 7 Even after viability, abortion
exposes the fetus (at a minimum) to a serious risk of death, and thus
constitutes the use of deadly force.48 To be sure, under Roe even a
viable fetus is not a Fourteenth Amendment person.49 But Roe's rec-
ognition that states have a "compelling" interest in viable fetal life pre-
supposes that after viability the fetus may be counted as an
47 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)
(defining the circumstances under which "the use of deadly force" is 'justifiable");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 65 (1965) (defining the circumstances in which
"an actor is privileged to defend himself against another by force intended or likely to
cause death or serious bodily harm").
48 After viability, by definition, the fetus has a realistic chance of surviving outside
its mother-but only if (contrary to prevailing abortion practice) it is removed from
her body by a nonviolent method such as inducing labor. When that is done, the
fetus's chance of survival increases rapidly during the first several weeks after viability
(around twenty-three weeks). SeeJay D. Iams, Preterm Birth, in STEVEN G. GABBE ET AL.,
OBSTETRIcs 755, 812 (4th ed. 2002) ("As many as 15 percent of infants born at 23
weeks, 56 percent at 24 weeks, and 80 percent at 25 weeks may now survive to hospital
discharge in the postsurfactant era."). By the twenty-eighth week, the fetus has
approximately a ninety percent chance of survival. See Mayo Clinic, Fetal Develop-
ment: The Third Trimester, www.mayoclinic.com/health/fetal-developmdevelop-
ment/PROO114 (last visited Nov. 23, 2009). But most postviability abortions occur
before twenty-eight weeks, and even a ten percent chance of death obviously puts the
fetus in grave danger. Consequently, even if the method used maximizes the chance
it will survive, a postviability abortion constitutes the use of deadly force against the
fetus.
49 The law of self-defense "contemplates a human attacker," and therefore
applies only to the use of "deadly force against humans." Karen L. Bell, Toward a New
Analysis of the Abortion Debate, 33 Amuz. L. REV. 907, 926 (1991). Here the argument
threatens to turn normative: one could argue that viable fetuses are humans, and so
within the implicit protection conferred on each of us by the legal limits on deadly
force in self-defense. That argument lies outside the scope of this Article. For its
descriptive purposes, the key point is that Roe can be read as acknowledging that
viable fetuses are, so to speak, human enough that states may elect to treat them as
persons against whom deadly force may not be used except in self-defense. In this
connection, it also bears mention that legislatures are empowered to restrict the use
of deadly force against nonhuman animals for valid public purposes. For example, an
individual who kills an animal protected by the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (2006), is subject to civil and criminal penalties unless the killing was
"based on a good faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a mem-
ber of his or her family, or any other individual from bodily harm, from any endan-
gered or threatened species." Id. § 1540(a) (3), (b) (3); see United States v. Clavette,
135 F.3d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1998).
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independent human life.50 By definition, a viable fetus is presently
capable of being born alive and has a realistic chance of surviving
indefinitely after birth.5' Were a viable fetus to be born alive, it would
indisputably be a Fourteenth Amendment person-indeed, a citizen
of the United States, and of the state in which it resided.5 2 The state's
interest in protecting these potential citizens is directly advanced by
prohibiting the woman from terminating her pregnancy, because-
depending on the method used-there is at least a serious risk (and at
most a virtual certainty) that abortion will kill the fetus.
This reasoning explains why Roe permits states to prohibit abor-
tions after viability-and why Roe mandates that such prohibitions
contain a life-or-health exception. The state's interest in viable fetal
life can override the woman's liberty to choose an abortion but cannot
override her traditional right to self-preservation. Our legal tradition
has long recognized each individual's right to use deadly force when
reasonably necessary to avoid serious threats to life or limb, even
though the result may be that the threatening person suffers injury or
death.5 3 Thus, a woman's right to self-preservation can plausibly be
deemed so fundamental that it overcomes the state's otherwise com-
pelling interest in the life of her viable fetus.5 4
50 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) ("[T]he 'compelling' point is at
viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaning-
ful life outside the mother's womb."). Indeed, Jed Rubenfeld has gone farther, argu-
ing that in Roe, "despite its vocabulary of potential life, the Court in all essential
respects made a determination about when the states could deem the fetus a person."
Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that "Life Begins at Conception, " 43
STAN. L. REV. 599, 635 (1991).
51 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (joint opin-
ion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,JJ.) ("[T]he concept of viability, as we noted
in Roe, is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourish-
ing a life outside the womb .... ").
52 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside."). The United States presumably also has a compelling
interest in protecting the lives of those who, but for their temporary location inside
their mothers' bodies, would be its citizens.
53 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *126 ("Both the life and limbs of a
man are of such high value, in the estimation of the law of England, that it pardons
even homicide if committed se defendendo, or in order to preserve them. For whatever
is done by a man, to save either life or member, is looked upon as done upon the
highest necessity and compulsion.").
54 The qualification "plausibly" is an important one. Some people think the
deliberate killing of a viable fetus should be unlawful even if necessary to save the
mother's life. Others think that while danger to the mother's life is a sufficientjustifi-
cation (or excuse), danger to her health is not. Although worthy of serious normative
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Self-defense principles are also consistent with the fact that Roe's
exception extends to the mother's health as well as her life. Self-
defense law generally authorizes the use of deadly force if an actor
reasonably believes that he or she is in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily harm.5 5 By analogy, a woman is entitled to a self-
defense abortion when continuation of her pregnancy places her in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm-that is, when an
abortion is "necessary to preserve" her "life or health."
It could be argued that the analogy is defective because fetuses,
far from being deliberate aggressors, are entirely innocent-indeed,
are not even voluntary actors. That may explain why the strict anti-
abortion laws of the late nineteenth century construed the mother's
self-defense rights narrowly by permitting abortion only when neces-
sary to preserve her life.5 6 But modern self-defense law, as exemplified
by the Model Penal Code, takes a broader view, allowing the use of
consideration these views are obviously inconsistent with Roe's life-or-health
exception.
55 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2) (b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985) ("The use of deadly force is notjustifiable . . . unless the actor believes that such
force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping
or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat. . . ."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 65(1) (1965) (stating that, in general, an actor is privileged to use deadly
force in self-defense "when he reasonably believes that (a) the other is about to inflict
upon him an intentional contact or other bodily harm, and that (b) he is thereby put
in peril of death or serious bodily harm or ravishment, which can safely be prevented
only by the immediate use of such force").
56 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *186 ("There is one species of homicide se
defendendo [in self-defense], where the party slain is equally innocent as he who occa-
sions his death: and yet this homicide is also excusable from the great universal princi-
ple of self-preservation, which prompts every man to save his own life preferable to
that of another, where one of them must inevitably perish."). In addition to self-
defense, the common law also recognized the closely related defense of "necessity,"
and the Model Penal Code generalized the latter defense in its "choice of evils" provi-
sions. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.01-3.02 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985). Moreover, the commentary on the Model Penal Code's abortion provisions
speaks of "necessity" rather than self-defense in connection with exceptions in abor-
tion statutes, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11 cmt. 3 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959), as
do some English authorities, see generally D. Seaborne Davies, The Law of Abortion and
Necessity, 2 MOD. L. REv. 126 (1938). In this Article, I put to one side such questions as
whether and why abortion on maternal life or health grounds is better understood in
terms of self-defense, or, alternatively, in terms of necessity or the choice-of-evils
defense. Although there are significant differences between the two defenses, their
strong similarities-particularly as compared with the relative-safety approach-war-
rant this simplification. (Nor do I consider the possibility that a life-or-health excep-
tion should be viewed as an excuse, rather than a justification, in which case the
defense of "duress" might furnish the closest analogy. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
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deadly force even against an innocent aggressor.5 7 Consistent with
that approach, long before Roe a few states (and the District of Colum-
bia) allowed abortions if necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother.5 8 Similarly, the Model Penal Code, on which fourteen states
patterned their laws at the time of Roe,59 permitted abortions if a doc-
tor believed "there is substantial risk that continuance of the preg-
nancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the
mother."60
Roe's second formulation of the life-or-health exception qualifies
the word "necessary" with the phrase "in appropriate medical judg-
ment."6 ' This too can be explained in self-defense terms. In most
self-defense settings, there is no alternative to allowing the threatened
victim to decide whether or not to use deadly force in self-defense. In
the abortion setting, there is an alternative: to place the initial deci-
sion whether or not an abortion is justified in the hands of the
woman's doctor, who can be expected to be more knowledgeable and
objective about the gravity of the risks pregnancy poses to her life or
health. Self-defense law, which permits persons to use deadly force in
defense of others, is consistent with this aspect of Roe as well. 6 2 But
self-defense principles also suggest that, contrary to some lower court
precedent, a doctor's medical judgment must be reasonable, as well as
made in good faith, in order to qualify as "appropriate."63
57 The Model Penal Code simply requires that the actor invoking self-defense be
threatened with "unlawful force," which includes cases such as a psychotic aggressor
or an involuntary aggressor. See Boaz Sangero, A New Defense for Self-Defense, 9 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 475, 512 (2006); Alec Walen, Consensual Sex Without Assuming the Risk of
Carrying an Unwanted Fetus; Another Foundation for the Right to an Abortion, 63 BROOK. L.
REv. 1051, 1107 (1997). The Second Restatement of Torts "expresses no opinion as to
whether there is a similar privilege of self-defense against conduct which the actor
recognizes, or should recognize, to be entirely innocent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 66 caveat (1965).
58 The earliest examples of which I am aware are the 1868 Colorado statute and
the 1869 Wyoming statute, both of which authorized abortions believed necessary to
avoid "serious and permanent bodily injury" to the mother. See COLo. REv. STAT. ch.
22, § 42 (1868); Wyo. Laws 1869, c. 3, § 25, repealed by Wyo. Laws 1890, § 32.
59 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 n.37 (1973).
60 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
61 Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
62 The fact that, even today, self-abortion of a second- or third-trimester preg-
nancy would be extremely dangerous suggests another reason for treating doctors as
the gatekeepers for postviability abortions.
63 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65(1) (1965) (requiring that the per-
son acting in self-defense "reasonably believe[ ]" that he or she is "in peril of death or
serious bodily harm or ravishment"); cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 note (Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1985) ("[T]he actor's actual belief is sufficient to sup-
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B. The (Complicated) Prima Facie Case for the Relative-Safety
Interpretation
Prior to 1968, the general understanding in both the legal and
medical professions was that restrictive abortion laws were intended to
protect fetuses and mothers alike 64 by banning abortions unless the
mother's life or (in a few jurisdictions) 65 health was gravely endan-
gered.66 As the twentieth century wore on, an increasing number of
doctors chose to perform "therapeutic" abortions where pregnancy
port the defense; if his belief is mistaken and is recklessly or negligently formed, he
may then be prosecuted for an offense of recklessness or negligence . . . ."). This
Article will not attempt to resolve the contested question of whether Roe's life-or-
health exception permits states to impose criminal penalties on a doctor whose judg-
ment about whether the life-or-health exception applies is unreasonable, but made in
good faith. See Voinovich v. Women's Med. Prof'1 Corp., 523 U.S. 1036, 1347-40
(1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that the Court
should review a Sixth Circuit decision invalidating, inter alia, a statutory requirement
that a doctor's finding of medical necessity be made "'in good faith and in the exer-
cise of reasonable medical judgment"' (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.17(A) (1) (West 1996))). Plainly, the self-defense approach is more likely than
the relative-safety approach to include a reasonableness requirement. See 40 AM. JUR.
2D Homicide § 152 (2008) ("In order to justify or excuse a homicide on the ground of
self-defense, the accused must not only have entertained the belief, but there must
have been reasonable grounds for his or her belief, that the accused was in imminent
danger of loss of life, or of suffering serious bodily harm, at the hands of the person
killed.").
64 See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 267
(2006); James S. Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth-Century Abortion Statutes
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 29, 45-50 (1985).
65 Witherspoon, supra note 64, at 45 n.49.
66 As Joseph Dellapenna explains, arguments for the maternal-life exceptions in
nineteenth-century abortion statutes "were grounded on appeals to a maternal right
of self-defense, not on a rejection of fetal personhood. The 'self-defense' argument
was made explicitly in the United States at least as early as 1866." DELLAPENNA, supra
note 64, at 279. Space constraints preclude even a representative sampling of the
evidence for this proposition. I will confine myself to two of the more important
cases. In Worthington v. State, 48 A. 355 (Md. 1901), the Maryland Court of Appeals
suggested that the repression of the crime of abortion "can only be efficiently dealt
with by severity in the enactment and administration of the law punishing the attempt
upon the life of the unborn child.... The corpus delicti of the offense of abortion is
the destruction of the unborn infant . . . ." Id. at 357. As to the dangerousness of
abortion, the court explained that whereas formerly abortion had been very
dangerous,
[i] n these days of advanced surgery and marvelous medical science and skill,
operations are performed and powerful drugs administered by skillful and
careful men without danger to the life of the patient. Indeed, it is this com-
parative immunity from danger to the woman which has doubtless led to the
great increase of the crime, to the establishment of a class of educated pro-
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posed serious danger to the mother's health, even if the applicable
statute permitted only life-preserving abortions.67  But this broader
understanding of when abortions were justifiable was still rooted in
the mother's right of self-preservation.6 8 Law-abiding doctors did not
argue that an abortion was per se life-preserving whenever a woman's
fessional abortionists, and to the enactment of the severe statutes almost everywhere
found to prevent and punish this offense.
Id. at 356-57 (emphasis added). As for the scope of the life-only exceptions, the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court stated the common understanding in State v. Rudman,
136 A. 817 (Me. 1927):
It is well known that occasion arises where, in the exercise of proper surgical
advice and care, it becomes necessary, in order to save the mother's life, to
remove the unborn foetus. To such highly honorable and proper acts, in
accord with the highest ethics of the medical profession, the dictates of
humanity, and all legal precepts, the statute has, and can have, no applica-
tion. But to the destruction of unborn life for reasons, whatever they may
be, other than necessity to save the mother's life, the law is intended, we
believe, to be an express and absolute prohibition.
Id. at 819; see also Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Fight from
Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 15, 109-15 (1993) (collecting
cases nationwide regarding the self-defense argument).
67 See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 45-47
(1984).
68 For example, in 1914, Dr. William R. Nicholson addressed the Obstetrical Soci-
eties of New York and Philadelphia on the topic, "When, under the present code of
medical ethics, is it justifiable to terminate pregnancy before the third month?" Here
is the "working hypothesis" he advanced:
Abortion is justifiable first, when the mother is in danger of losing her life or
health if the pregnancy be allowed to continue, because of some pathologi-
cal condition directly dependent upon the pregnancy itself; and second,
when the continuation of the pregnancy threatens an aggravation of an
independent pathological condition, which will eventually destroy life or
health, even though neither is actually threatened at the time the interfer-
ence is proposed. In other words we are in favor of a wide latitude always
provided that the decision be made by a man, or better, and this for many
reasons, by men who by their experience are qualified to make such a deci-
sion righteously.
The justification for the above attitude is based on the inherent right of
self-preservation possessed by the pregnant woman in common with all
other human beings, which right she is by no means obliged to resign in
order to attempt to bring into existence a merely possible life. Statute laws
give the individual the right to protect his life at the expense of another
adult life if necessary, and therefore the life of the unborn child may be
sacrificed if, to use an old common law term, the life of the mother is in
duress through the child in utero.
William R. Nicholson, When, Under the Present Code of Medical Ethics, Is it justifiable to
Terminate Pregnancy Before the Third Month; What Should Our Attitude Be Toward a Patient
upon Whom a Criminal Operation Has Been Performed; What Should Be Our Attitude Toward
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statistical chances of dying were greater if she carried the fetus to term
than if she had an abortion.6 9
1. Cyril Means's Advocacy of the Relative-Safety Test
All this changed rapidly with the appearance of the first of two
influential law review articles by Professor (and NARAL General
Counsel) Cyril Means.7 0 The first article presented a radically revi-
sionist history of the restrictive nineteenth-century abortion statutes.7 1
Means argued that the sole purpose of the statutory prohibitions on
Those Suspected of the Performance of Criminal Operations?, 69 Am. J. OBSTETRICS & Dis-
EASES WOMEN & CHILD. 1004, 1005 (1914) (emphasis omitted).
69 In 1959, Herbert L. Packer and Ralph J. Gampell published their famous law
review article, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and Medicine, 11 STAN. L. REv. 417
(1959). Packer and Gampell gave eleven case histories to a representative sample of
California hospitals and asked each (among other things) whether it would perform a
therapeutic abortion on such a patient. Id. at 431-44. The applicable law was the
California statute, which made it a felony to perform an abortion on a woman "'unless
the same is necessary to preserve her life."' Id. at 418 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 274 (West 1955) (repealed 2000)). The main theses of the article were that the
statutory standard was not being strictly complied with, and that there was considera-
ble uncertainty about which cases came within the statutory exception, and considera-
ble variation from hospital to hospital in the interpretation of the law. See id. at 447.
But if one reads the article with a different question in mind-did the authors think
some doctors and hospitals would perform abortions whenever they believed the over-
all health risks of abortion to be lower than those of pregnancy?-the answer is clearly
no. None of the eleven cases described a situation in which the health risks of abor-
tion were marginally lower than those of pregnancy for the particular woman in ques-
tion. Rather, the focus was on the absolute gravity of the risks posed by continued
pregnancy to the woman's physical or mental health. See id. at 431-44. When the
authors did mention the relative risks of pregnancy and abortion, they did so to high-
light the seriousness of the pregnancy-related risks. See id. at 432 ("The effect of the
pregnancy on her life expectancy cannot be accurately measured but it is felt that the
risk of the patient dying during or immediately following this pregnancy would be at
least thirty times greater than if she were not pregnant.").
70 Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the
Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y. L.F. 411 (1968) [here-
inafter Means, The Law of New York]; Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Phoenix of Abortional Free-
dom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century
Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y. L.F. 335 (1971)
[hereinafter Means, Abortional Freedom]. For Means's affiliation with NARAL, see DEL-
LAPENNA, supra note 64, at 143-44.
71 As its title suggests, Means's first article focused on New York abortion law, but
he argued that New York law was typical, and also that it had strongly influenced
legislation in other states. Means, The Law of New York, supra note 70, at 418, 452, 506.
In his second article, Means famously argued that abortion had never been a crime at
common law, even after quickening. Means, Abortional Freedom, supra note 70, at
336-59.
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abortion throughout pregnancy was to protect women from the grave
nineteenth-century risks associated with abortion in an era before
antisepsis and antibiotics. 7 2 In adopting the statutory exceptions for
abortions necessary to preserve the life of the mother, Means con-
tended, legislatures
expected physicians . .. to weigh the patient's chance of surviving a
surgical abortion against her chances of surviving continuance of
pregnancy. In the case of most women-all healthy women and
many unhealthy ones-in their day, childbirth was the safer alterna-
tive; so abortion was forbidden. But in the case of an unhealthy
woman whose condition combined with pregnancy could be dan-
gerous, abortion might be the safer alternative; if it was, then the
doctor was to go ahead and abort her, under the therapeutic
exception.7 3
Although Means did not use the phrase, he was clearly proposing
the relative-safety interpretation: a statute with a life-only exception
authorized abortion when pregnancy posed even greater risks to the
mother's life; a statute with a life-or-health exception expanded on
the same basic idea by authorizing abortion when pregnancy posed
greater risks to the mother's life or health.
Later scholars, particularly Joseph Dellapenna, Philip Rafferty,
and James Witherspoon, have convincingly demonstrated that Means
was wrong: the protection of fetal life was a central purpose of the
nineteenth-century abortion statutes, whether they applied through-
out pregnancy or only after quickening; and the life-only or life-and-
health exceptions were intended to recognize only the narrow circum-
stances in which an abortion would be justified on self-defense
grounds. 74 For present purposes, however, what matters is not where
the historical truth lies, but the impact Means's relative-safety thesis
72 Means, The Law of New York, supra note 70, at 418.
73 Id. at 513 n.261. Means also failed to recognize that even if the nineteenth-
century abortion laws had been motivated exclusively by a desire to protect maternal
life and health, it would not necessarily follow that their exceptions for abortions to
save the life of the mother were intended to adopt the relative-safety approach. Sup-
pose a nineteenth-century legislature was convinced (a) that abortion was extremely
dangerous to women, but also (b) that some doctors, for financial reasons, would
abuse any exception the legislature adopted. These premises might lead the legisla-
ture to reject the relative-safety test in favor of a more stringent self-defense test.
74 DELLAPENNA, supra note 64, at 275-88; PHILIP A. RAFRrY, ROE v. WADE 72-77
(1992); Witherspoon, supra note 64, at 45. See alsoJohn Keown, Back to the Future of
Abortion Law: Roe's Rejection of America's History and Traditions, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 3,




had on courts, including the Supreme Court-and above all the Roe
Court.
As abortion-rights litigators began challenging restrictive abor-
tion laws in the late 1960s, it gradually became clear that Means's the-
sis could be used to make three distinct arguments: (1) that the
nineteenth-century laws had become unconstitutional because their
sole purpose (protecting maternal life and health) was now disserved
by bans on early abortions; (2) that the nineteenth-century laws were
unconstitutionally vague, because they failed to inform doctors of
whether their legal obligations were determined by the self-defense
test or the relative-safety test; and (3) that the nineteenth-century laws
were constitutional, but permitted far more abortions than anyone
had previously realized, because their actual meaning was captured by
the relative-safety test. Means had emphasized the first argument, but,
as we shall now see, the most important judicial decision lending
credence to the relative-safety test relied on the second argument
(while also finding some merit in the third).
2. People v. Belous
In People v. Belous, 5 the California Supreme Court struck down
the California statute prohibiting abortion on the grounds that the
words "'unless the same is necessary to preserve her life'"7 6 were
unconstitutionally vague.77 The court rejected several possible inter-
pretations that would have required danger of death in varying
degrees.78 It then turned to the construction Means had suggested:
"[A] bortion was permitted when the risk of death due to the abortion
was less than the risk of death in childbirth and that otherwise abor-
tion should be denied."7 This test, the court suggested, was "proba-
bly in accord with the legislative intent at the time the statute was
75 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969) (in bank).
76 Id. at 197 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West Supp. 1967) (repealed
2000)).
77 Id. at 197-98.
78 Specifically, the Court held that (1) to construe the statute as requiring that
"death be certain" would infringe the woman's constitutional right to life, id. at 199;
(2) to construe the statute as referring "to a possibility of death different from or
greater than the ordinary risk of childbirth" would make the statute "virtually mean-
ingless" because almost any woman facing an unwanted pregnancy could satisfy that
test; and (3) that to "read[ ] it as 'substantially or reasonably' necessary to preserve
the life of the mother" would if anything increase the uncertainty as to the statute's
meaning. Id. at 204.
79 Id. at 204.
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adopted."80 Moreover, this test "would serve to make the statute cer-
tain," because it called for a judgment within the realm of "[m]edical
science" ("the proper method to treat a patient to minimize the risk of
death") rather than one calling for a value judgment "outside medical
competence" ("the circumstances in which the safest treatment
should be rejected and a more dangerous treatment followed in order
to protect an embryo or fetus").81
Nevertheless, the court refused to adopt this construction of the
statute, holding instead that its language was unconstitutionally
vague.82 The court reasoned that "[t]he language of the statute,
'unless the same is necessary to preserve her life,' does not suggest a
relative safety test, and no case interpreting the statute has suggested
that the statute be so construed."83 Moreover, "[n]one of the parties
or numerous amici who have filed briefs in the instant case suggest
that the statute applies a relative safety test."84 As the court memora-
bly put it, "men of 'common' intelligence, indeed of uncommon intel-
ligence, have not guessed at this meaning."85 In other words, until
80 Id. The Court cited no evidence to support this speculation, but offered the
following argument in its defense:
As we have seen, at the time of the adoption of the statute abortion was a
highly dangerous procedure, and under the relative safety test abortion
would be permissible only where childbirth would be even more dangerous.
In light of the test and the then existing medical practice, the question
whether abortion should be limited to protect the embryo or fetus may have
been immaterial because any such interest would be effectuated by limiting
abortions to the rare cases where they were safer than childbirth.
Id. This argument unintentionally highlights an important difference between two
versions of Means's thesis: (1) that the nineteenth-century laws were unconstitutional
because their purpose (protecting maternal life and health) was now disserved by
bans on early abortions; and (2) that the nineteenth-century laws were constitutional,
because their actual meaning was captured by the relative-safety test. The Belous
court's argument for version (2) backfires. The legislature could have written a ban
on abortions "unless an abortion would be safer than childbirth." Had it done so,
abortions in 1850 would still have been rare, but by 1950 would have become quite
common. Instead, and still supposing that the legislature's purpose was solely to pro-
tect maternal life and health, the legislature banned abortions "'unless ... necessary
to preserve her life.'" Id. at 197 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 274). Given how dan-
gerous abortions were in 1850, the legislature might very well have intended by this
language to authorize abortion only if otherwise the mother would probably die-
thereby ensuring that abortions would be limited "to the rare cases where they were
safer than childbirth." Id. at 204.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 205-06.





Cyril Means published his article, it had been universally understood
that the statute did require that, in some circumstances, "the safest
treatment should be rejected and a more dangerous treatment fol-
lowed in order to protect an embryo or fetus." 6 But whereas the dis-
senting justices concluded that the statute's common sense meaning
(an abortion was justified only if necessary to save the mother from
serious danger of dying) had been reasonably clear to persons of aver-
age intelligence for more than a century,87 the Belous majority found
no such consensus, and hence deemed the statute intolerably vague.88
Although the Belous court declined to construe the 1850 statute
as adopting the relative-safety approach, that is exactly how-in dic-
tum-it construed California's 1967 Therapeutic Abortion Act.89 The
1967 statute, influenced by the Model Penal Code, permitted abor-
tions during the first twenty weeks of pregnancy if "' [ t] here is substan-
tial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the
physical or mental health of the mother."' 90 In the teeth of this lan-
guage, the Belous court asserted that
[t]he ... criteria for determining whether an abortion is permissi-
ble is the pregnant woman's physical and mental health.... [T]he
test established is . . . whether the pregnant woman's physical and
mental health will be furthered by abortion or by bearing the child
to term . . . . There is nothing to indicate that in adopting the
Therapeutic Abortion Act the Legislature was asserting an interest
in the embryo.9 1
This dictum proved short lived, and rightly so. The court's ratio-
nale for interpreting the 1850 statute as intended to protect the lives
of women, not fetuses, was that "at the time of the adoption of the
statute abortion was a highly dangerous procedure."9 2 By 1967, how-
ever, as the Belous court pointed out, it was considered "safer for a
woman to have a hospital therapeutic abortion during the first trimes-
86 Id. at 204.
87 Id. at 207-09 (Burke, J., dissenting); id. at 211-12 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
The dissenters did not explicitly make their case in self-defense terms. They simply
argued that the 1850 statute rested on concern for fetal life as well as maternal life,
and accordingly limited abortions to those necessary to save the mother's life. See id.
at 209 (Burke, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 206 (majority opinion).
89 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-25954 (West Supp. 1968) (repealed
1995).
90 Belous, 458 P.2d at 205 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951(c)(1)).
The new California statute was not applicable in Belous because the defendant's con-
viction preceded its enactment. See id. at 197.
91 Id. at 205.
92 Id. at 204.
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ter than to bear a child."93 If the Therapeutic Abortion Act were moti-
vated solely by concern for maternal health, one would therefore have
expected it to authorize all first-trimester abortions. The Belous
court's claim that the Act's restrictive life-or-health exception was
intended to adopt the relative-safety test was, to put it mildly, implausi-
ble-so much so that, three years later, the California Supreme Court
repudiated it. 4 But by then, Belous had already figured prominently
in the litigation that led to the U.S. Supreme Court's important pre-
Roe decision in United States v. Vuitch.95
3. United States v. Vuitch
In 1901, Congress liberalized what had originally been a standard
nineteenth-century abortion statute by authorizing abortion when
"done as necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or health
and under the direction of a competent licensed practitioner of
medicine."96 The legislative history is silent on the reason for the
change or the meaning of the new statute.97 In 1968, as part of the
nationwide litigation campaign against abortion laws that culminated
in Roe, a District of Columbia abortion provider challenged the statute
as unconstitutionally vague.98 Judge Gesell, writing for the district
court, held that the statute was vague for two reasons: it failed to indi-
cate whether it included "mental as well as physical health," and it
failed to specify "what degree of [harm to] mental or physical health
or combination of the two" was required to justify an abortion.99
Echoing Belous, the district court found that "[n]o body of medical
knowledge" supplied an answer to the degree-of-harm conundrum,
93 Id. at 200-01.
94 In People v. Barksdale, 503 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1972) (in bank), the California
Supreme Court struck down the 1967 Therapeutic Abortion Act on vagueness
grounds. The Barksdale Court retracted the Belous dictum, acknowledging that "[i]t
seems more probable ... that the legislative intent was to require some impairment to
health greater or of a different nature than that attendant upon normal pregnancy."
Id. at 264. Accordingly, the Court found the 1967 Act's "gravely impair" language
void for vagueness because it could not "ascertain within the meaning of the statute
either the nature of the diminished health required or that degree of diminution
which stamps it as 'gravely impaired.'" Id.
95 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
96 D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-809 (1901), repealed by Elimination of Outdated Crimes
Amendment Act of 2003, § 15-154. Prior to 1901, the statute allowed abortion only
when necessary to save the woman's life. Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 70 n.5.
97 See Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 71.
98 Id. at 63.
99 United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (D.D.C. 1969).
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and suggested that Belous had identified "other uncertainties" in the
statutory language that "need not be repeated here." 00
The Supreme Court was sharply divided by a technical question
lurking in Vuitch: whether the Court had jurisdiction under the Crimi-
nal Appeals Act' 0 ' to hear a direct appeal from the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia.10 2 Beyond that, the Justices
were also divided on the merits of the district court's vagueness rul-
ing.10 3 When the dust settled, there were two different majorities. In
an opinion by Justice Black, a 5-4 majority held that the Court had
jurisdiction.'0 4 On the merits, Black's opinion for a different 5-2
majority (which included two of the jurisdictional dissenters) held
that the D.C. statute was not unconstitutionally vague. 05
By the time it granted review in Vuitch, the Court was well aware
that multiple challenges to state abortion laws were underway in the
lower courts, and that it would soon be asked to decide whether abor-
tion was a constitutionally protected right in light of Griswold v. Con-
necticut.06 Indeed, the challengers in Vuitch (and their amici) asked
the Court to decide that question. 0 7 The Court declined to do So.10s
Instead, it held the abortion cases on which it had not yet granted
review-including Roe and Doe-for evaluation after Vuitch was
decided. 09 The Court finally granted certiorari in Roe and Doe one
day after Vuitch was decided on April 22, 1971.110
100 Id.
101 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1971) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2006)); see
Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 63-64.
102 Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 64.
103 See, e.g., id. at 73 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that the statute was not
vague on its face because it put everyone on notice of the standard and because "[n]o
one of average intelligence could believe that under this statute abortions not dic-
tated by health considerations are legal").
104 Id. at 67 (majority opinion). ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Douglas, Stew-
art, and White joined the jurisdictional portion of Black's opinion. Id. at 63 n.*. Jus-
tice Harlan, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissented as to
jurisdiction. Id. at 81 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 72 (majority opinion). ChiefJustice Burger and Justices White, Harlan,
and Blackmun joined Black on the merits. Id. at 63 n.*. Justices Douglas and Stewart
filed separate dissents on the merits. Id. at 74 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 96
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall expressed no opinion on the
ments.
106 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
107 DAVIDJ. GARRow, LIBERTY AND SEXuALrYI 476-78 (1994) (describing oral argu-
ment in Vuitch).
108 See Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 72-73.
109 GARRow, supra note 107, at 480.
110 Id. at 491.
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Under these circumstances, it comes as no surprise that Justice
Black's opinion on the merits disposed of the vagueness issue on nar-
row grounds. Black ignored the district court's invitation to discuss
Belous, which he did not even deign to cite.'I Nor did he discuss
alternative interpretations of the D.C. statute.11 2 Instead, taking a
page from the Solicitor General's brief in defense of the statute,11 3
Black endorsed recent rulings by lower federal courts construing it to
allow abortions for mental health reasons1 4:
Certainly this construction accords with the general usage and mod-
ern understanding of the word "health," which includes psychologi-
cal as well as physical well-being. Indeed Webster's Dictionary, in
accord with that common usage, properly defines health as the
"[s]tate of being ... sound in body [or] mind." Viewed in this light,
the term "health" presents no problem of vagueness. Indeed,
whether a particular operation is necessary for a patient's physical
or mental health is a judgment that physicians are obviously called
upon to make routinely whenever surgery is considered.' 15
This argument satisfactorily responds to the district court's objection
that the statute failed to make clear whether it applied to mental
health. A statute that says "health" and means "only physical health"
arguably fails to give doctors fair warning of what conduct is forbid-
den." 6 If the statute says "health" and means "physical or mental
health," this problem disappears.
111 The Court had previously denied certiorari in Belous. California v. Belous, 397
U.S. 915 (1970). Justice Douglas cited Belous in his dissent. Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 76
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
112 One amicus brief in Vuitch explicitly invoked self-defense principles, arguing
that
there is analogy to be found in the usual rule of criminal law which treats as
justifiable homicide, killing done to repel a threat of substantial bodily
injury. Thus, where a pregnancy constitutes a threat to the duration of the
life of a mother by grave impairment of her health, there is a conflict
between her interests in being free of such impairment and the fetus' inter-
est in life.
Brief of Dr. William F. Colliton, Jr., et al. Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 41,
Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (No. 84).
113 See Brief for the United States at 38-39, Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (No. 84).
114 See Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 72 (citing cases construing the statute to permit abor-
tions for mental health reasons).
115 Id. (alteration in original).
116 The Court did not discuss the possibility that the legislature may have intended
to allow abortion only when justified by self-defense principles, understood as limited
to threats of death or serious bodily harm. If that intent had been generally under-
stood by doctors for decades, the statute might not be vague although it would not
include impairment of mental health unless physical harm were also involved.
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But what about the district court's second objection-that the
statute failed to specify what degree of health impairment is required to
justify an abortion? Black's cryptic response came in the last sentence
quoted above, when he asserted that "whether a particular operation
is necessary for a patient's physical or mental health is ajudgment that
physicians are obviously called upon to make routinely whenever sur-
gery is considered.""' 7 The first-cut meaning of this statement is sim-
ply that the statutory standard is not vague because it is the familiar
one doctors routinely use in deciding whether other types of surgery
are necessary for a patient's health.
On reflection, however, that statement has momentous implica-
tions. The Court was surely cognizant that doctors normally make
judgments about whether surgery is necessary solely by assessing its
expected effects on the patient's health. If the health benefits out-
weigh the health risks, the surgery is (as the Court put it) "necessary
fo?' the patient's health-that is, expected to improve the patient's
health. Gone is the statutory reference to "the preservation of' the
patient's health, with its self-defense overtones. In its place is a ruling
that the statute authorizes an abortion under the same standard that
doctors use to authorize, say, a tonsillectomy. That standard focuses
exclusively on what is best for the woman's health, thus giving no
weight at all to the life of the fetus as against the woman's health.",, In
short, Vuitch implicitly construed the D.C. statute as adopting the rela-
tive-safety test.' 19
4. The Relative-Safety Approach as an Interpretation of Roe's Life-
or-Health Exception
In light of Vuitch, the relative-safety approach must be recognized
as a plausible interpretation of Roe's life-or-health exception. Linguis-
tically, it is more than a little awkward to read the phrase "necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother" to mean "necessary to reduce
risks to the life or health of the mother." Yet that is essentially how the
Vuitch Court read the equivalent language of the D.C. statute. Techni-
117 Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 72.
118 The thrust of the Solicitor General's brief in Vuitch was that the D.C. statute
was intended to protect fetuses, but only by prohibiting abortions not based on legiti-
mate health reasons. See Brief for the United States, supra note 113, at 28-29.
119 Particularly in light of the fact that Justice White joined Black's opinion, one
could argue that the Vuitch Court left open the possibility that D.C. doctors-as a
matter of medical practice and custom-used more restrictive criteria to decide
whether abortions were "necessary" than whether other surgeries were "necessary." It
matters not, because by 1971 whatever limits medical custom might once have
imposed on therapeutic abortions were fading fast.
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cally, Vuitch's tacit construction, coming as it did in the context of a
vagueness challenge to a statute that applied to abortions before as
well as after viability, had no direct bearing on the meaning of Roe's
postviability life-or-health exception. Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun
must have realized that, after Vuitch, the language in which he framed
the life-or-health exception could plausibly be interpreted in relative-
safety terms-and therefore that the exception itself was ambiguous.
Moreover, the relative-safety approach arguably squares with Roe's
premises. The argument is that maternal health should trump viable
fetal life because: (1) women are Fourteenth Amendment persons,
and fetuses are not; and (2) a woman has an even more fundamental
interest in choosing to protect her health than she does in deciding
whether or not to accept the inherent burdens of pregnancy and
motherhood. Prior to viability, the state must permit the woman to
choose whether to bear those burdens. After viability, the state's inter-
est in fetal life is strong enough to justify requiring the woman to bear
them; accordingly, states may prohibit "elective" abortions based on
considerations other than the woman's health. But risks to health
stand on a different footing, because they implicate both the woman's
autonomy and her bodily integrity.120 If the pregnancy proves to
involve material risks to the woman's life or health that could be
avoided by a postviability abortion, her fundamental interest in her
own good health should trump the state's interest in fetal life. 121
120 See Richard M. Cooper, Response, 121 HARv. L. REV. F. 31, 33 n.7 (2008)
(responding to Volokh, supra note 7) ("Deciding whether to abort or to accept a risk
to maternal life or health . . . is a different type of private decision from deciding
whether to abort in the absence of such a risk because (1) it involves the woman's
interest in deciding whether to risk her own health or life, and (2) the state's interest,
although strong enough post-viability to override the woman's choice to abort in the
absence of risk to herself, simply is not strong enough to defeat the woman's interest
in deciding whether to risk her own life or health.").
121 It might be objected that the relative-safety test completely nullifies the state's
power to protect viable fetal life, because states could invoke maternal health to justify
banning all abortions that have incrementally greater health risks than pregnancy for
particular women. The objection fails because its premise is almost certainly wrong:
the Court would presumably hold that women are constitutionally entitled to make an
informed choice in favor of bearing some increased health risks in order to avoid the
burdens of pregnancy and childrearing. The Court might, however, permit states to
ban abortions that are dangerously riskier than pregnancy on maternal-health grounds.
If this analysis is correct, under the relative-safety test, the state's interest in viable fetal
life allows it to ban the following category of postviability abortions that could not be
banned on maternal-health grounds: abortions whose risks equal or exceed those of preg-
nancy and childbirth, but are not so great as to make them dangerous for the mother.
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C. The Life-or-Health Exception as an Instance of Studied Ambiguity
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe was clearly influenced in some
respects by Means's revisionist history, which he repeatedly cited.12 2
But he made no reference to Means's claims about the meaning of
life-only and life-or-health exceptions. Nor did he refer to Vuitch's
construction of the D.C. statute's life-or-health exception. Instead,
Blackmun simply presented Roe's life-or-health exception, without
explanation, as the rule to which postviability state abortion bans must
conform.12s He said nothing one way or the other about whether the
self-defense interpretation or the relative-safety interpretation was
intended. Under these circumstances, the only reasonable inference
is that the Roe Court left that question for another day.
Some might argue, to the contrary, that Justice Blackmun may
have thought it too obvious to warrant explanation that a life-or-
health exception applies whenever an abortion is "necessary" to bene-
fit the woman's physical or mental health. After all, the Court in
Vuitch had tacitly adopted the relative-safety interpretation of the D.C.
life-or-health exception without even mentioning the self-defense
interpretation. Why should we assume, then, that Blackmun thought
Roe's life-or-health exception was ambiguous as between these two
meanings?
This argument is fallacious. To begin with, the Vuitch Court did
not purport to have discovered a generally understood meaning for
the words "necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or
health." Rather, in the absence of legislative history, case law, or other
evidence that the D.C. statute's language had a generally understood
meaning, the Court agreed with the Solicitor General's interpretation
of the D.C. statute.124
Beyond that, had Justice Blackmun thought Vuitch established
the settled and unambiguous meaning of the words "necessary for the
preservation of the mother's life or health," standard opinion-writing
practice would have been to add a sentence along the following lines
122 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132-33, 134 (1973) (citing Means, The Law
of New York, supra note 70, at 411-12); id. at 136, 139 (citing Means, Abortional Freedom,
supra note 70, at 375-76).
123 Id. at 183.
124 Compare Brief for the United States, supra note 113, at 39 (arguing that the
statute required doctors to make "a judgment that physicians are called upon to make
almost every time surgery is contemplated"-namely, whether a "surgical procedure is
necessary to preserve the health of an individual"), with United States v. Vuitch, 402
U.S. 62, 72 (1971) ("[W]hether a particular operation is necessary for a patient's
physical or mental health is a judgment that physicians are obviously called upon to
make routinely whenever surgery is considered.").
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to his opinion in Roe "An abortion may be deemed necessary to pre-
serve the mother's life or health if pregnancy is believed to pose
greater risks to her physical or mental health than an abortion would.
Cf United States v. Vuitch." Instead, Blackmun offered no explanation
of the life-or-health exception and made no mention of Vuitch in the
relevant portions of his opinion.125
Nor is it credible that Blackmun was unaware of the self-defense
interpretation-or unaware of its standing as the traditional under-
standing of the life-of-the-mother exceptions contained in most state
abortion laws. Even Cyril Means acknowledged that his relative-safety
interpretation of the nineteenth-century statutes ran counter to the
conventional wisdom.12 6 Indeed, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe
describes several exceptions to prohibitions on abortion that can only
be interpreted along self-defense lines. For example, consider the
English Abortion Act of 1967,127 which, as Blackmun explained, per-
mitted a doctor to perform an abortion when two other doctors con-
cur "'that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the
life of the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental
health of the pregnant woman . . . greater than if the pregnancy were
terminated,"'" 28 or "without the concurrence of others, to terminate a
pregnancy where he is of the good-faith opinion that the abortion 'is
immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent
injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman.'"'12 9
The first of these exceptions explicitly adopts the relative-safety
approach-and the second explicitly adopts the self-defense
approach. The language Blackmun used in Roe, of course, more
closely resembles the second exception.
Finally, there is the fact that no later opinion of the Court touch-
ing on the meaning of Roe's life-or-health exception-including two
in which Justice Blackmun nudged the law in the direction of the rela-
tive-safety approach-has ever claimed that Roe itself adopted that test,
or rejected the self-defense approach. It is simply incredible that if a
125 Blackmun did cite Vuitch as support for Roe's holding that fetuses are not Four-
teenth Amendment persons, "for we there would not have indulged in statutory inter-
pretation favorable to abortion in specified circumstances if the necessary
consequence was the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protec-
tion." Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
126 Means, The Law of New York, supra note 70, at 509-11.
127 Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87 (Eng.).
128 Roe, 410 U.S. at 137 (quoting Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § 1(1) (Eng.)).
129 Id. at 138 (quoting Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § 1(4) (Eng.)).
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colorable argument to that effect could have been made, Blackmun
would have passed over it in silence.o30
In short, Roe does not decide between the two competing inter-
pretations that best fit the life-or-health exception's ambiguous lan-
guage. Clearly, in the wake of Belous and Vuitch, Blackmun's failure to
endorse either the self-defense or relative-safety approaches was no
oversight, but a deliberate choice. What explains this crucial omission
from an opinion that, in its author's view, appropriately contained
more dicta than most?s13
It seems likely that Justice Blackmun left the scope of the life-or-
health exception unresolved either because the seven Justices in the
majority would have had difficulty reaching agreement on this issue,
or because they wanted to gauge public reaction to Roe before com-
mitting themselves. Although the Justices by all accounts underesti-
mated the extent of the backlash Roe generated, they certainly
130 Had Justice Blackmun attempted to construct such an argument, he might
have invoked Roe's recognition that the state also has a compelling interest in mater-
nal health. See id. at 163 ("With respect to the State's important and legitimate inter-
est in the health of the mother, the 'compelling' point, in the light of present medical
knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the
now-established medical fact ... that until the end of the first trimester mortality in
abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth."). The state's compelling
interest in maternal health, the argument goes, counterbalances its compelling inter-
est in protecting viable fetal life whenever pregnancy poses greater health risks than
abortion. Under those circumstances, the woman's privacy or autonomy right to
choose whether or not to terminate her pregnancy should prevail.
Assuming it survives the rejection of Roe's trimester framework in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-76 (1992) (joint
opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,JJ.), this argument depends on the dubi-
ous premise that when two compelling state interests conflict, they should be deemed
to be in equipoise, so that a tie-breaker is needed. What seems called for is not equi-
poise, but rather an inquiry into the extent to which these two compelling state inter-
ests are at stake. A postviability ban that is subject to the self-defense version of the
life-or-health exception exposes women to substantial health risks, but not to highly
dangerous ones, and hence still affords considerable protection to the interest in
maternal health. By contrast, the relative-safety version of the life-or-health exception
severely undermines the protection of viable fetal life, because in most unwanted
pregnancies a doctor can assert in good faith that a postviability abortion is safer for
the mother's overall health (physical and mental) than pregnancy. Indeed, if a future
technological breakthrough were to make even postviability abortions as safe as first-
trimester abortions are now, the relative-safety test would render state bans on
postviability abortions nugatory.
131 Justice Blackmun's cover memo to his colleagues, accompanying his revised
draft opinion after reargument in Roe, noted that "'[i]n its present form it contains
dictum, but I suspect that in this area some dictum is indicated and not to be
avoided."' GARRow, supra note 107, at 580 (quoting Memorandum from Justice
Harry A. Blackmun to the Conference (Nov. 21, 1972)).
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anticipated that the decision would be controversial.I3 2 Roe's only con-
cession to the pro-life standpoint was its acknowledgement that the
state has a sufficiently compelling interest in viable fetal life to pro-
hibit abortions. If the Roe Court had simultaneously announced that
the mandatory life-or-health exception applied whenever a doctor
believed in good faith that an abortion would involve fewer maternal
health risks than pregnancy and childbirth, it would have been evi-
dent to everyone that the exception had largely swallowed the conces-
sion. Instead, by electing not to explain the life-or-health exception,
the Roe Court was able to keep its options open while credibly claim-
ing, as Justice Blackmun wrote in Doe, that "a pregnant woman does
not have an absolute constitutional right to an abortion on her
demand."1 3 3
Whether or not these speculations are correct, the key point for
descriptive legal analysis is simply this: Roe's ambiguous formulation of
the life-or-health exception is consistent with either the self-defense
interpretation or the relative-safety interpretation.13 4 As we'll see
next, Roe's less well-known companion case, Doe v. Bolton, did not set-
tle this question either.
D. The Myth of Doe v. Bolton
Many pro-life commentators have suggested a different explana-
tion for Roe's silence on the meaning of the life-or-health exception:
that Justice Blackmun stealthily used the Court's opinion in Doe v.
Bolton to endorse a virtually limitless right to postviability abortions for
"health" reasons. As Mary Ann Glendon puts it, "when Roe is read
with Doe, third-trimester restrictions are effectively ruled out as well-
for Roe's dictum that such restrictions might be permissible if they did
not interfere with the mother's health was negated by Doe's definition
132 Id. at 587 (discussing Justice Blackmun's suggestion that issuance of the opin-
ions in Roe and Doe "be accompanied by an unprecedented eight-page explanatory
statement").
133 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973).
134 In the first years after Roe, some commentators noted that the scope of the life-
or-health exception was uncertain. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1972 Tern, 87 HARv. L.
REV. 55, 79 n.24 (1973) ("The practical effect of this part of the decision is particu-
larly unclear."). Others seemed, if anything, to favor the self-defense interpretation.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 cmt. at 444 (Official Draft and Revised Com-
ments 1980) ("Only in the final trimester of pregnancy, after viability of the fetus, is
abortion still subject to the essentially ethical restrictions long enforced by the crimi-
nal law and retained in qualified form under Section 230.3.").
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of 'health' as 'well-being."" 3 5 I will argue that this argument is mis-
taken. Not until Justice Blackmun's later decisions in Colautti3 6 and
Thornburgh13 7 did he publicly espouse an expansive version of the life-
or-health exception; and when he did, it was the relative-safety inter-
pretation. Doe v. Bolton does not suggest-even in dictum-that
"health" means "well-being" for purposes of the life-or-health
exception.
Patterned on the Model Penal Code, the Georgia statute at issue
in Doe criminalized abortions unless, in a doctor's "'best clinical judg-
ment ... an abortion is necessary"' (1) to preserve the woman's life or
health, (2) to avoid the birth of a gravely defective fetus, or (3)
because the pregnancy resulted from rape.' 38 Relying on Griswold v.
Connecticut, a three-judge district court held the statute unconstitu-
tional insofar as it limited abortions to these three situations.13 9 The
lower court then upheld the redacted statute, which now unqualifiedly
authorized abortions at any stage of pregnancy whenever "necessary"
in a physician's "best clinical judgment."140
Not content with this victory, the appellants claimed that the
redacted statute was unconstitutionally vague because "the word 'nec-
135 Mary Ann Glendon, The Women of Roe v. Wade, 134 FIRST THINGS 19, 20
(2003); see also, e.g., DELLAPENNA, supra note 64, at 695 ("Blackmun's definition of a
women's [sic] 'health' in Doe as encompassing anything affecting her 'well-being' vir-
tually precluded any possible regulation of abortion during the entire months of
pregnancy."); RAMESH PONNURU, THE PARTY OF DEATH 10 (2006) ("Roe required that
any ban on late-term abortion include an exception allowing abortion to protect a
woman's health; Doe defined that exception so broadly that it swallowed up any possi-
bility of a ban."). Pro-life legislators have proceeded on this same understanding. See
HENRY J. HYDE, CATCH THE BURNING FLAc 138 (2008) ("Roe v. Wade allows abortions
up to the moment of birth. The unborn have been summarily stripped of any legal
protection since 1973."); id. at 154 ("[A]ny 'health' exceptions are so broadly con-
strued by the courts as to make a ban meaningless."); see also STAFF OF S. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 9
7
TH CONG., REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL 5 (Comm. Print 1981)
("The exception for maternal health has been so broad in practice as to swallow the
[restrictive standard for the third trimester]."). For an early evaluation along the
same lines by a prominent pro-choice critic of Roe, see John Hart Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 921 & n.19 (1973).
136 See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400-01 (1979).
137 See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
768-69 (1986), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
138 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 183 (1973) (alteration in original) (quoting GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-1202(a) (rev. 1971)). The statute omitted the Model Penal Code's
specific exception for incest. Georgia assured the Doe Court, however, that the stat-
ute's "reference to 'rape' was intended to include incest." Id. at 183 n.5.
139 Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
140 Doe, 410 U.S. at 191.
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essary' does not warn the physician of what conduct is proscribed."' 4 '
Unsurprisingly, Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court ruled that
this vagueness challenge was meritless in light of Vuitch.14 2 The lower
court had construed the redacted statute to allow the doctor, in deter-
mining whether an abortion was necessary, to exercise "his profes-
sional, that is, his 'best clinical,' judgment in light of all the attendant
circumstances." 43 This, the Doe Court reasoned, was the kind of all-
things-considered judgment about whether an operation is "neces-
sary" that Vuitch had said doctors "routinely" are expected to make.1 44
Having thus rejected the vagueness challenge, the Doe Court pro-
ceeded to emphasize its agreement with the lower court's interpreta-
tion of the redacted statute, under which a doctor's "medical
judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emo-
tional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the
well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health."' 45
Glendon and others view this language as effectively defining mater-
nal health in all-inclusive terms for purposes of both elective abortions and
postviability abortions. 4 6 What else, after all, could explain why the Doe
Court went out of its way to endorse this apparent equation of health
with overall well-being?
There is a simple answer: because otherwise the redacted statute
would have been unconstitutional under the standard for elective,
previability abortions announced in Roe. It is often forgotten nowa-
days that Roe phrased the right to elective abortion in iatrocentric
terms: "the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is
free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical
judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated."' 47  Roe
stressed that these "medical judgments" should take into account the
full range of harms that can befall women who are denied abortions:
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early preg-
nancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may
force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological
harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed
by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associ-
ated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing
a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise,
141 Id.
142 Id. at 191-92.
143 Id. at 191.
144 Id. at 192.
145 Id.
146 Glendon, supra note 135, at 20.
147 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (emphasis added).
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to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficul-
ties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will
consider in consultation.1
4 8
Doe's ballyhooed list of "factors" is nothing more than a short-
hand version of the foregoing passage from Roe- the Georgia statute is
constitutional, but only because it permits the doctor's "medical judg-
ment" about whether an elective abortion is "necessary" to be based
on "all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the
woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient." 4 9 Doe thus
applies and reiterates Roe's mandate that, in the context of elective
abortions, doctors should consider everything about the pregnant
woman's situation that affects her "well-being." 5 0 This is not a consti-
tutional definition of "health": it is an affirmation that previability
abortions must be permitted even if they involve concerns about the
woman's "well-being," rather than her health.
Granted, Roe and Doe assert that in assessing pregnancy's impact
on a woman's well-being, a doctor is still making a "medical judg-
ment," as evidenced by the fact that the factors affecting her well-
being "may relate to health."' 5 ' We can fairly infer that the Doe Court
believed that elective abortions (like other elective surgeries) could
sometimes increase a woman's well-being in ways that would promote
her health.'52 This inference, however, does not mean that the Court
148 Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
149 Doe, 410 U.S. at 192. Indeed, the Doe Court probably thought it was limiting
the right to an elective abortion by permitting the state to require that the attending
doctor make a good-faith professional judgment that abortion is in the woman's best
interest. The three-judge district court in Doe had opined that "although the state
may not unduly limit the reasons for which a woman seeks an abortion, it may legiti-
mately require that the decision to terminate her pregnancy be one reached only
upon consideration of more factors than the desires of the woman and her ability to
find a willing physician." Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (N.D. Ga. 1970). It
argued that the Georgia statute reflected a reasonable decision to "treat the problem
as a medical one" by requiring doctors to "to judge concurrently the basis as well as
the risk inherent in such a decision." Id.
150 That Doe was so understood is confirmed by Utah's previability abortion stat-
ute, which, as the Court noted in H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), "expressly
incorporates the factors we identified in Doe v. Bolton, as pertinent to exercise of a
physician's best medical judgment in making an abortion decision." Id. at 404 (cita-
tion omitted).
151 Doe, 410 U.S. at 192; see Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
152 In this connection, it is noteworthy that the redacted Georgia statute called
upon doctors to make their "'best clinicaljudgment[s]'" as to whether "'an abortion is
necessary."' Doe, 410 U.S. at 183 (emphasis added) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-
1202(a) (rev. 1971)).
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equated "health" and "well-being" in the elective-abortion context.'5 3
And even if it did, that would tell us absolutely nothing about what
"health" means when the question is whether-in the face of a state's
assertion of its power to ban postviability abortions for the purpose of
protecting fetal life-an abortion is "necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."15 4
On the contrary, Roe's critical distinction between previability and
postviability regimes presupposes that "health," as used in the
postviability exception, has a narrower meaning than "overall well-
being." The most salient (but as we shall see not the only) alternative
is the "modern understanding" endorsed in Vuitch: unimpaired
soundness of body and mind.'5 5 Before viability, states may not pro-
tect fetal life by prohibiting abortions; by the same token, abortion
doctors may base their "medical judgments" exclusively on the
woman's interests-that is, her well-being (including but not limited
to her health). After viability, Roe permits states to protect fetal life,
even at the expense of maternal well-being, unless the mother's life or
health is endangered. That holding would be absurdly self-contradic-
tory if "health" meant "well-being. "156
E. The Mental-Health Problem
Even accepting my revisionist interpretation of Doe, however, isn't
Roe's life-or-health exception inconsistent with self-defense princi-
153 In this connection, consider again the language in which Vuitch approved the
lower court's conclusion that the D.C. statute authorized abortions for mental health
reasons: "Certainly this construction accords with the general usage and modern
understanding of the word 'health,' which includes psychological as well as physical
well-being. Indeed Webster's Dictionary, in accord with that common usage, properly
defines health as the '[s]tate of being .. . sound in body [or] mind.'" United States v.
Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971) (alterations in original)). The Vuitch Court's reference
to "psychological as well as physical well-being" clearly was not intended to suggest
that psychological and physical well-being are the same as overall well-being (meaning
happiness, utility, and so forth). On the contrary, Vuitch uses "well-being" to mean
well-working, that is why the Court treats well-being of body and mind as equivalent to
being "sound in" body and mind.
154 Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
155 Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 72.
156 In theory, one can imagine a rule restricting postviability abortions by requir-
ing that continued pregnancy be thought to pose a serious threat to the woman's well-
being. For example, if pregnancy meant the woman were likely to lose her well-pay-
ing job, she would be entitled to a postviability abortion. By contrast, if there were
only a remote possibility she would lose her job, or if her family's income would be
adequate even without it, she would not be entitled to a postviability abortion. So far




ples-and hopelessly expansive in practice-because it encompasses
mental health? Subject to qualifications I discuss below, I will assume
that the premise of this objection is correct: as used, in the exception,
"health" includes mental health, understood as soundness of mind.
The problem then is that, as usually stated, the right to use deadly
force in self-defense requires that one be threatened with death or
serious bodily harm.157  Nevertheless, it is exceedingly difficult to
defend a conception of self-defense that categorically bars persons
from defending themselves against threats of serious mental injury.
Imagine, for example, that someone is attempting to shoot you with a
tiny drug-laden dart that poses no risk of serious physical injury, but
will make you irreversibly schizophrenic or psychotic. There would be
something seriously amiss with a conception of self-defense that pro-
hibited you from using deadly force to defend yourself from an attack
of this dangerousness. Consistent with that intuition, self-defense law
has long allowed persons who are imminently threatened with rape to
use deadly force against their attackers-whether or not they expect
to suffer serious physical injuries-because of the grave emotional
and dignitary injuries rape typically inflicts.15 8 And in any event, seri-
ous mental illnesses often do involve a serious "physical" or "bodily"
injury, namely, an injury to (or dysfunction of) the brain.'5 9  If
indeed Roe's life-or-health exception encompasses serious threats to
the mother's mental health, then that is not inconsistent with the self-
defense interpretation.
Nor is the floodgates objection persuasive. Obviously the self-
defense approach will not yield a broader mental-health exception
157 See 0. Carter Snead, Unenumerated Rights and the Limits of Analogy: A Critique of
the Right to Medical Self-Defense, 121 HARv. L. REv. F. 1, 3 (2007) (arguing that "[t]he
right to post-viability abortion is not rooted in self-defense principles," because it
encompasses "[t]hreats to mental health," which "are never sufficient to justify lethal
self-defense").
158 Cf Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 250 (1992) (arguing that
contemporary rape laws are written for the purpose of protecting "the physical, emo-
tional, and dignitary interests of the woman" (emphasis added)). See generally Arlette
Grabczynska & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, justifying Killing in Self-Defense, 99 J. CRim. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 235, 251 (2009) (book review) (discussing how author Leverick
believes the use of self-defense should be extended beyond physical cases because
"rape is a denial of humanity"); Amy J. Sepinwall, Defense of Others and Defenseless
"Others, " 17 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 327, 381 (2005) (contemplating the limits of "the
right to use deadly force to safeguard one's dignity").
159 See generally Nancy C. Andreasen, Linking Mind and Brain in the Study of Mental
Illnesses: A Project for a Scientific Psychopathology, 275 SCIENCE 1586, 1586 (1997) (discuss-
ing the relationship between mind and body, in which "aberrations of mental illnesses
reflect abnormalities in the brain/mind's interaction with its surrounding world").
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than the relative-safety approach. The real objection, therefore, must
be that the mental-health exception will cause the self-defense
approach to expand so widely that it will in practice be indistinguish-
able from the relative-safety approach. If that is true, the argument
goes, why notjust adopt the relative-safety approach and be done with
it? But there is no convincing reason to accept this alleged equiva-
lence.160 On self-defense principles, only a threat of severe mental ill-
ness would suffice to trigger the life-or-health exception.16' An
unscrupulous psychologist or psychiatrist can certify with impunity
that pregnant women are anxious, nervous, or depressed. That would
be far less likely to be true, however, if the required diagnosis involved
severe depression, schizophrenia, psychosis, or other disabling mental
illness. Abuses would undoubtedly still occur, but at least there would
be solid grounds on which charges of abuse could be predicated. And
the message sent by state laws that limited postviability abortions to
pregnancies presenting a substantial risk of death or severe impair-
ment of physical or mental health would be consistent with self-
defense principles, not a mere pretext for postviability abortion on
demand.
As for the status and scope of the mental-health component of
Roe's life-or-health exception, it too is unsettled in important respects.
Neither Roe nor Doe holds that postviability abortions must be permit-
160 This is not to deny that it would be trickier to place workable limits on the
mental-health branch of a self-defense exception than the physical-health branch.
The same could be said, however, of the relative-safety test. Doctors'judgments about
whether the physical health risks of abortion are smaller than those of pregnancy are
less open-ended and manipulable than their judgments about whether the combined
physical and mental health risks of abortion are smaller than those of pregnancy.
161 Exhibit A for the proposition that mental-health exceptions will lead to ram-
pant abuses is California's experience with the 1967 Therapeutic Abortion Act, which
defined the requisite injury to mental health as "mental illness to the extent that the
woman is dangerous to herself or to the person or property of others or is in need of
supervision or restraint." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25954 (West Supp. 1968)
(repealed 1995). As the California Supreme Court noted in Barksdale, this standard
"appears to be, with only minor modifications, a statement of the former standard for
involuntary commitment to a mental institution." People v. Barksdale, 503 P.2d 257,
264 (Cal. 1972) (in bank). Yet in 1970, more than 98% of all abortions in California
(more than 60,000 in total) were approved on mental health grounds. Id. at 265.
This prompted the California Supreme Court to deadpan that "[s]erious doubt must
exist that such a considerable number of pregnant women could have been commit-
ted to a mental institution." Id. While this example is undoubtedly worrisome, the
California statute did not take the approach I have tentatively suggested (restricting
the exception to serious risks of severe, disabling mental illness); instead, by borrow-
ing civil commitment standards, it invited unscrupulous doctors to make nonfalsifi-
able predictions that their patients were potentially suicidal.
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ted on mental-health grounds. In light of Vuitch's conclusion that
"health" includes mental health as a matter of "general usage and
modern understanding," 162 however, it seems clear that Roe's unde-
fined reference to the "health of the mother" after viability should
also be read to include mental health.163 In Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, however, the Supreme Court upheld
a medical emergency exception that was limited to "'avert[ing] ...
death or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and
irreversible impairment of a major bodily function."' 6 4 Because the medi-
cal conditions that were at issue in the Casey litigation involved only
physical health, the plurality had no occasion to address (and said
nothing about) whether this statutory language excluded some or all
risks to mental health.165
Responding to Casey, the Ohio legislature banned postviability
abortions unless a doctor determined "in good faith and in the exer-
cise of reasonable medical judgment, that the abortion is necessary to
prevent the death of the pregnant woman or a serious risk of the sub-
stantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the
pregnant woman."166 In Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voi-
novich,167 a divided Sixth Circuit held that this prohibition was uncon-
stitutional because it contained no "mental health" exception.168 The
162 United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971).
163 Similarly, in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), the Court recognized (albeit in a
nonconstitutional setting) that whether an abortion is "medically necessary" turns on
the pregnancy's expected impact on the woman's physical and mental health. See id.
at 442 n.3; see alo id. at 450 n.* (Brennan,J., dissenting) (arguing for an even broader
conception of health equivalent to well-being).
164 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (emphasis
added) (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (1990)).
165 Interestingly, the Third Circuit's opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), stated that "[t]he essence of the
definition ... is that it allows a woman and her doctors to forego many of the Act's
requirements when there is a medical emergency to the woman's physical health." Id.
at 701 (emphasis added); see also id. at 702 ("Physically threatening emergencies are
covered . . . ."). This dictum seemingly implies that risks that solely concern mental
health fall outside the medical-emergency provision, while leaving it unclear whether
(and at what point) mental-health risks might qualify because of their expected
effects on the functioning of the woman's brain.
166 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17(A) (1) (LexisNexis 2006).
167 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997).
168 Id. at 207-10. In dissent, Judge Boggs argued that the statutory exception
should be construed to include threats of severe mental harm, because "[i]t is
counterintuitive to say that sufficiently severe mental harm is not an impairment of a
major bodily function; if anything, it could be seen as an impairment of the most
significant bodily function." Id. at 217 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
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Sixth Circuit reasoned "Doe and Vuitch . .. strongly suggest that a State
must provide a maternal health exception to an abortion ban that
encompasses situations where a woman would suffer severe mental or
emotional harm if she were unable to obtain an abortion."169 It "rec-
ognize [d] the problems associated with a mental health exception,"
but viewed them as manageable if the exception was limited to "severe
irreversible risks of mental and emotional harm."1 70
The Supreme Court denied certiorari, over a dissent by Justice
Thomas in which ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined.17 1
The dissenters argued that Doe was not controlling, and that whether
state postviability bans were required to include explicit mental health
exceptions was an important and unresolved question the Court
should address.17 2 The question has remained in this somewhat
unsettled posture ever since. That said, the exception for "severe"
mental and emotional harm crafted by the Sixth Circuit is arguably
consistent with self-defense principles.' 7 3 Whether that exception is
sufficiently limited to avoid the floodgates problem that the Sixth Cir-
cuit acknowledged is a question I leave for another day.' 7 4
F. Is the Self-Defense Approach Unconstitutionally Vague?
Before turning to the post-Roe adventures of the life-or-health
exception in the Supreme Court, it is necessary to address the most
radical objection to the self-defense approach: that it is unconstitu-
tionally vague. This objection could mean two different things: (1) a
statute that reads "necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother" is unconstitutional if given a self-defense interpretation,
because the statute's language does not give fair warning of this mean-
ing; or (2) a statute that reads "necessary to avoid a threat to the
mother's life or health that justifies her use of deadly force in self-
defense," or otherwise unambiguously adopts the self-defense
approach, is unconstitutionally vague because self-defense principles fail to
169 Id. at 209.
170 Id.
171 Voinovich v. Women's Med. Profl Corp., 523 U.S. 1036, 1037-40 (1998)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
172 Id.
173 For an argument that a mental health exception for postviability abortions is
ill-advised, see Brian D. Wassom, Comment, The Exception that Swallowed the Rule?
Women's Medical Professional Corporation v. Voinovich and the Mental Health Excep-
tion to Post-Viability Abortion Bans, 49 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 799, 837-66 (1999).
174 The Sixth Circuit's inclusion of "severe irreversible risks of . .. emotional harm"
may be especially problematic. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 209 (second emphasis
added).
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give doctors fair warning of what the law requires. 175 As I will now show,
Vuitch arguably lends some support to the first objection, but not the
second; and only the second objection poses an insuperable obstacle
to the self-defense approach.
Although the Vuitch Court did not reiterate the point in discuss-
ing the vagueness issue, it had already invoked (in connection with a
different issue) the canon that "statutes should be construed when-
ever possible so as to uphold their constitutionality." 7 6 This canon
probably played a role in the Court's decision to construe the statute
in accord with the relative-safety approach. By interpreting the life-or-
health exception so that it called for nothing more than a judgment
about whether abortion was better for the woman's health than preg-
nancy, the Vuitch Court was able to make a slam-dunk case that the
statute was not vague.
But suppose that this saving construction had not been availa-
ble-for example, because the lower courts had authoritatively con-
strued the statute to require a grave threat to the mother's life or
health. Then doctors could argue, with some plausibility, that the stat-
ute's language did not give them fair warning of its restrictiveness,
because they could reasonably have believed the statute adopted the
relative-safety approach. Even under these circumstances, there is a
strong counterargument. If the statute had long been generally
understood to employ the self-defense approach, doctors could rea-
sonably be expected to know that abortions were not justifiable unless
the woman's life or health was in serious danger. In the end, it makes
little difference which argument prevails, because the thrust of this
vagueness challenge is simply that the statute is ambiguous. If there is
intolerable ambiguity, it can readily be cured by clearer drafting.
The second objection, on the other hand, makes the more radi-
cal claim that the self-defense approach is inherently vague. According
to this objection, even a statute that unambiguously adopts the self-
defense approach nonetheless fails to give doctors fair warning of
what it requires. If Vuitch means that even an explicit self-defense
exception would be unconstitutionally vague, the self-defense
approach is obviously untenable as an interpretation of the constitu-
tional life-or-health exception. It cannot be that the Constitution, as
175 An alternative self-defense statute would provide that "to protect the life of the
fetus, no abortion shall be performed unless necessary to save the mother's life, or
prevent serious and permanent injury to her health."
176 United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 69-70 (1971) (discussing whether the
D.C. statute assigned the burden of persuasion to the defendant once the prosecution
proved the fact of abortion).
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interpreted by the Supreme Court, authorizes states to adopt uncon-
stitutionally vague prohibitions on postviability abortions.
This question deserves a more complete analysis than the brief
response I can offer here.' 77 That said, so far as I know, it has never
been seriously contended that the law of self-defense-in either its
common-law or statutory versions-is unconstitutionally vague. Yet
individuals risk prison time whenever they use deadly force in the face
of what they genuinely believe to be an imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury.178 If ajury determines that an individual's belief
was unreasonable, that the perceived risk of serious injury was too
small to qualify as dangerous, that the perceived danger was not
imminent, or that it involved only minor bodily injury, the plea of
self-defense will fail, and criminal and civil liability will attach.179
Moreover, individuals must frequently make immediate decisions about
whether and by what means to defend themselves under these some-
what fuzzy standards. Doctors, by contrast, normally have plenty of
time to evaluate whether the health risks associated with a particular
woman's pregnancy rise to the level that would justify an abortion on
self-defense grounds.
Second, even accepting for argument's sake that some statutory
incarnations of the self-defense approach may be unconstitutionally
vague, surely more detailed statutory drafting could cure any vague-
ness problem. If a court were ever to strike down a state's general self-
defense statute on vagueness grounds, it is unthinkable that the rem-
edy would be either (1) that self-defense was eliminated or (2) that
persons now enjoyed a right to use deadly force against one another
whenever they believed in good faith that this would make them safer.
Instead, the court would presumably explain how the legislature could
more clearly spell outjust what persons must do to justify their use of
deadly force. It should be equally feasible, if the Constitution requires
it, to craft a self-defense life-or-health exception that clearly spells out
the criteria doctors are to apply in evaluating women's requests for
postviability abortions.
In short, there is no good reason to think that the self-defense
version of a life-or-health exception is inherently void for vague-
ness.'80 Vuitch is not Belous.
177 The argument I make here draws on the analysis in Jane Lang McGrew, Com-
ment, To Be or Not to Be: The Constitutional Question of the California Abortion Law, 118 U.
PA. L. REv. 643, 647-49 (1970).
178 6 Am. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 52 (2008) [hereinafter Assault and Battery].
179 Id.
180 Of course, a self-defense exception may not provide as much guidance to doc-
tors about what conduct is forbidden as a relative-safety exception would. But the
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II. THE RISE OF THE REiATIVE-SAFETY APPROACH
We have seen that Roe and Doe leave open the fundamental
choice between the self-defense and the relative-safety interpretations.
The stakes in choosing between these two rationales for the life-or-
health exception are very high. Consider the most important doctri-
nal issues raised by the exception: what counts as a risk to the
mother's life or health? To trigger the exception, how likely must it
be that continued pregnancy will lead to impairment of the mother's
health, and how serious must that potential impairment be? Does
Doe's "appropriate medical judgment" refer to the good-faith judg-
ment of the woman's doctor, to an objective reasonableness standard,
or to some combination of both? On self-defense principles, only
risks of death or serious bodily harm count, there must be a substan-
tial risk of serious health impairment,18 1 and the doctor's evaluation
must be objectively reasonable. On the relative-safety rationale, all
non-negligible health risks count, an abortion is justified whenever
the expected health risks of pregnancy exceed those of abortion, and
void-for-vagueness test obviously does not require legislatures to choose the substan-
tive content of criminal law based on which lines are clearest.
181 The question of how likely the threatened harm must be to justify the use of
deadly force is not one to which self-defense law offers a well-defined answer. Never-
theless, the principle of proportionality supplies some guidance. The idea of propor-
tionality is built into the rule that one may not use deadly force unless threatened
with deadly force or serious bodily harm. Assault and Battery, supra note 178, § 52. A
person who uses deadly force to repel an attack that was expected at most to inflict a
broken finger would not be acting in self-defense, because he or she would be using
force disproportionate to the threatened harm. Proportionality should also have a
role to play in defining what constitutes a danger of death or serious bodily harm.
Proportionality does not require equality: if you reasonably believe there is a ten per-
cent chance you will be killed unless you use your shotgun at close range, you are
justified in firing even if there is, say, a fifty percent chance your attacker will die as a
result. But now suppose your attacker aims a gun at you from a very great distance, so
that there is only a 1 in 10,000 chance you will be injured if he in fact fires. May you
defend yourself from this attack by means that would subject your attacker to the
same fifty percent chance of death as in the previous example? No, because in order
for a belief in danger to be reasonable, there must appear to be a substantial chance
of death or serious bodily harm. See id. § 51. The implicit definition of danger in the
law of self-defense, I suggest, is "a risk of serious harm sufficiently probable that the
use of deadly force in self-defense is not disproportionate to that risk." See Sangero,
supra note 57, at 479 (explaining that proportionality requires "a reasonable correla-
tion between the force of attack and the force of defense, between the expected
injury to the person attacked, if prevented from defending herself, and the antici-
pated injury to the aggressor if defensive force is applied"). Thus, a test based on self-
defense principles would require that there be a substantial chance the mother would
suffer death or serious health impairment absent an abortion.
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the doctor's good-faith judgment amounts to a "physician veto" over
the application of a statutory prohibition on postviability abortion. 18 2
In the decade after Roe, the pro-Roe majority shrank as Justice
O'Connor replaced Justice Stewart,' 8 3 and Chief Justice Burger (and
to a lesser extentJustice Powell) defected on some issues.18 4 But the
pro-Roe majority also grew more inflexible, subjecting state abortion
regulations to ever stricter scrutiny. Without ever squarely defining
the scope of the life-or-health exception, the Court made it increas-
ingly clear that state prohibitions on postviability abortions would sur-
vive only if they were toothless. The state's supposedly compelling
interest in viable fetal life repeatedly yielded to the woman's interest
in minimizing risks of harm to her health. 8 5 The decisive rulings
involved state restrictions on postviability abortion methods-restric-
tions designed to increase the chances that viable fetuses would sur-
vive abortions and receive appropriate postnatal care.'8 6
A. Colautti v. Franklin
In Colautti v. Franklin, the Court considered a vagueness chal-
lenge to a Pennsylvania statute requiring that, after viability,187 "'the
abortion technique employed shall be that which would provide the
best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive so long as a different
technique would not be necessary in order to preserve the life or
182 See Peter M. Ladwein, Note, Discerning the Meaning of Gonzales v. Carhart: The
End of the Physician Veto and the Resulting Change in Abortion Jurisprudence., 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1847, 1860-61 (2008).
183 Although she ultimately voted to reaffirm Roe's "essential holding[s]" in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992), Jus-
tice O'Connor extensively criticized Roe in her dissent in City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
184 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312-26 (1980) (rejecting, by a vote of
5-4, constitutional challenges to the Hyde Amendment's prohibition on the use of
federal funds to pay for Medicaid abortions except in cases of rape, incest, or danger
to the mother's life).
185 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 931 (2000).
186 Id.
187 The Court bad previously invalidated a Missouri provision requiring abortion
providers to exercise the same care "'to preserve the life and health of the fetus which
such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of
any fetus intended to be born and not aborted'" on the ground that this provision was
not limited to postviability abortions. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 82-83 (1976) (quoting H.B. 1211, 77th Gen. Assem. (Mo. 1974)). The
Danforth Court did not suggest that this provision would be unconstitutional if it
applied only to postviability abortions.
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health of the mother."'188 Because the language of the statutory
exception was virtually identical to the language of Roe's life-or-health
exception ("except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health
of the mother" 189), one might have expected the Supreme Court sum-
marily to reject the vagueness claim. Instead, in an opinion by Justice
Blackmun, the Court held 6-3 that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague:
[The statute] directs the physician to employ the abortion tech-
nique best suited to fetal survival "so long as a different technique
would not be necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the
mother" (emphasis supplied). In this context, the word "necessary"
suggests that a particular technique must be indispensable to the
woman's life or health-not merely desirable-before it may be
adopted. And "the life or health of the mother," as used in § 5 (a),
has not been construed by the courts of the Commonwealth to
mean, nor does it necessarily imply, that all factors relevant to the
welfare of the woman may be taken into account by the physician in
making his decision. Cf. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S., at 71-72;
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S., at 191.
Consequently, it is uncertain whether the statute permits the
physician to consider his duty to the patient to be paramount to his
duty to the fetus, or whether it requires the physician to make a
"trade-off" between the woman's health and additional percentage
points of fetal survival. Serious ethical and constitutional difficul-
ties, that we do not address, lurk behind this ambiguity. We hold
only that where conflicting duties of this magnitude are involved,
the State, at the least, must proceed with greater precision before it
may subject a physician to possible criminal sanctions.' 90
The chutzpah on display in these paragraphs is breathtaking. 19
The ambiguity the Court discerned in the statute is precisely the ambi-
188 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 381 n.1 (1979) (quoting 35 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 6605(a) (West 1977)).
189 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
190 Colautti, 439 U.S. at 400-01 (quoting § 6605(a)).
191 Not that chutzpah was the only problem. In particular, Blackmun's "Cf." cite
to Vuitch and Doe was tendentious and misleading. The impression this citation seems
intended to convey is that in Vuitch and again in Doe, the Court construed "the life or
health of the mother" to mean that "all factors relevant to the welfare of the woman
may be taken into account by the physician in making his decision" about an abor-
tion. As we've seen, the Court made no such leap in either of those cases. See supra
Parts I.B.3, I.D. Vuitch construed "the life or health of the mother" to include physical
and mental health, understood as soundness of body and mind-not overall welfare.
See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971). And Doe did not construe "the life
or health of the mother" at all; it simply indicated that a doctor, in deciding whether
elective abortions are "necessary," should consider all "factors ... relevant to the well-
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guity that inhered in Roe's life-or-health exception, promulgated with-
out explanation as it had been.19 2 In dissent, Justice White tried to
limit the damage by asserting that "the Court has not yet invalidated a
statute simply requiring abortionists to determine whether a fetus is
viable and forbidding the abortion of a viable fetus except where nec-
essary to save the life or health of the mother."'93 But that is exactly
the result that follows if Colautti's logic is taken seriously: a state ban
on postviability abortions that contains a life-or-health exception lifted
verbatim from the Supreme Court's opinion in Roe is void for
vagueness!
What accounts for this seemingly absurd result? To use the terms
employed in this Article, Justice Blackmun's basic point was that the
statutory life-or-health exception fails to specify whether it adopts
some version of a self-defense approach (which "requires the physi-
cian to make a 'trade-off between the woman's health and additional
percentage points of fetal survival"I 94) or the relative-safety approach
(which "permits the physician to consider his duty to the patient to be
paramount to his duty to the fetus"' 9 5 ).196 Consequently, the vague-
ness argument goes, a doctor does not have fair warning as to what
conduct is prohibited.
Assuming arguendo that this reasoning is correct, the ultimate
responsibility for the statutory exception's fatal ambiguity rests
entirely on Roe's undefined life-or-health exception. In Colautti, Jus-
tice Blackmun apparently recognized that the Court could not credi-
bly condemn legislatures for following its example without giving
them some guidance as to how to proceed. The obvious solution
would have been to remove the underlying constitutional ambiguity
by endorsing either the self-defense approach or the relative-safety
approach as the correct understanding of Roe's life-or-health excep-
being of the patient," while adding that "[a]ll these factors may relate to health." Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
192 Ironically, Justice Blackmun's suggestion that the word "necessary" in the con-
text of the Pennsylvania statute means "indispensable to the woman's life or health-
not merely desirable," Colautti, 439 U.S. at 400, applies with equal force to the word
"necessary" in the context of Roe's life-or-heath exception.
193 Colautti, 439 U.S. at 409 (White, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 400 (majority opinion).
195 Id.
196 So far as I know, Justice Blackmun never publicly acknowledged the possibility
that self-defense principles could supply a coherent interpretation of Roe's life-or-
health exception. As his description shows, however, Blackmun clearly perceived the
essential practical difference between an approach that seeks to protect fetal life by
requiring maternal-health "tradeoffs" to enhance the chances of fetal survival, and an
approach under which maternal health is always "paramount."
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tion.19 The legislature could then have enacted new legislation in
conformity with the Court's clarification.
Whether because he lacked the votes or for other reasons, Justice
Blackmun did not issue a definitive holding on the meaning of Roe's
life-or-health exception in Colautti. Instead, he sent the following sig-
nals to state legislatures and the lower federal courts: (1) statutory
language adopting the relative-safety approach would be substantively
constitutional and immune from vagueness attack; and (2) statutory
language adopting any form of self-defense approach would raise
"[s] erious ethical and constitutional difficulties"-that is to say, might
very well be substantively unconstitutional. In other words, the Court
was inclined to construe Roe's life-or-health exception in accord with
the relative-safety approach, but found it unnecessary and/or impru-
dent so to hold.
B. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists
Seven years later, in the 5-4 decision in Thornburgh, Justice Black-
mun issued the holding Colautti foreshadowed. In an attempt to com-
ply with Colautti, the Pennsylvania legislature had revised its
postviability restriction on abortion methods by enacting a broader
exception that applied whenever compliance "'would present a signifi-
cantly greater medical risk to the life or health of the pregnant
woman."' 198 The Third Circuit struck this provision down, falsely
describing Colautti as having held that the earlier Pennsylvania statute
impermissibly required the doctor "to 'make a trade-off between the
woman's health and . . . fetal survival," and finding that "[tihe new
197 Alternatively, Justice Blackmun could simply have accepted what he claimed
was Pennsylvania's interpretation of its own statute. According to Blackmun, Penn-
sylvania's position was that the fetal-care provision "simply requires that when a physi-
cian has a choice of procedures of equal risk to the woman, he must select the
procedure least likely to be fatal to the fetus." Colautti, 439 U.S. at 390. Blackmun
responded that "[t]he statute does not clearly specify, as appellants imply, that the
woman's life and health must always prevail over the fetus' life and health when they
conflict." Id. at 400. Although Pennsylvania's brief was not a model of clarity on this
issue, the state's actual position appears to have been that the statute required the
doctor to "determine whether in any given case a procedure exists to safely abort a
woman in a manner most conducive to the continuation of viable fetal life." Brief for
Appellants at 21, Colautti, 439 U.S. 379 (No. 77-891).
198 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768
(1986) (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3210(b) (1982)), overruled in part by Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Pennsylvania statute, like the old, fails to require that maternal health
be the paramount consideration."199
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Blackmun asserted that Colautti
had "recognized the undesirability of any 'trade-off between the
woman's health and additional percentage points of fetal survival."'200
He avoided having to defend this no-trade-off rule by pointing out-
quite accurately-that Pennsylvania did not "take any real issue with
this proposition." 201 Instead, he characterized Pennsylvania as argu-
ing that "the statute's words 'significantly greater medical risk' for the
life or health of the woman do not mean some additional risk (in
which case unconstitutionality apparently is conceded) but only a
'meaningfully increased' risk."202 Blackmun agreed with the Third
Circuit that this reading was incompatible with the statute's language,
because "the adverb 'significantly' modifies the risk imposed on the
woman" and "the adverb is 'patently not surplusage.'o2 0 3 He held the
statute facially invalid because it was "'not susceptible to a construc-
tion that does not require the mother to bear an increased medical
risk in order to save her viable fetus." 204
Although this edict was issued in connection with a postviability
restriction on abortion methods, its logic was equally applicable to
postviability prohibitions on abortions. The categorical priority
Thornburgh assigned to maternal health dictates that if continuing a
pregnancy would "'require the mother to bear an increased medical
risk in order to save her viable fetus,"'205 she must be allowed to have
an abortion-even if that risk is minuscule compared to the risks to
the fetus. At last, the life-or-health exception had been given definite
content: it is triggered whenever a pregnancy poses "an increased
medical risk" of any degree or kind as compared to an abortion.206 With
Thornburgh, the relative-safety exception effectively became the law of
the land (albeit by implication rather than by a direct holding). The
Court offered no rationale for its decision, but its message was clear
199 Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 300
(3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Colautti, 439 U.S. at 400).
200 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 769 (quoting Colautti, 439 U.S. at 400).
201 Id.
202 Id. Blackmun's summary of Pennsylvania's position here was misleading. The
State's contention was that, to avoid "constitutional problems," "the term 'signifi-
cantly' should be construed to mean, in the context of this statute, a 'meaningful'
increased risk ... [rather than] a 'substantial' increased risk." Brief for Appellants at
85, Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747 (No. 84-495).
203 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 769 (quoting Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 300).
204 Id. (quoting Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 300).




and uncompromising-so much so that ChiefJustice Burger, who had
joined Roe on the understanding that it did not authorize abortion on
demand throughout pregnancy, finally urged that the Court "should
reexamine" that decision. 207
C. justice White's Thornburgh Dissent
Justice White's dissent in Thornburgh has the distinction of being
the first and only opinion by a Supreme Court Justice to present a
reasoned argument about the proper meaning of the constitutional
life-and-health exception. It has influenced the Court's postviability
abortion jurisprudence ever since, though not in the manner White
would have preferred.
White began with a narrow argument that echoed Pennsylvania's
defense of its statutory provision. He challenged the Court's holding
that the statute's use of the term "significantly" necessarily meant that
the mother was required to "bear an increased medical risk."208 To
the contrary, he argued that in context the word "significant" was
"most naturally read as synonymous with the terms 'meaningful,' 'cog-
nizable,' 'appreciable,' or 'nonnegligible.' That is, the statute
requires only that the risk be a real and identifiable one."209 Maternal
health risks falling below that minimal threshold, White wrote, could
not possibly trump what Roe had acknowledged to be the state's com-
pelling interest in viable fetal life. 210
White then turned to a more ambitious claim: that the statute was
constitutional even if it required the pregnant woman "to endure a
method of abortion chosen to protect the health of the fetus despite
the existence of an alternative that in some substantial degree is more
protective of her own health."211 In support of this contention, White
offered two arguments-one based on Roe's life-or-health exception,
and the other based on the state's concededly compelling interest in
viable fetal life. The crux of the life-or-health exception argument was
that Thornburgh's per se ban on "tradeoffs" of maternal health against
fetal life "directly contradicts one of the essential holdings of Roe-
that is, that the State may forbid all postviability abortions except
when necessary to protect the life or health of the pregnant woman."212
In White's view, it was "evident" that this holding "involves a tradeoff
207 Id. at 785 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
208 Id. at 807 (White, J., dissenting).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 808 (emphasis added).
212 Id. at 809.
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between maternal health and protection of the fetus, for it plainly per-
mits the State to forbid a postviability abortion even when such an
abortion may be statistically safer than carrying the pregnancy to term,
provided that the abortion is not medically necessary."213
White's state interest argument was based on "the usual under-
standing of the term 'compelling interest,' which we have used to
describe those governmental interests that are so weighty as to justify
substantial and ordinarily impermissible impositions on the individ-
ual."2 1 4 Pointing to the examples of the military draft and compulsory
vaccination, White argued that "a compelling state interest may justify
the imposition of some physical danger upon an individual." 215 Con-
sequently, he concluded, Thornburgh's prohibition on trading off the
woman's health against fetal survival was starkly inconsistent with Roe's
holding that the state has a compelling interest in fetal life. 2 16
Let's now step back and evaluate Justice White's arguments.
Unless the term "compelling" is to be drained of all meaning, White's
narrow argument that a state may at least impose insignificant health
risks on women to protect viable fetuses must be right. But that pro-
position falls far short of establishing a self-defense approach to the
life-or-health exception. White's invocation of Roe's life-or-health
exception was also problematic. White wrote as if it were self-evident
that Roe's life-or-health exception does not adopt the relative-safety
test. The ambiguity of the life-or-health exception, in historical con-
text, belies this claim.
White was on more solid ground when he inferred from Roe's
concession that states have a "compelling" interest in viable fetal life
that states can require women to bear "some degree of risk of physical
harm."217 Here, too, however, Roe proved an elusive target,218
213 Id. at 809-10. Justice White did not explain what criteria he thought doctors
used to determine whether an abortion is "medically necessary."
214 Id. at 808.
215 Id. at 809.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 808-09.
218 The passage in which Justice Blackmun refers to the state's interest in viable
fetal life as "compelling" does not cite any compelling state interest cases. Earlier in
Roe, however, Blackmun cited three precedents for the proposition that "[w]here cer-
tain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting
these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest."' Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citing Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 406 (1963)). Kramer did not decide whether the state interest asserted in that
case (limiting the franchise to persons primarily interested in a school board elec-
tion) was compelling, see 395 U.S. at 632 n.14; Shapiro, which involved a rule mandat-
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because in the same breath Roe also implied that at some undefined level
of risk the woman's interest in her life and health trumped the state's
interest in fetal life.2 19 White was surely right that the examples of the
military draft and compulsory vaccination suggest that compulsory
state interests may require individuals to accept "substantial" risks of
serious harm.220 But some interests may be more "compelling" than
others, and White offered no reason why a state's interest in viable
fetal life, in particular, should justify "the infliction of some degree of
risk of physical harm." Justice White's reasoning suffered from his
failure to invoke self-defense principles and (relatedly) to explain at
what point the imposition of a "risk of physical harm" on pregnant
women would, in his view, satisfy the life-or-health exception. Never-
theless, Justice White's arguments were sufficiently cogent that Justice
Blackmun offered no response to any of them.
D. Justice O'Connor's Thornburgh Dissent
Justice O'Connor221 did notjoin White's opinion, which included
a full-throated argument that Roe should be overruled. 222 Her sepa-
rate dissent raised procedural objections to the Court's sweeping rul-
ings on the merits,223 and reiterated her adherence to the "undue
burden" approach she first proposed in her dissent in City of Akron v.
ing that new residents wait one year before receiving welfare benefits, ruled that the
administrative purposes the state invoked were not advanced by the waiting period, see
394 U.S. at 638; and Sherbert held that the state failed to establish any compelling state
interest in denying unemployment benefits to a worker who was discharged for refus-
ing to work on her religion's Sabbath day, see 374 U.S. at 406-07. None of these
decisions supplies any guidance as to the kinds of individual interests that can out-
weigh a compelling state interest.
219 Imagine that the Roe Court had added this gloss on the life-or-health excep-
tion: "The state's interest becomes compelling at viability, and therefore states may
ban abortions that are not necessary to avoid meaningful risks to the mother's physi-
cal or mental health." Roe's critics could have argued that the Court was debasing the
word "compelling," creating an exception that would prove limitless in practice, and
thus effectively mandating abortion on demand throughout pregnancy. But they
could not have accused the Court of violating any principle contained in Roe. The Roe
Court would simply have been more forthcoming about the nature of the balance it
had decided to strike-namely, the one embodied in the relative-safety test.
220 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 808 (White, J., dissenting).
221 1 clerked forJustice O'Connor during the 1985-86 Term, when Thornburgh was
argued and decided.
222 See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 786-97 (White, J., dissenting).
223 Id. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court followed the Third
Circuit's lead in ruling on the merits of the constitutional issues, notwithstanding that
the district court had merely denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunc-
tion (and hence there had been no trial on the merits). See id. at 815.
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Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.224 O'Connor did, however,
agree with White that the Pennsylvania statute could reasonably be
read to require "only that the risk be a real and identifiable one."2 2 5
Because it was unlikely that "risks falling below that threshold" would
constitute an undue burden,2 2 6 O'Connor found it unnecessary to
decide "the point at which a 'trade-off between the health of the
woman and the survival of the fetus would rise to the level of an
undue burden."227
When Thornburgh was decided in 1986, Justice O'Connor was not
the swing vote in abortion cases. That role still belonged to Justice
Powell, who provided the fifth vote in Thornburgh despite having writ-
ten, in Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft,228 of "those rare situations where
there are compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion
after viability."229 But O'Connor's vote would become pivotal soon
enough. In hindsight, her characteristically cautious Thornburgh dis-
sent suggests that she may have seen in White's fallback argument
(and in the language of the post-Colautti Pennsylvania statute) the
basis for an interpretation of the life-or-health exception that would
allow states seeking to protect viable fetal life to require women to
bear some health risks-so long as they were not significant risks. The
sixty-four-thousand-dollar question for that interpretation, of course,
is what "significant" means. White's dissent was convincing testimony
that it could denote anything from "substantial" at one extreme to
"nonnegligible" at the other.230 As we shall see, what it does denote
224 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor's undue bur-
den approach, as described and applied in her Akron dissent, would have permitted
significantly more state regulation of abortion than the undue burden test that she
(along with Justices Kennedy and Souter) adopted in Casey. See Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 988-90 (1992) (Scalia,J., dissenting) (describing the
inconsistencies between the two versions of undue burden analysis).
225 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 832 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
229 Id. at 484 n.7 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.).
230 Justice O'Connor's Akron dissent provides an earlier example of the use of
"significant" to refer to substantial-indeed quite serious-risks. The ordinance at
issue in Akron contained a medical-emergency exception for cases in which "'continu-
ation of the pregnancy poses an immediate threat and grave risk to the life or physical
health of the pregnant woman.'" Akron, 462 U.S. at 449 n.42 (quoting AKRON, OHIO,
CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.12 (1978)). As part of her argument that the ordi-
nance's twenty-four-hour waiting period did not impose an undue burden, O'Connor
construed this exception to mean that "should the physician determine that the wait-
ing period would increase risks significantly, he or she need not require the woman to
wait." Id. at 473 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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remains one of the riddles that bedevils the Court's abortion jurispru-
dence.
III. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANLA V.
CASEY AND THE "SIGNIFICANT HEALTH RISKS" TEST
To date, Thornburgh has proved to be the high-water mark for the
relative-safety interpretation of the life-or-health exception. As the
Court's composition changed, the number of Justices who were
known to be unqualified supporters of Roe shrank below the magic
number five. By the time Webster v. Reproductive Health Services231 came
before the Court in 1989, many observers expected Roe to be over-
ruled. But Justice O'Connor balked, refusing to address Roe's validity
on the grounds that the Missouri statutory provisions at issue in Web-
ster were consistent with Roe and subsequent cases.232 The upshot was
that there appeared to be four votes substantially to curtail Roe,2 33
four votes to keep Roe unchanged 234-and Justice O'Connor, whose
concurring opinion in Webster reiterated her view that the correct stan-
dard for a previability abortion restriction was whether it "'unduly bur-
dens the right to seek an abortion.' 235 Essentially the same pattern
recurred the following year in Hodgson v. Minnesota.23 6
It was against this backdrop that Planned Parenthood asked the
Court to review the Third Circuit's decision in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,23 7 rejecting constitutional challenges
231 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
232 Id. at 525-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
233 Only Justice Scalia voted to overrule Roe in Webster. Id. at 532 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment). ChiefJustice Rehnquist, joined by
Justices White and Kennedy, voted to narrow Roe by employing a form of reasonable-
ness review instead of strict scrutiny, while reserving judgment as to whether it should
be overruled. Id. at 520 (plurality opinion).
234 Justices Brennan and Marshall joined justice Blackmun's partial dissent in Web-
ster, which vigorously defended Roe. Id. at 537 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Stevens wrote a separate partial dissent, which included a
passage reiterating his view that Roe followed ineluctably from Griswold. See id. at
564-65 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
235 Id. at 530 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
236 497 U.S. 417 (1990). In Hodgson, Justice O'Connor cast the decisive fifth vote
to strike down a parental-notification statute without a judicial bypass provision, but
she did so only after finding an undue burden. Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
237 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991).
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to the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982.238 Among the law's
provisions were an informed-consent requirement, a twenty-four-hour
waiting period, and spousal and parental notification requirements.23 9
Each of these mandates applied both before and after viability; and
each was subject to a "medical emergency" exception for cases in
which, in the physician's "'good faith clinical judgment,"' an immedi-
ate abortion was necessary to "'avert [the woman's] death or for which
a delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impair-
ment of a major bodily function."'240
Our immediate concern, of course, is with the medical emer-
gency exception. If Thornburgh's relative-safety interpretation of the
life-or-health exception was still good law, the medical emergency
exception's requirement of a "serious risk of substantial and irreversi-
ble [health] impairment" was blatantly unconstitutional. The district
court struck down the exception for precisely that reason: "' [T]he
narrow definition of medical emergency . . . creates an unconstitu-
tional trade off between the woman's health and the life or health of
the fetus . ."'241
A. The Third Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Third Circuit ignored Thornburgh, focusing
instead on Justice O'Connor's "undue burden" approach. As Judge
Stapleton's opinion (joined by then-Judge Alito and Judge Seitz)
explained, in light of Webster, "Justice O'Connor's undue burden stan-
dard is the law of the land, and we will apply that standard to all provi-
sions of the Pennsylvania Act at issue in this appeal."242 Oddly,
however, the Third Circuit's discussion of the medical emergency pro-
vision made no mention of Justice O'Connor's brief undue burden
238 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203-3220 (1990) (as amended in 1988 and 1989); see
Casey, 947 F.2d at 719 (rejecting all challenges to the statute except for the spousal
notice requirement).
239 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
240 Id. at 879 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203).
241 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1377 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 686 F.
Supp. 1089, 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1988)).
242 Casey, 947 F.2d at 698. The Third Circuit arguably overstepped its bounds,
particularly with regard to Thornburgh. Even though Justice O'Connor's votes in Web-
ster and Hodgson, and the undue burden rationale on which she based them, were
controlling as to the issues raised in those cases, neither Webster nor Hodgson involved
the application of Roe's life-or-health exception. Under those circumstances, the
Third Circuit should perhaps have applied Thornburgh and left it to the Supreme




analysis of the "significantly greater risk" issue in her Thornburgh dis-
sent.2 4 3 Instead, the Third Circuit relied on what it took to be the
"definition" of the undue burden standard used by O'Connor in Web-
ster and Hodgson: an "absolute obstacle or severe limitation" on the
woman's decision to have an abortion.24 4
Turning to the medical emergency exception, the Third Circuit
began by (correctly) deriving from Roe's life-or-health exception the
broader rule that "any abortion regulation which might delay or pre-
vent an abortion must contain a medical emergency exception."2 45 It
noted Pennsylvania's concession that its statutory exception would be
unconstitutional unless it included "situations in which compliance
would pose a serious risk to the life or health of the woman." 246 But
the medical emergency exception by its terms did apply whenever "'a
delay [would] create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impair-
ment of major bodily function.' 24 7 The question, therefore, was
whether the set of risks that qualified as "serious" under the statute
was sufficiently inclusive to comply with the constitutional life-or-
health exception.
That question would seem to call for an inquiry into both the
meaning of the statute and the scope of Roe's life-or-health exception.
Rather than directly tackling the latter issue, the Third Circuit folded
an implicit interpretation of the life-or-health exception into its
explicit interpretation of Pennsylvania's medical emergency
exception:
[W]e read the medical emergency exception as intended by the
Pennsylvania legislature to assure that compliance with its abortion
regulations would not in any way pose a significant threat to the life
or health of a woman. We believe it should be interpreted with that
objective in mind. While the wording seems to us carefully chosen
to prevent negligible risks to life or health or significant risks of only
transient health problems from serving as an excuse for noncompli-
ance, we decline to construe "serious" as intended to deny a woman
the uniformly recommended treatment for a condition that can
lead to death or permanent injury.248
Let's now compare this passage with the emergency exception's
requirement that "'a delay will create serious risk of substantial and
243 See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
814-33 (1986), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
244 Casey, 947 F.2d at 698 n.14.
245 Id. at 699.
246 Id.
247 Id. (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (1983 & Supp. 1991)).
248 Id. at 701.
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irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.' 24 9 In effect, the
Third Circuit construed this language to mean a significant (but mean-
ing what?) risk of a serious (i.e., substantial and irreversible) impair-
ment of a major bodily function. This reading of the statute arguably
lowers the legislature's intended threshold for the likelihood of harm,
while preserving the intended threshold for the severity of harm.
The Third Circuit's implicit definition of the life-or-health excep-
tion, then, seems to be that a postviability abortion is justified when
pregnancy poses "a significant threat"-meaning a significant risk of
serious harm-to the woman's life or health. This understanding of
the exception seems to straddle the self-defense and relative-safety
interpretations. Consistent with self-defense principles, it requires
that the threatened risk involve death or serious impairment of
health. But by introducing the vague and undefined word "signifi-
cant," it leaves the door open to the relative-safety approach. If any
non-negligible risk of serious health injury suffices to justify a
postviability abortion, we have left the limits of self-defense behind.
Conversely, if "significant" refers to a substantial risk of serious injury,
we are back to justice White's preferred position in Thornburgh, which
can readily be reconciled with self-defense principles.
In any event, having so construed the medical emergency provi-
sion, the Third Circuit rejected Planned Parenthood's claim that the
provision failed to cover three risky conditions-preeclampsia, inevita-
ble abortion, and prematurely ruptured membrane. 250 The parties
agreed that each of these conditions could lead to the "substantial and
irreversible impairment of a major bodily function."25 1 But whereas
Pennsylvania argued that this sufficed to constitute a "serious risk"
within the meaning of the statute, Planned Parenthood argued that
"no such 'serious risk' exists until the woman has actually experienced
shock or contracted an infection." 252 The Third Circuit concluded
that Planned Parenthood's interpretation was too restrictive, because
the fact that the risk of serious health impairment is "quantitatively
less at the onset [of these conditions] than after shock has
occurred . . . does not mean the risk at onset is not 'serious."'253
The Third Circuit's decision can fairly be read as a prediction
about how the Supreme Court (and Justice O'Connor in particular)
would define the life-or-health exception and apply it to Penn-
249 Id. at 699 (quoting PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203).
250 Id. at 699-700.
251 Id. at 700.




sylvania's medical emergency provision. Judged by that standard, the
Third Circuit was right on target.2 5 4 What the Third Circuit may not
have anticipated, however, was the extent to which the Justices,
instead of analyzing the issues the court of appeals had identified and
provisionally resolved, would simply cut and paste excerpts from the
lower court's opinion-and in the process restore much of its original
ambiguity to Roe's life-or-health exception.
B. The Joint Opinion ofJustices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
In the Supreme Court, Casey proved to be the watershed case in
which the Court finally reconsidered Roe. In an elaborately argued
joint opinion, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter provided the
decisive votes to retain the tripartite "essential holding" of Roe,2 5 5 but
also to modify Roe in several important respects. 25 6 Parts I, II, and III
of the joint opinion were joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens and
so constituted the opinion of the Court;257 they presented an "explica-
tion of individual liberty" (including the liberty to have an abortion)
and explained why "the reservations any of us may have in reaffirming
the central holding of Roe are outweighed by [that] explication ...
combined with the force of stare decisis."2 58
Justices Blackmun and Stevens did not join Part IV of the joint
opinion, in which Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter rejected
Roe's trimester framework and adopted the undue burden stan-
dard.25 9 Nevertheless, although Part IV was only a plurality opinion,
its standards were controlling, because it represented the "'position
254 The Third Circuit may also have intended to invite the Supreme Court to
explore another approach to the life-or-health exception: what we might call the
wanted-pregnancy test. The Third Circuit floated this idea by pointing out that, for
"all three conditions pointed to by the clinics ... an immediate abortion. . . . was the
recommended treatment in all pregnancies in which these conditions arose, includ-
ing planned and desired pregnancies." Id. This suggests that the life-or-health excep-
tion should apply when the maternal health risks are sufficiently serious that there is a
medical consensus that they would warrant an immediate abortion even in a
"planned" or "desired" pregnancy. None of the Justices in Casey discussed this
intriguing idea.
255 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
256 See id. at 869-79 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
257 Id. at 844-69 (majority opinion). I will cite the parts of the joint opinion to
which Blackmun and Stevens subscribed as the "majority opinion," and the other
parts as the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. In text, how-
ever, I will refer to the "joint opinion" unless it is important to deviate from that
usage.
258 Id. at 853.
259 Id. at 869-79 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
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taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the nar-
rowest grounds."' 26 0 Part IV acknowledged that "from the outset the
State can[ ] show its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later
point in fetal development the State's interest in life has sufficient
force so that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can
be restricted."26 ' Invoking stare decisis, but also reasoning that viabil-
ity was the fairest and most "workable" line available, the joint opinion
reaffirmed Roe's decision to make viability the cutoff point past which
states may prohibit elective abortions.262
The joint opinion then proceeded to make two important
changes in abortion jurisprudence. Whereas Roe had banned
previability legislation aimed at protecting fetal life, Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter ruled that what Roe termed the
State's "important and legitimate interest in protecting the potential-
ity of human life"2 63 was strong enough to justify some types of state
intervention throughout pregnancy.264 Whereas Roe and later cases
had applied strict scrutiny to state regulation of previability abortions,
the joint opinion adopted the undue burden test, under which a state
regulation is unconstitutional if it "has the purpose or effect of plac-
ing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus."2 65
After a detailed explanation of the undue burden test, the plural-
ity took up Roe's holding that postviability abortions may be prohib-
ited subject to the life-or-health exception. 266 Abruptly, explanation
260 Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991). Justice Blackmun favored continuing Roe's
strict scrutiny approach, Casey, 505 U.S. at 926; Justice Stevens appeared to favor a
more demanding version of the undue burden standard, see id. at 920 (opinion of
Stevens, J.); and the three authors of the joint opinion favored the undue burden
standard. Id. at 871-79 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). The
remaining four Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and
Thomas) favored rational basis review. Id. at 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
261 Id. at 869 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
262 Id. at 870. Although the plurality presented its reaffirmation of the viability
line as a holding, there is a forceful argument for characterizing it as dictum. See
Randy Beck, The Essential Holding of Casey: Rethinking Viability, 75 UMKC L. REV. 713,
715-19 (2007).
263 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
264 Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
265 Id. at 877.
266 The joint opinion elsewhere refers to "exceptions for pregnancies which
endanger the woman's life or health," id. at 846 (majority opinion), to "those rare
circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a danger to her own life or health, or is
the result of rape or incest," id. at 851, and to "the third trimester, when the fetus is
viable, [and] prohibitions are permitted provided the life or health of the mother is
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ceased, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter simply cast their
votes in favor of Roe's ipse dixit-
We also reaffirm Roe's holding that "subsequent to viability, the
State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may,
if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it
is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation
of the life or health of the mother."2 6 7
So ends Part IV of the plurality opinion, with its joint authors neither
explaining why they believed that holding to be correct, nor what they
understood it to mean.
Nevertheless, Planned Parenthood's challenge to Pennsylvania's
medical emergency provision made it impossible for Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter to duck the life-or-health exception
issues altogether. In Part V.A of the joint opinion, they held that, "as
construed by the Court of Appeals, the medical emergency definition
imposes no undue burden on a woman's abortion right."2 68 Justice
Stevens joined Part V.A-and so did, astonishingly, Justice Black-
mun, 269 thus making it the opinion of the Court.
C. The Casey Court's Treatment of the Medical Emergency Provision
Let's turn, then, to the Casey Court's discussion of Planned
Parenthood's challenge to Pennsylvania's medical emergency provi-
sion. One might have expected that, in evaluating the medical emer-
gency provision, the Court would begin with Thornburgh's no-trade-
offs test for postviability abortions. If that test was still good law, the
medical emergency exception, requiring as it did a "'serious risk of
substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily func-
not at stake." Id. at 872 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
While these formulations manage to convey the impression that the life-or-health
exception is a narrow one, they are also careful to make no definite representations
about its content or rationale.
267 Id. at 879 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65).
268 Id. at 880 (majority opinion).
269 Justice Blackmun also joined Part V.C, but that part of the joint opinion invali-
dated the husband-notification provision. See id. at 922 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Blackmun dissented from Parts V.B (upholding the
informed-consent provision), V.D (upholding the one-parent consent requirement),
and V.E (upholding the recordkeeping and reporting provisions). See id. Thus, the
medical-emergency provision was the only challenged provision of the Pennsylvania
statute that Blackmun voted to uphold. Justice Stevens, by contrast, also voted to
uphold the one-parent consent requirement and the recordkeeping and reporting
provisions. See id. at 922 & n.8 (StevensJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tion,'"2 7 0 was plainly unconstitutional. As Planned Parenthood's
Supreme Court brief correctly pointed out, it was impossible to con-
strue this statutory language "to ensure that a woman's health remains
the . . . paramount consideration," as Thornburgh required.271
Nevertheless, the majority opinion managed to uphold the medi-
cal emergency exception while completely ignoring Thornburgh's no-
trade-offs test. 2 7 2 It focused exclusively on Planned Parenthood's
alternative argument that the medical emergency provision unconsti-
tutionally "forecloses the possibility of an immediate abortion despite
some significant health risks."2 73 The Court agreed that " [i]f the con-
tention were correct, we would be required to invalidate the restrictive
operation of the provision, for the essential holding of Roe forbids a
State to interfere with a woman's choice to undergo an abortion pro-
cedure if continuing her pregnancy would constitute a threat to her
health."274
This sentence artfully accomplishes two things. First, it confirms
that the life-or-health exception applies to state abortion regulations
before viability as well as after. Prior to Casey, that proposition was true
but inconsequential, because previability state regulation of abortions
to protect fetal life was per se unconstitutional. After Casey, it became
very important indeed. Absent special circumstances, Casey permits
previability state regulation of abortions only if (1) the regulation
does not impose an undue burden, and (2) it contains an adequate life-
or-health exception.275 As the First Circuit has explained, "Comple-
menting the general undue burden standard, the Supreme Court has
also identified a specific and independent constitutional requirement
that an abortion regulation must contain an exception for the preser-
vation of a pregnant woman's health."276
270 Id. at 879 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (quoting 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (1990)).
271 Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 61, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (No. 91-
744).
272 The very next section of the joint opinion, by contrast, explicitly overruled the
limitations imposed by Thornburgh on previability informed consent requirements.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
273 Id. at 880 (majority opinion).
274 Id.
275 See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 327-28
(2006). Under Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), there is an exception to this
rule for statutes that the legislature reasonably concludes will rarely, if ever, impose a
significant health risk. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 166-67.
276 Planned Parenthood of N. New England v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir.




Second, the sentence speaks to the content of the life-or-health
exception: state abortion laws-including prohibitions on postviability
abortions-are unconstitutional if they impose "significant health
risks" on a woman, that is, if compliance with them "would constitute
a threat to her health."277 These formulations run directly counter to
Thornburgh's assertions that the Constitution categorically forbids any
and all "tradeoffs" of fetal life against maternal health, and conse-
quently that a state "'[may] not require the mother to bear an
increased medical risk in order to save her viable fetus."' 278 Under
Casey, states may require such tradeoffs so long as they do not involve
"significant health risks" that pose a threat to the mother's health.
On the other hand, the phrase "significant health risks" is itself
ambiguous.279 Does "significant" mean "substantial" (i.e., weighty,
profound, grave, important),280 as Justice White's Thornburgh dissent
suggested would be justifiable in light of the state's compelling inter-
est in viable fetal life? Or does it mean merely that the risks must be
"appreciable," "meaningful," "nonnegligible," "real and identifiable,"
as White had argued in the alternative?28' In Thornburgh, Justice
O'Connor had agreed with White that states could at least impose
risks that fell below the latter-and lower-threshold, while declining
277 Casey, 505 U.S. at 880.
278 See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
769 (1986) (quoting Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737
F.2d 283, 300 (1984)), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833. In explaining his deci-
sion to join Part V.A of the joint opinion, upholding the medical emergency provi-
sion, Justice Blackmun passed over in silence the glaring inconsistency with his
opinion in Thornburgh. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 925 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, and dissenting in part). The only justification he offered for his vote on this
issue was that "[a]s the Court notes, its interpretation is consistent with the essential
holding of Roe that 'forbids a State to interfere with a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion procedure if continuing her pregnancy would constitute a threat to her
health.'" Id. (quoting majority opinion).
279 So is the phrase "threat to her health," which could refer to anything from an
imminent danger to a distant risk.
280 See WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1817 (2d ed. 1979)
(listing, inter alia, the four quotations as synonyms of "substantial"); cf id. at 1688
(listing "important; momentous" as the second definition of "significant").
281 The United States was of little help to the Court on this point. The Solicitor
General's brief conflated the two standards, arguing in the same breath that due pro-
cess "does not require the State to avoid placing insignificant health risks on individu-
als for the public benefit," and that the state's compelling interest in fetal life
"'justif[ies] substantial and ordinarily impermissible impositions on the individual,'
including 'the infliction of some degree of risk of physical harm.'" Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 27, Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(No. 91-744) (alteration in original) (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 808-09 (White,
J., dissenting)).
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to take a position on the constitutionality of the higher one.28 2 Did
she and her Casey coauthors keep their options open on this score, or
does the remainder of the joint opinion's disposition of the medical
emergency issue remove that ambiguity?
As I will explain below, the Court's opinion leaves that ultimate
issue unresolved, while providing some guidance on other important
questions. To enable readers to make their own assessments, I set out
the passage in full:
The District Court found that there were three serious condi-
tions which would not be covered by the statute: preeclampsia, inev-
itable abortion, and premature ruptured membrane. Yet, as the
Court of Appeals observed, it is undisputed that under some cir-
cumstances each of these conditions could lead to an illness with
substantial and irreversible consequences. While the definition
could be interpreted in an unconstitutional manner, the Court of
Appeals construed the phrase "serious risk" to include those circum-
stances. It stated: "[W]e read the medical emergency exception as
intended by the Pennsylvania legislature to assure that compliance
with its abortion regulations would not in any way pose a significant
threat to the life or health of a woman." . . . "Normally, ... we defer
to the construction of a state statute given it by the lower federal
courts." Indeed, we have said that we will defer to lower court inter-
pretations of state law unless they amount to "plain" error. This
"'reflect[s] our belief that district courts and courts of appeals are
better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws of their
respective States."' We adhere to that course today, and conclude
that, as construed by the Court of Appeals, the medical emergency
definition imposes no undue burden on a woman's abortion
right.2 8 3
Although it is a poor substitute for an explicit discussion of the
life-or-health exception (or even of the phrase "significant health
risks") ,284 this passage establishes several important points. First, the
282 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 827-28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
283 Casey, 505 U.S. at 880 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 701 (3d Cir. 1991); Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1985); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S.
109, 118 (1943); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 482 (1988)).
284 Interestingly, the Court's first use of the phrase "significant health risk" came
not in an abortion case, but in a famous risk-regulation case. In Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980), Justice Ste-
vens's plurality opinion construed section 3(8) of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 3(8), 84 Stat. 1590, 1591 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 652 (2006)), to require the Secretary of Labor, in issuing a health and safety stan-
dard for a toxic substance, "to find, as a threshold matter, that the toxic substance in
question poses a significant health risk in the workplace and that a new, lower stan-
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expected harm necessary to trigger the life-or-health exception must
involve a risk of serious injury to health. The conditions the Court
indicated would justify an abortion involved health risks that were
conceded to be "serious" in the sense that they could lead to substan-
tial, irreversible health impairment if left untreated. For example,
"failure to obtain an abortion when a woman is diagnosed with preec-
lampsia can lead to irreversible damage to the liver, kidneys and
more."285 The Third Circuit's construction of the medical emergency
provision, which the Casey majority accepted, 2 8 6 did not dilute the stat-
utory requirement that the threatened risk involve "substantial and
irreversible impairment of a major bodily function."287
Second, Casey indicates that the risk of serious health impairment
need not be imminent to satisfy the life-or-health exception. Even
though the specified conditions do not inevitably lead to shock, infec-
tion, or other problems that make irreversible damage imminent, 288
the Court agreed with the court of appeals that a woman suffering
from any of them is entitled to an "immediate abortion."289 We can
safely conclude that a state may not require that the risk of serious
injury to bodily health be imminent.
Third, although the risk need not be imminent, it must be more
than a remote possibility. Consider, for example, a pregnant woman
who is at high risk of developing the most common of the three
threatening conditions Planned Parenthood cited-preeclampsia.
dard is therefore 'reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful
employment and places of employment."' Indus. Union, 448 U.S. at 614-15 (quoting
§ 3(8)). Subsequently, in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), the Court dealt at
some length with what constitutes a significant health risk in the context of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006). Bragdon, 524 U.S. at
649-55.
285 Casey, 947 F.2d at 700.
286 The Casey plurality can also be seen as informally signaling that lower courts
should follow the Third Circuit's lead, construing state restrictions on abortion some-
what narrowly if feasible, and upholding them as so narrowed. One advantage of that
approach is that the Supreme Court would often be freed from the burden of decid-
ing abortion cases. The Court could simply defer to the lower courts' construction of
state law-provided that the lower courts faithfully applied the Court's basic doctrine.
287 Casey, 947 F.2d at 700.
288 For example, even when preeclampsia is left untreated, it frequently does not
develop into eclampsia. Babyloss.com, Pre-eclampsia, http://www.babyloss.com/
pdfs/babyloss-preeclampsia.pdf, at 2 (last visited Oct. 30, 2009). And even when it
does, although eclampsia is indisputably a dangerous condition, the mortality rate
associated with it in advanced societies is reportedly around two percent. See KA.
Douglas & C.W.G. Redman, Eclampsia in the United Kingdom, 309 BRuT. MED. J. 1395,
1397 (1994).
289 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 880 (1992).
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Should preeclampsia actually occur, Casey requires that she be allowed
to have an immediate abortion, even after viability; the state may not
require the woman to wait to see whether her preeclampsia leads to
full-blown eclampsia. 290 But Casey does not suggest-indeed, Planned
Parenthood did not contend-that a woman is entitled to an immedi-
ate abortion to avoid the risk that she may develop preeclampsia. Why
the difference? Because prior to the onset of preeclampsia there is no
present danger of the harmful complications that can ensue once it
occurs. The woman's condition can be monitored, and an abortion
may ultimately be necessary. But the state's interest in fetal life out-
weighs the as-yet remote risk of serious health impairment.
What, if anything, can we deduce from these implicit rulings
about how likely a risk of serious health impairment must be in order
to qualify as a "significant health risk"? Very little. As the Third Cir-
cuit pointed out, while the risk of serious health impairment "will be
quantitatively less at the onset" of the conditions in question than
after they lead to further complications (e.g., shock or infection),
"this does not mean the risk at onset is not 'serious."' 291 How likely
were these "serious" risks believed to be? The Third Circuit did not
say, nor did the joint opinion for the Court.
Similarly, Casey's implicit requirement that the risk of health
impairment not be remote does not tell us at what point an actual risk
is too improbable to satisfy the life-or-health exception. Imagine, for
example, a hypothetical condition that develops in the second trimes-
ter, results in sudden maternal death in 1 out of 10,000 cases, and is
harmless in the other 9999. Does the presence of that condition enti-
tle a woman to a postviability abortion, or not? Self-defense principles
would say no, because the risk to the woman is too low to make contin-
uing her pregnancy dangerous. The relative-safety approach would
say yes, because a 1 in 10,000 risk of death is clearly "nonnegligible,"
and might well be material in the decisionmaking of reasonable doc-
tors and patients.
If this analysis is right, Casey does not tell us whether a very small
risk of death or severe health impairment qualifies as a "significant"
health risk. In Justice White's terms, Casey left unresolved whether a
"significant" health risk is better understood as a "substantial" risk of
serious harm or as a "nonnegligible" risk of serious harm.2 9 2 In so
doing, the Court also left open the choice between the relative-safety
290 Id.
291 Casey, 947 F.2d at 701.
292 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 807
(1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
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and self-defense interpretations of the life-or-health exception. For,
as I will now explain, those alternative interpretations correspond, at
least roughly, to the alternative versions of the "significant health
risks" test.
The relative-safety approach can readily be softened from Thorn-
burgh's absolutist version while retaining its essential character. The
revised, post-Casey version concedes that the significant health risks
test permits some tradeoffs of maternal health against fetal life. But,
the argument goes, those tradeoffs are limited to the kinds of insignifi-
cant risks Justice White described in Thornburgh: risks that are "negligi-
ble." States are permitted to impose them precisely because risks of
this magnitude would not be material in the decisionmaking of a rea-
sonable woman and her physician. Put another way, a woman cannot
justify an abortion by pointing to a health risk that she would disre-
gard in other contexts.
As for the self-defense approach, it too is qualified somewhat.
Self-defense principles normally require that the threat of death or
serious bodily harm be imminent, and Casey rejects that requirement.
But this deviation may make good sense, because the fetus is not a
conscious aggressor that may abandon a threatened attack before it
gets underway.293 In any event, the core requirement of this
approach-that there be a substantial risk of death or serious health
impairment to justify a postviability abortion-conforms closely to
self-defense principles.
What explains the reticence of the Casey majority when it comes
to the life-or-health exception? If we assume that the authors of the
joint opinion were concerned with gaining a majority for their disposi-
tion of the medical emergency provision, the answer seems obvious: at
a minimum, Justice Blackmun or Justice Kennedy would probably
have defected had the joint opinion unequivocally embraced either
competing interpretation of the life-or-health exception. The conse-
quences, however, would have been much more dramatic had Ken-
nedy defected. He might either have joined with the four anti-Roe
dissenters on this issue, or written a separate opinion that would have
become the governing law on the scope of the life-or-health excep-
tion. Blackmun's defection, by contrast, would simply have meant
that the plurality opinion's disposition of the medical emergency pro-
293 For example, if the fetus poses an inevitable but distant danger (e.g., an
ectopic pregnancy in which the danger will become acute later in pregnancy), there is
no reason to delay an abortion. Casey's implicit rejection of the imminence require-
ment, however, seems to go beyond such situations, and to that extent is difficult to
reconcile with self-defense principles.
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vision lacked the extra cachet attendant on opinion-of-the-Court
status.
Under these circumstances, it seems reasonable to infer that Ken-
nedy had the stronger bargaining position, and consequently that
Casey's treatment of the life-or-health exception more closely reflected
his position than Blackmun's. Conversely, from the standpoint ofJus-
tice Blackmun and any Justices who agreed with him, the less the joint
opinion said about the life-or-health exception, the better.294 Casey'S
ambiguous "significant health risks" language-and ambiguous appli-
cation thereof-kept the life-or-health exception issue alive for the
future. As Part IV will discuss, the issue did not resurface again until
after Blackmun's retirement. When it did, in Stenberg v. Carhart, Jus-
tice Kennedy openly parted ways with Justices O'Connor and Souter
(his Casey coauthors) on the meaning of "significant health risks," and
more generally on the meaning of Casey itself.2 95
D. justice Stevens's Attempt to Lay a Foundation for the
Relative-Safety Test
The plurality opinion's barebones reaffirmation of Roe's life-or-
health exception, together with the majority's ambiguous new "signifi-
cant health risks" test, created an irresistible opportunity for Justice
Stevens to give a subtle boost to the relative-safety interpretation. Ste-
vens used his partial concurring opinion, inter alia, for this purpose.
Part IV of the plurality opinion omitted any reference to Roe's holding
294 One of Justice Blackmun's concerns was presumably that lower courts not
interpret Casey as overruling Thornburgh's relative-safety interpretation of the life-or-
health exception. If so, his hopes bore fruit in Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th
Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds sub nom Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996) (per
curiam). In Bangerter, the Tenth Circuit struck down a Utah statute requiring that "a
doctor perform a post-viability abortion in a manner that 'will give the unborn child
the best chance of survival' unless that method would cause 'grave damage to the
woman's medical health.'" Id. at 1502 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-307 to -308
(1995)). The Tenth Circuit rejected the state's argument that "the relevant portions
of Thornburgh were uprooted by Casey." Id. at 1503. Because "Casey explicitly reaf-
firms Roe's approach to post-viability abortions," the Tenth Circuit reasoned that "Roe
... continues to govern the relevant portion of Thornburgh dealing with choice of
method restrictions on post-viability abortions." Id. at 1504. The Tenth Circuit
accordingly held the Utah statute unconstitutional because it failed to comply with
Thornburgh's requirement "that the woman's health must be the physician's 'para-
mount consideration.'" Id. at 1504 (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768-69).
295 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 964-72 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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that fetuses are not persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.296 Stevens exploited this opening as follows.
First, he insinuated that the life-or-health exception itself might
be questionable as an original matter, by stating that "[s]tare decisis
also provides a sufficient basis for . . . agreement with the joint opin-
ion's reaffirmation of Roe's postviability analysis."297  Second, he
claimed that Roe's holding that fetuses are not Fourteenth Amend-
ment persons was "implicit in the Court's analysis." 2 9 8 Third, he
asserted that the joint opinion's implicit acceptance of this holding
was ipso facto "a reaffirmation of Roe's explanation of why the State's
obligation to protect the life or health of the mother must take prece-
dence over any duty to the unborn."299 Fourth, that explanation,
according to Stevens, is to be found in the proposition that "as a mat-
ter of federal constitutional law, a developing organism that is not yet
a 'person' does not have what is sometimes described as a 'right to
life.'" 300 Fifth, as a result, "the state interest in potential human life is
not an interest in loco parentis," but "instead, an indirect interest sup-
296 Casey, 505 U.S. at 869-79 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,
JJ.); cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (holding that the unborn are not
persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
297 Casey, 505 U.S. at 912 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis omitted).
298 Id.
299 Id. at 912-13. Justice Stevens apparently believes that if viable fetuses are not
Fourteenth Amendment persons, the state cannot have a compelling interest in pro-
tecting their lives. To see why he is wrong, imagine that the Roe Court had added this
gloss to the life-or-health exception: "Although viable fetuses are not Fourteenth
Amendment persons, the state has a compelling interest in protecting their lives, and
may therefore restrict abortions, in accordance with the mother's fundamental right
of self-preservation, to those necessary to avoid grave danger of death or serious
impairment of her physical or mental health." Would proponents of the relative-
safety test approach have been able to construct a convincing argument that the
Court was contradicting itself by allowing states to treat viable fetuses as if they were
Fourteenth Amendment persons? Not according to Justice Blackmun's famous
"dilemma" footnote, which suggested that if fetuses were Fourteenth Amendment per-
sons, states might be required to forbid all abortions-even those necessary to save
the mother's life. SeeRoe, 410 U.S. at 158 n.54 ("[I]f the fetus is a person who is not to
be deprived of life without due process of law, and if the mother's condition is the
sole determinant, does not the Texas exception [for the life of the mother] appear to
be out of line with the Amendment's command?"). The more limited authority the
Roe Court actually gave the states-i.e., to ban postviability abortions subject to the
life-and-health exception-stemmed, therefore, from the Court's judgment that the
state interest in viable fetal life is "compelling" even though viable fetuses are not
Fourteenth Amendment persons.
300 Casey, 505 U.S. at 913 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ported by both humanitarian and pragmatic concerns."301 Specifi-
cally, the state has "a legitimate interest" in minimizing the offense to
those citizens who believe that abortion "reflects an unacceptable dis-
respect for potential human life," as well as "a broader interest in
expanding the population" to benefit from "additional productive citi-
zens."302 And sixth-here I am drawing a connection at which Ste-
vens only hinted-it seems highly doubtful, as an original matter, that
these state interests should outweigh the woman's right to an elective
abortion merely because the fetus has become viable and hence is
"approaching personhood."3 0 3
If Stevens's reasoning were to command a majority of the Court,
the life-or-health exception, assuming it survived at all, would almost
certainly be interpreted in line with the relative-safety test. The state
has a constitutional "obligation to protect the life or health of the
mother," and no such obligation to protect the life or health of the
fetus.30 4 Where the two interests conflict, the mother's life or health
obviously prevails.305 Therefore, a state must permit abortion, even
after viability, whenever continued pregnancy and childbirth would
present greater risks to the mother's life or health.
But the joint opinion in Casey is plainly inconsistent with Ste-
vens's reasoning. To begin with, the joint opinion neither says nor
implies that because viable fetuses are not Fourteenth Amendment
persons, states may not endow them with "what is sometimes
described as a 'right to life.' 30 6 On the contrary, the joint opinion
argues that both Roe and subsequent cases failed to live up to Roe's
recognition of the state's "important and legitimate interest" in "pro-
tecting the potentiality of human life."3 07 According to Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, "there is a substantial state interest
in potential life throughout pregnancy," and Roe's trimester frame-
work must be rejected because it "undervalues" that interest.308 More-
over, this state interest increases as the fetus develops, until, after
viability, "the State's interest in life has sufficient force so that the
right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted."30 9
301 Id. at 914.
302 Id. at 914-15.
303 See id. at 915.
304 Id. at 912.
305 Id. at 912-13.
306 Id. at 913.
307 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
308 Casey, 505 U.S. at 875-76 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,
3 I.).
309 Id. at 869.
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The theory that justifies these restrictions is not, as Justice Stevens
would have it, that the state has an overriding interest in avoiding
offense to pro-life citizens or swelling society's ranks. Instead, it is that
"the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness
be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the
woman."310 This "State[ ] intervention on behalf of the developing
child"3 11 takes the form of prohibiting its abortion-thereby enforc-
ing its 'right to life'-subject only to Roe's life-or-health exception.
So does it follow that Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy
committed themselves to the self-defense version of Roe's life-or-health
exception? Clearly not. Even if states may confer "what is sometimes
described as a 'right to life"' on viable fetuses, that right is trumped by
the life-or-health exception. The decisive issue, therefore, is the scope
of that exception-and as we've already seen, Casey's "significant
health risks" formulation fails to choose between the relative-safety
and self-defense approaches.
E. The Plurality's Failure to Endorse Roe's
Compelling-State-Interest Holding
The joint opinion in Casey omitted any reference to Roe's holding
that " [w] ith respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability."312 Instead, the
joint opinion described the state's interest as having "sufficient force
so that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be
restricted." 13  This omission is unlikely to have been inadvertent. But
is it substantively significant, and if so, how?
One obvious possibility is that this omission was intended to clear
the way for the eventual adoption of the relative-safety test. As we
have seen, Justice White argued forcefully in his Thornburgh dissent
that, in order to advance a "compelling" interest, states may require
individuals to bear substantial risks to their lives and health. 314 If the
state's interest in viable fetal life is merely "substantial"3 15 (or "'impor-
tant and legitimate"') ,316 rather than "compelling," that objection no
longer applies.
310 Id. at 870 (emphasis added).
311 Id.
312 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
313 Casey, 505 U.S. at 869 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,JJ.).
314 See supra Part II.C.
315 Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
316 Id. at 875-76 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 162).
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This reading of the joint opinion cannot be right. It asks us to
believe that the authors of the joint opinion agreed that Roe's recogni-
tion of the "compelling" state interest in viable fetal life was not one of
its "essential holdings," was erroneous, and should be overruled not-
withstanding stare decisis-and moreover should be overruled sub
silentio. An overruling of that kind would have been a departure from
the Court's ordinary practice, and an even greater departure from the
joint opinion's careful and respectful treatment of the Roe holdings it
did discuss (whether it reaffirmed them or not). Beyond that, it would
mean that Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter intended, on the
one hand, to permit substantially more state regulation of previability
abortions (as the undue burden test does), and on the other, to per-
mit substantially less state regulation of postviability abortions (as
would presumably result if the state's interest in viable fetuses is
deemed less than compelling). Nothing in the joint opinion provides
even colorable support for that interpretation. 3 1 7
317 Justice O'Connor had previously taken the position that "the State possesses
compelling interests in the protection of potential human life . . . throughout preg-
nancy," City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gyne-
cologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled in part by
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (same); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 505
(1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same), and Justice
Kennedy had joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Webster, which treated that
proposition approvingly, but only "in the context of the Roe trimester analysis," which
Rehnquist's opinion rejected. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 519
(1989) (plurality opinion). Interestingly, the most straightforward interpretation of
Justice O'Connor's prior view is that states can ban abortions throughout pregnancy,
subject to Roe's life-or-health exception (and perhaps other exceptions as well).
There are hints in Casey that the authors of the joint opinion may have given serious
consideration to this alternative before ultimately rejecting it. See Casey, 505 U.S. at
850-51 ("The underlying constitutional issue is whether the State can resolve these
philosophic questions in such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the
matter, except perhaps in those rare circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a
danger to her own life or health, or is the result of rape or incest"); id. at 871 (joint
opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) ("We do not need to say whether
each of us, had we been Members of the Court when the valuation of the state interest
[in fetal life] came before it as an original matter, would have concluded, as the Roe
Court did, that its weight is insufficient to justify a ban on abortions prior to viability
even when it is subject to certain exceptions."). It seems extremely unlikely that a
Justice who would have chosen, as an original matter, a constitutional rule allowing
states to ban nontherapeutic abortions throughout pregnancy, would also have been
prepared to conclude-contrary to Roe's holding-that the state's interest in fetal life
is not compelling even after viability. In any event, if Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter had chosen to eliminate the right to an elective abortion, the stakes
involved in defining the life-or-health exception would have been enormous. One
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The Casey joint opinion's failure to discuss the "compelling" sta-
tus vel non of viable fetal life comes into clearer focus when we com-
pare its undue burden approach with Roe's strict scrutiny. As the joint
opinion explained, Roe and subsequent cases "decided that any regu-
lation touching upon the abortion decision must survive strict scru-
tiny, to be sustained only if drawn in narrow terms to further a
compelling state interest."318 Roe's trimester framework was part and
parcel of the strict-scrutiny approach: state regulation to promote
maternal health was prohibited until "the State's important and legiti-
mate interest in the health of the mother" became "compelling" at the
end of the first trimester;3 19 while state regulation to protect fetal life
was prohibited until "the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life" became "compelling" at viability (in 1973, approxi-
mately the end of the second trimester).320 Part IV of the joint opin-
ion, by abandoning strict scrutiny and the trimester framework in
favor of the undue burden approach, made it unnecessary to character-
ize the relevant state interests as "compelling" (or not).32' So long as
the state acts for "a valid purpose,"3 22 and does not impose an undue
burden on the woman's choice, it may regulate previability
abortions. 323
After viability, of course, the undue burden approach ceases to
apply, and states may prohibit abortions subject to Roe's life-or-health
exception.3 2 4  The joint opinion fails to explain whether this is
because (1) a compelling state interest is necessary to override the
woman's right to choose, and the state's interest in viable fetal life is
compelling, or (2) a compelling state interest is not necessary to over-
salient compromise would have been to define the life-or-health exception in relative-
safety terms early in pregnancy, and in self-defense terms later in pregnancy (whether
after viability or after the point at which abortion becomes statistically less safe than
pregnancy and childbirth).
318 Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
319 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
320 Id.
321 Consistent with this analysis, the joint opinion is also silent on whether (as Roe
holds) the state has a compelling interest in maternal health. See Casey, 505 U.S. at
878 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and SouterJJ.) ("Regulations designed to
foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not constitute an
undue burden.").
322 Id. at 874.
323 Id. at 877. In particular, measures "designed to foster the health of a woman
seeking an abortion," or "designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abor-
tion," are constitutional if they do not constitute an undue burden and are reasonably
related to their goals. Id. at 878.
324 Id. at 879.
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ride the woman's right to choose, and the state's interest in viable
fetal life meets whatever lower standard is necessary. In either case,
the same conclusion follows: the joint opinion neither holds nor
implies that the state's interest in viable fetal life is less than compel-
ling.325 Consequently, Justice White's remark in Thornburgh still
applies: "In Roe, the Court conceded that the State's interest in pre-
serving the life of a viable fetus is a compelling one, and the Court has
never disavowed that concession."3 26
F The Anti-Roe Coalition's Treatment of the Medical
Emergency Exception
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Casey, which Jus-
tices White, Scalia, and Thomas joined, would have overruled Roe and
replaced it with rational basis review of state restrictions on a woman's
liberty to have an abortion.327 Like the plurality opinion, Rehnquist's
dissent dealt only briefly with the medical emergency provision.328
The dissenters offered no explanation for why, on their approach, a
325 Justice Scalia's dissent in Casey included a paragraph pointing out the inconsis-
tencies between the joint opinion and Justice O'Connor's prior opinions describing
her version of the undue burden approach. See id. at 988-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
To avoid possible misunderstanding, one of Scalia's charges needs to be addressed
here. He wrote:
Gone too is Justice O'Connor's statement that "the State possesses compelling
interests in the protection of potential human life . . . throughout preg-
nancy" . [I]nstead, the State's interest in unborn human life is stealthily
downgraded to a merely "substantial" or "profound" interest. (That had to
be done, of course, since designating the interest as "compelling" through-
out pregnancy would have been, shall we say, a "substantial obstacle" to the
joint opinion's determined effort to reaffirm what it views as the "central
holding" of Roe.).
Id. at 989 (citations omitted) (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). Scalia was certainly
right that O'Connor's change of position was necessary to reaffirming the right to
previability elective abortion. But Scalia's claim that the joint opinion "downgraded"
the state's interest in fetal life to a "merely 'substantial' or 'profound' interest" failed
to mention that the joint opinion acknowledged that the state's interest, already "sub-
stantial" at the outset of pregnancy, grows stronger once the fetus reaches viability.
See id. at 869 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). Moreover, had
Justice Scalia believed that the joint opinion also disavowed Roe's holding that the
state has a compelling interest in viable fetal life, we can be certain he would have
added that to his indictment.
326 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 808
(1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
327 Casey, 505 U.S. at 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
328 Id. at 949.
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medical emergency exception should be required at all. Indeed, they
did not even refer to Roe's life-or-health exception, let alone explain
whether they agreed that a woman is constitutionally entitled to an
abortion if pregnancy threatens her life or health.
Instead, the dissenters simply asserted that they would uphold the
statute, as interpreted by the court of appeals, as "eminently reasona-
ble."32 9 Like the plurality, the dissenters referred approvingly to the
court of appeals' "significant threat" language.330 Unlike the plurality,
however, they did not use the phrase "significant health risks" as short-
hand for risks states may not require women to bear. Moreover, the
dissenters described the three contested medical problems as "danger-
ous conditions," thus seeming to suggest that they would allow states
to forbid abortions unless the woman's life or health is endangered.33 1
Insofar as the dissenters were prepared to recognize the life-or-health
exception as surviving Roe, then, they implicitly favored a self-defense
approach.3 3 2 Yet neither in Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, nor in
Justice Scalia's accompanying one, did the dissenters link their inter-
pretation of Roe's life-or-health exception to self-defense principles
and explain why those principles should be controlling.
The dissenters may have had their reasons for not wanting to be
drawn into a discussion of abortion after viability. For that discussion
might well have exposed fault lines within the anti-Roe coalition. Spe-
cifically, it would have brought to the fore the question whether, even
if Roe were to be overruled, the Court should recognize a more lim-
ited right to an abortion when necessary to preserve the life or health
of the mother. In substance, that is simply the postviability life-or-
health exception in the form of a right that applies throughout
pregnancy. 3
In his dissent in Roe, Justice Rehnquist indicated his belief that a
statute that "prohibit[ed] an abortion even where the mother's life is
in jeopardy . . . would lack a rational relation to a valid state objec-
tive." 33 4 Justice White went farther in his Roe dissent (which Rehn-
quistjoined), suggesting that it was possible that due process requires
329 Id. at 979.
330 Id.
331 Id. at 978.
332 The dissenters did not directly refer to the Third Circuit's use of the wanted-
pregnancy test, but they did point out that the Third Circuit had "noted that the
medical profession's uniformly prescribed treatment for each of the three conditions
is an immediate abortion." Id. This suggests that the dissenters may have seen some
potential in the wanted-pregnancy test.
333 For a brief discussion of this approach, see supra Part II.B.
334 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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that a woman, whose pregnancy poses a "threat to her mental or physi-
cal health," be permitted to have an abortion.335 Neither White nor
Rehnquist explained the rationale for their views, but it seems a fair
conjecture that they had traditional self-defense principles in mind.
Justices Scalia and Thomas, on the other hand, while continuing
to call for overruling Roe v. Wade (and Casey), have to this day never
said whether they would be prepared to accept a limited right to abor-
tion on maternal life-or-health grounds.3 36 Often, Justice Scalia's lan-
guage has sounded like a call for the complete abolition of federal
abortion rights.3 3 7 At times, his calls for repeal have focused on elec-
tive abortions, as when he wrote in Casey that "[t] he States may, if they
wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution does not
require them to do so."3 38 But it seems unlikely that Scalia and
Thomas would stop there. As they also asserted in Casey: "The permis-
sibility of abortion, and the limitations upon it, are to be resolved like
most important questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to per-
suade one another and then voting." 3 9
It is entirely possible, then, that the anti-Roe Justices disagreed
among themselves about whether to overrule Roe's life-or-health
exception along with its right to elective abortion. Had it com-
manded a majority, Rehnquist's opinion would have left that question
for another day. There was a rational basis for the state's medical
emergency exception to its various (and likewise rational) regulations
of abortion, and nothing more needed to be said.
335 Id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
336 At least, not in a Supreme Court opinion.
337 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 980 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("Nothing in our Federal Constitution deprives the people of this country of the right
to determine whether the consequences of abortion to the fetus and to society out-
weigh the burden of an unwanted pregnancy on the mother. Although a State may
permit abortion, nothing in the Constitution dictates that a State must do so."); Ohio
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I
continue to believe ... that the Constitution contains no right to abortion." (citation
omitted)).





IV. THE LIFE-OR-HEALTH ExCEPTION SINCE C(4sEY THE
CARHART DECISIONS
A. The Return of the Relative-Safety Approach in Stenberg v. Carhart 4 0
By the time Stenberg v. Carhart came before the Court, Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer had replaced Justices White and Blackmun. 341
As Stenberg confirmed, this meant that Justice O'Connor returned to
the role of swing voter in the Court's abortion cases. In that role, she
provided the decisive fifth vote for an opinion that essentially adopted
the relative-safety version of the life-or-health exception under the
aegis of Casey's "significant health risks" language.34 2
Nebraska, like many other states, had enacted legislation banning
partial-birth abortions (in medical terminology, "intact D&E" abor-
tions) throughout pregnancy, except when necessary to save the life of
the mother. 343 In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the Court held this
statute unconstitutional because, inter alia, it lacked a maternal-health
exception.344 In reaching this result, Stenberg interpreted Casey's "sig-
nificant health risks" test as banning state imposition of material health
risks-that is, risks a reasonable woman and her doctor would take
into account in deciding which abortion method should be used.34 5
This is a relative-safety approach, albeit a less absolutist one than
Thornburgh's ban on all maternal-health "tradeoffs."
The Stenberg Court's critique of Nebraska's failure to include a
maternal-health exception opened by quoting the postviability life-or-
health exception as stated in Roe and reaffirmed in Casey.346 The
Nebraska law, however, banned intact D&E abortions whether per-
formed before or after viability.3 47 The Court indicated that this
340 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
341 Id. at 918-19.
342 Casey, 505 U.S. at 880 (majority opinion).
343 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 921-22.
344 The Court also held that the statute violated the undue burden test, because
(as the Court construed it) the statute banned the most widely used late abortion
method (standard D&E) as well as the partial-birth (intact D&E) procedure. Id. at
938. Nebraska conceded that its statute imposed an undue burden if it also applied to
the "more commonly used" standard D&E. Id. I have argued elsewhere that, in light
of Gonzales v. Carhart, there is a good chance that the Court would now rule that a ban
on all D&E abortions does not impose an undue burden. See Stephen G. Gilles, As
justice Kennedy Said... , FIRsr THINGS, Jan. 2008, at 18, 18-21.
345 The Stenberg opinion does not use the phrase "material health risks," but the
analysis in text shows, I believe, that this is a fair characterization.
346 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930.
347 A restriction on previability abortion methods will not directly save any fetal
lives, because nonviable fetuses will die no matter what method is used to abort them.
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"aggravate [d] the constitutional problem," because the state's interest
in restricting abortion is "considerably weaker" before viability.348 But
rather than crafting and applying a potentially broader previability
life-or-health exception, the Court proceeded to strike the statute
down because it failed to meet the postviability standard.3 4 9
Nebraska argued that no statutory health exception was neces-
sary, because there are no circumstances in which intact D&E is the
only safe abortion method.3 5 0 The Court did not dispute Nebraska's
factual premise. Instead, it responded that the district court "found
that the [intact D&E method] was significantly safer in certain circum-
stances."351 Because intact D&E "would be the safest procedure" in
some situations, the Court held that the absence of a health exception
would "create significant health risks for women." 3 5 2
The Stenberg Court's reasoning, while directly addressed to the
need for a statutory health exception, also applies to the postviability
life-or-health. exception. Indeed, for the first time in thirty years, the
Court actually construed the exception's language:
The word "necessary" in Casey's phrase "necessary, in appropri-
ate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother," cannot refer to an absolute necessity or to absolute
proof. Medical treatments and procedures are often considered
Even as applied after viability, Nebraska's ban on partial-birth abortions was unlikely
to save any fetal lives, because (as construed by Nebraska) its ban did not apply to the
standard D&E method, which is invariably fatal to the fetus. See id. at 940. That raises
important questions I cannot pursue here: whether the State could invoke its interest
in protecting fetal life on the ground that the statute would indirectly save fetal lives,
and what other legitimate state interests, if any, were advanced by the partial-birth
abortion ban. See id. at 930-31 (alluding to, but not deciding, these questions); id. at
946 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that Nebraska has no "legitimate interest in
requiring a doctor to follow any procedure other than the one that he or she reasona-
bly believes will best protect the woman in her exercise of this constitutional liberty");
id. at 960-64 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that Nebraska has several legitimate
interests in its partial-birth abortion ban). Of course, under the Stenberg majority's
construction of the statute as prohibiting both D&E methods, it could very well have
saved the lives of some viable fetuses, because the remaining method (induced labor)
often allows the fetus to be born alive. For the Stenberg Court, however, the Nebraska
statute's supposed breadth was an independent ground on which to hold it
unconstitutional.
348 Id. at 930 (majority opinion).
349 Id. at 938.
350 Id. at 931.
351 Id. at 934.
352 Id. at 931.
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appropriate (or inappropriate) in light of estimated comparative
health risks (and health benefits) in particular cases.353
This interpretation is tantamount to a holding that a postviability
abortion is justified whenever it is "appropriate" in light of the "esti-
mated comparative health risks (and health benefits)" of abortion and
pregnancy in a particular woman's case. 354 That, of course, is the
essence of the relative-safety approach. But to take that approach to
its logical conclusion (as Thornburgh had) would have required jet-
tisoning Casey's "significant health risks" language; and that would
have clashed with the central rhetorical trope of Justice Breyer's
Stenberg opinion-that the Court was breaking no new ground, but
merely reaching a result compelled by the joint opinion in Casey.366
Justice Breyer's solution was to retain the "significant health risks"
formulation, but make plain that risks are "significant" if they are non-
negligible, that is, if they would be material in the decisionmaking of
women and their doctors.35 6 This understanding of "significant" risks
is implicit in Stenberg's discussion of safe-versus-safest abortion meth-
ods. What kinds of risks make one concededly safe abortion method
significantly riskier than another? Clearly not serious health risks, for
then the second-best method could not be deemed "safe." The differ-
ences between safe and safer methods must involve risks that are
neither negligible nor serious-risks that, while small, are "signifi-
cant" enough to be worth considering when choosing among meth-
ods. So it is that we find Justice Breyer quoting with approval an
American Medical Association (AMA) policy statement asserting that
an intact D&E should be performed only when "' alternative procedures
pose materially greater risk to the woman. 37 Thus, Stenberg implies that a
woman is entitled to an abortion via the prohibited abortion method
whenever the perceived risks of the safest legal abortion method are
materially greater. As applied to a prohibition on postviability abor-
tions, this means that the life-or-health exception is triggered when-
ever the health risks of pregnancy are materially greater than those of
abortion. Even an extremely small chance of death or serious health
impairment is likely to satisfy that test.
353 Id. at 937 (citation omitted) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,JJ.)).
354 Id.
355 See id. at 921 (asserting that the Court was merely applying the rules laid down
in Casey).
356 Id. at 931.
357 Id. at 935 (quoting Late Term Pregnancy Termination Techniques, AMA Pol-
icy H-5.982).
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This analysis is confirmed by a look at the medical disagreement
in Stenberg between doctors who think intact D&E is safer and doctors
who think standard D&E is safer. The reason why neither school of
thought can claim a decisive victory is precisely that the distinctive
risks associated with each of these procedures involve only very small
chances of a serious injury. Doctors who believe intact D&E is safer
than standard D&E argue that the former involves less risk of uterine
perforation, cervical laceration, and retained fetal tissue.358 These
possible complications of D&E are rare35 9 as are the risks that other
doctors believe make intact D&E the riskier procedure.360 Yet Stenberg
holds that differences of this order of magnitude can constitute "sig-
nificant health risks." 3 6 1 Stenberg thus revives, in less absolute form,
the relative-safety understanding of the life-or-health exception that
first emerged in Thornburgh. And, as in Thornburgh, it does so without
providing any rationale for that result.
B. Justice Kennedy's Stenberg Dissent
Justice Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist) wrote an
impassioned dissent in Stenberg, arguing that the Court had breached
the plurality's promise in Casey that states would now have greater lee-
way to protect fetal life by regulating abortions throughout preg-
nancy.362 Kennedy raised multiple objections to Stenberg's various
rulings, including its holding that the Nebraska statute unconstitu-
tionally lacked a maternal-health exception. Much of his dissent was
devoted to a lengthy argument that the Court failed to give appropri-
ate deference to the Nebraska legislature's judgment about the rela-
tive safety of the banned (intact D&E) method and the permitted
(standard D&E) method, and conversely, gave virtually unfettered dis-
cretion to individual abortion providers.3 63 Of more interest for our
358 See Brief of Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
et al. in Support of Respondent at 21-22, Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914 (No. 99-830).
359 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 164 (2007).
360 See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 933 (citing Brief Amici Curiae of Association of Ameri-
can Physicians and Surgeons et al., supra note 358, at 21-23). Some of the risks asso-
ciated with intact D&E include "cervical incompetence caused by overdilitation, injury
caused by conversion of the fetal presentation, and dangers arising from the 'blind'
use of instrumentation to pierce the fetal skull while lodged in the birth canal." Id. at
933.
361 This is not to say that Stenberg holds that every health risk, however minimal, is
"significant." If pressed, Justice Breyer could no doubt have come up with some low-
probability risk of a minor health problem that is not "significant" because it never
leads to more serious complications.
362 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 956-57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
363 Id. at 964-72.
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purposes, Kennedy argued that the Court had misunderstood Casey by
holding that a ban on an abortion procedure must "include an excep-
tion permitting an abortionist to perform [that procedure] whenever
he believes it will best preserve the health of the woman."
3 64
Whereas the Stenberg majority used Roe's life-or-health exception
as the touchstone for its analysis, Kennedy made no reference to that
exception. Nor did he quote Casey's "significant health risks" lan-
guage. Instead, he used Casey's undue burden test, asking whether
the partial-birth abortion ban posed "'a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.' 3 65 As part
of that analysis, he also applied what he described as Casey's require-
ment that "a regulation . . . impose a 'significant threat to the life or
health of a woman' before its application would impose an undue bur-
den."3 6 6 In applying the undue burden test, the crucial fact for Ken-
nedy was that even if the intact D&E method "may present an
unquantified lower risk of complication for a particular patient[,] ...
other proven safe procedures remain available even for this
patient."367 Consequently, Nebraska's ban "deprived no woman of a
safe abortion and therefore did not impose a substantial obstacle on
the rights of any woman."3 68 Nor, for the same reason, did the statute
impose a "'significant threat to the life or health of a woman.' "369 The
"marginal" health differences between the forbidden method and the
standard alternative370 "created a substantial risk to no woman's
health."371
Justice Kennedy was undoubtedly right that Nebraska's ban on
intact D&E abortions did not violate the undue burden test. The
question for undue burden purposes is whether the burdens attributa-
ble to the ban-whether they involve health risks, emotional distress,
pecuniary cost, or some combination thereof-can be expected to
deter or impede a significant number of women from choosing abor-
tion over continued pregnancy and childbirth. The relevant compari-
son, therefore, is between the permitted abortion methods (standard
364 Id. at 964 (emphasis added).
365 Id. at 965 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877
(1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)).
366 Id. at 967 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 880 (majority opinion)).
367 Id.
368 Id. at 965.
369 Id. at 967 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 880 (majority opinion)).
370 Id. at 967-68.
371 Id. at 969.
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D&E) and childbirth.372 Given the consensus that the standard D&E
procedure is very safe, it would be preposterous to claim that the ban
on intact D&Es will deter women from having abortions. The Stenberg
majority did not argue otherwise.
What should we make of Justice Kennedy's failure to acknowl-
edge that Casey's "significant health risks" formulation was derived
from Roe's life-or-health exception, and as such constitutes an inde-
pendent limitation on previability abortion regulations? The answer,
if there is one, remains unclear.373 Fortunately, the issue is moot:
Kennedy's more recent opinion for the Court in Gonzales uses both
the "significant health risks" test and the general undue burden
test.3 74 For now, the key point is that Kennedy's view of the
postviability life-or-health exception is presumably at least as restrictive
of abortion rights as the previability undue burden analysis in which he
engaged in Stenberg. Kennedy's analysis, transposed to the
postviability context, implies that the life-or-health exception applies if
continued pregnancy would not be "safe." The mere fact that abor-
tion might be safer for a particular woman is not enough. Kennedy
did not attempt to define what a "safe" abortion is. But his focus on
whether an abortion is "safe" suggests that he would limit Roe's life-or-
health exception to cases in which continued pregnancy would be
unsafe-that is, dangerous. Whereas Breyer's majority opinion comes
down in favor of the relative-safety approach, Kennedy's dissent has
the hallmarks of a self-defense approach.
C. justice Thomas's Stenberg Dissent
Justice Thomas (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia) also filed an elaborate dissent in Stenberg, which included a
372 When the life-or-health exception is applied to a postviability abortion ban, the
relevant comparison should likewise be between the maternal-health risks of abortion
and those of continued pregnancy and childbirth. But when the life-or-health excep-
tion is applied to a ban on a particular abortion method, the relevant comparison
should be between the maternal health risks of the prohibited method and those of
the safest permitted method.
373 Kennedy may have written his analysis primarily in undue burden terms to
preserve the possibility that the postviability life-or-health exception should be nar-
rower than whatever health exceptions an undue burden analysis might require
before viability. Alternatively, Kennedy may have avoided discussing the life-or-health
exception to make it easier for Chief Justice Rehnquist to join both his dissent and
Justice Thomas's dissent. See discussion infra Part IV.C (discussing Thomas's argu-
ment that the life-or-health exception has no application to regulation of abortion
methods).
374 See discussion infra Part IV.E.
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renewed plea to overrule Roe and Casey.3 75 When he turned to the
statute's lack of a health exception, Thomas's lead-off argument was
that Roe's life-or-health exception, and the decisions applying it,
"address[ ] only the situation in which a woman must obtain an abor-
tion because of some threat to her health from continued pregnancy"
and "say nothing at all about cases in which a physician considers one
prohibited method of abortion to be preferable to permissible meth-
ods."3 7 6 This argument is untenable. Because the Court's pre- Casey
abortion-method decisions (in particular, Colautti and Thornburgh)
dealt with postviability restrictions, the women affected by those restric-
tions necessarily had pregnancy-related health problems that arguably
satisfied the life-or-health exception. But the legal issue in the abor-
tion-method cases was whether the additional health risks, if any,
attributable to the state's regulation of abortion methods were consis-
tent with Roe's life-or-health exception. The life-or-health exception
plays the same role in abortion-method cases as in abortion-prohibi-
tion cases: it limits the health risks a state may require women to bear
in pursuit of the state's interest in protecting fetal life (or any other
legitimate interest the state may have). As Justice Breyer correctly
observed in response to Thomas, the Court's cases "make clear that a
risk to a women's [sic] health is the same whether it happens to arise
from regulating a particular method of abortion, or from barring
abortion entirely."3 7 7
Justice Thomas's next objection was considerably more
perceptive:
I assume that the Court does not discuss the health risks with
respect to undue burden, and instead suggests that health risks are
relevant to the necessity of a health exception, because a marginal
increase in safety risk for some women is clearly not an undue bur-
den within the meaning of Casey. At bottom, the majority is using
the health exception language to water down Casey's undue-burden
standard.3 78
Thomas was correct: under the majority's relative-safety version of
Roe's life-or-health exception, "a marginal increase in safety risk for
375 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 980 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
376 Id. at 1010.
377 Id. at 931 (majority opinion). Justice Breyer's response also sought to use the
formula "significant health risks" to rationalize the Court's pre-Casey abortion-meth-
ods cases, which did not use that language. See id. ("Our cases have repeatedly invali-
dated statutes that in the process of regulating the methods of abortion, imposed
significant health risks." (emphasis omitted)).
378 Id. at 1011 n.20 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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some women" is unconstitutional even if it would not deter or impede those
women from choosing an abortion.
But so what? Roe's life-or-health exception is undeniably a consti-
tutional limitation separate and apart from the undue burden test. In
response, the Stenberg Court could therefore have argued that
Thomas's criticism simply reflects the fact that prior to the undue bur-
den test, Roe's strict scrutiny test invalidated virtually all previability
state regulations. Now that the more permissive undue burden test
has replaced strict scrutiny, the argument goes, it should not be sur-
prising that some previability state regulations run afoul of the life-or-
health exception while passing the undue burden test.
The rejoinder to this argument is that these consequences are
strong evidence that the relative-safety test is a misinterpretation of
Roe's life-or-health exception, as reaffirmed in Casey. Why should a
life-or-health exception designed for postviability situations in which
the state's interest is strongest invalidate laws that survive the undue
burden test, designed as it was for previability situations in which the
state's interest, while legitimate, is not as strong? Under the self-
defense test, this anomaly disappears: a law that passes the undue bur-
den test will rarely if ever violate the life-or-health exception-indeed,
some laws that fail the undue burden test will still not contravene the
exception. Any previability law that significantly increases the mater-
nal health risks of abortion as compared with those of pregnancy is
likely to fail the undue burden test because these increased risks will
deter many women from choosing abortion. Yet because the baseline
health risks of pregnancy are very small in contemporary America,
increased risks associated with state restrictions on abortion methods
may nevertheless fall below the level of dangerousness needed to trig-
ger the life-or-health exception.
Consider this example: a state law that permits only one abortion
method after the first trimester-hysterotomy, i.e., an early C-sec-
tion-but that also contains a life-or-health exception phrased in
explicit self-defense terms. The mortality risks of hysterotomy are
roughly 48 per 100,000,379 far higher than the mortality risks of child-
birth (roughly 12 per 100,000),380 or of a D&E abortion (roughly 5
per 100,000).381 It seems clear that the requirement that an abortion
be done by C-section would deter many women from choosing to have
379 See David A. Grimes & Kenneth F. Schulz, Morbidity and Mortality from Second-
Timester Abortion, 30 J. REPROD. MED. 505, 512 (1985).
380 DONNA L. HOYERT, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MATERNAL MORTALITY
AND RELATED CONCEPTs 1 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/
sr_03/sr03_033.pdf.
381 See Grimes & Schulz, supra note 379, at 512.
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one, both because of the greater mortality risks and because of the
other burdens associated with abdominal surgery. Therefore, as
applied to abortions between weeks thirteen and twenty-two, the hypo-
thetical statute imposes an undue burden. But the statute does not
trigger the self-defense version of the exception, because a mortality
risk of 48 per 100,000, while significant, is still disproportionately
small for self-defense purposes.38 2 (Of course there are some women
for whom a hysterotomy would be much more dangerous than this
statistical risk. They would be entitled to invoke the hypothetical stat-
ute's life-or-health exception.)
Justice Thomas did not present the argument as I have just
sketched it, but he made the same basic point:
[T]he majority expands the health exception rule articulated in
Casey in one additional and equally pernicious way. Although Roe
and Casey mandated a health exception for cases in which abortion
is "necessary" for a woman's health, the majority concludes that a
procedure is "necessary" if it has any comparative health bene-
fits.... But such a health exception requirement eviscerates Casey's
undue-burden standard and imposes unfettered abortion on
demand. The exception entirely swallows the rule.38 3
To clinch his case, Justice Thomas attempted to show that the
Stenberg majority's approach would have required the invalidation, on
health-exception grounds, of regulations that the Court upheld in
Casey. Specifically, he pointed out, the plurality in Casey held that a
twenty-four-hour waiting period did not impose an undue burden,
even though it recognized that "there were women for whom the reg-
ulation would impose some additional health risk who would not fall
within the medical emergency exception."38 4 Under Stenberg's version
of the life-or-health exception, by contrast, a twenty-four-hour waiting
period would be unconstitutional because it would create a "margin-
ally higher health risk" for some women.385
Justice Thomas is correct that Casey's "significant health risks" test
cannot mean that an abortion is "necessary" on health grounds when-
ever it has any "comparative health benefits." But that's a straw man;
Stenberg's position is that an abortion is "necessary" when its health
risks are significantly (as in, materially) lower than those of pregnancy.
As against that understanding of the life-or-health exception,
382 Indeed, it is an order of magnitude smaller than the matemal mortality risk of
childbirth in 1915, which is estimated to have been 608 per 100,000. HOYERT, supra
note 380, at 1.
383 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 1012 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
384 Id. at 1014.
385 Id.
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Thomas's argument is unpersuasive. In upholding the twenty-four
hour waiting period, the Casey plurality stated: "The statute, as con-
strued by the Court of Appeals, permits avoidance of the waiting
period in the event of a medical emergency and the record evidence
shows that in the vast majority of cases, a 24-hour delay does not cre-
ate any appreciable health risk." 3 86 On that basis, the plurality con-
cluded, "we cannot say that the waiting period imposes a real health
risk."38 7 These statements suggest that the plurality-or at least the
author of this section of the joint opinion-may have viewed "signifi-
cant" health risks as roughly synonymous with "real" or "appreciable"
health risks.3 88 If we think back to Justice White's laundry list of syno-
nyms for "significant" (in its weaker meaning) in Thornburgh, it is
noteworthy that both "real" and "appreciable" are among them-
along with "nonnegligible." 3 89 Had he bothered to respond to Justice
Thomas on this issue, Justice Breyer could have argued with some
plausibility that the twenty-four hour waiting period discussion in
Casey actually lent a modicum of support to his interpretation of "sig-
nificant health risks."
D. A Unanimous Interlude: Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of
Northern New England
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice O'Connor served on the Court
together from October 2005 until O'Connor's successor, Justice Alito,
was confirmed on January 31, 2006.390 During that brief period, the
Roberts Court managed to achieve rare unanimity in an abortion
case-and the new Chief Justice assigned the opinion to O'Connor.
386 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885 (1992) (joint opin-
ion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,JJ.) (emphasis added).
387 Id. at 886 (emphasis added).
388 In light of his subsequent dissent in Stenberg, it seems unlikely thatJustice Ken-
nedy realized this implication of the joint opinion when Casey was decided. Given the
lineup in Casey, any point on which the three Justices in the plurality disagreed
should, in theory, have been "won" by the Justice with the most restrictive standpoint
in terms of abortion rights. For example, suppose hypothetically thatJustice Kennedy
favored a self-defense interpretation of significant health risks, while Justices
O'Connor and Souter did not. At the time of Casey, Justice Kennedy could have
forced the issue-had he perceived that the disagreement existed. But by the time of
Stenberg, it was too late. Justice White's retirement had tipped the balance of the
Court and made justice O'Connor the swing voter. This may be one reason why Jus-
tice Kennedy's dissent in Stenberg conveys such a sense of betrayal.
389 See Thornburg v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 807
(1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruled in part ty Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
390 U.S. Senate, Supreme Court Nominations, http://senate.gov/pagelayout/ref-
erence/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
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O'Connor's opinion in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New
England391 expressly disclaimed any intent to "revisit our abortion
precedents," and addressed only "a question of remedy: If enforcing a
statute that regulates access to abortion would be unconstitutional in
medical emergencies, what is the appropriate judicial response?" 3 9 2
The Court unanimously held that "invalidating the statute entirely is
not always necessary or justified, for lower courts may be able to
render narrower declaratory and injunctive relief."393 As we'll see,
Ayotte's remedial holding was an important one. In addition,
although Ayotte broke no new substantive ground, it is worth attending
carefully to which doctrinal propositions all the Justices agreed on-
for the time being.
Ayotte involved a facial challenge to New Hampshire's 2003 Paren-
tal Notification Prior to Abortion Act,394 which prohibited a doctor
from performing an abortion on a pregnant minor until forty-eight
hours after notifying her parent or guardian.395 In addition to con-
taining ajudicial bypass provision, the statute provided that notice was
not required if the doctor certified that "'the abortion is necessary to
prevent the minor's death and there is insufficient time to provide the
required notice.'"3 9 6 The plaintiffs claimed that the Act unconstitu-
tionally failed to allow immediate abortions to minors whose health
would be endangered by compliance with the notice requirement.397
Invoking Stenberg, the First Circuit struck down the Act in its entirety
because it contained no health exception.3 98
391 546 U.S. 320 (2006). The Court's opinion was announced on January 18,
2006. Id. Justice Alito's confirmation hearing ended on January 13; the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee voted 10-8 in favor of confirmation on January 24, Confirmation
Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006);
and he was confirmed 58-42 on January 31. See Supreme Court Nominations, supra
note 390. Justice O'Connor's resignation, which she had announced on July 1, 2005,
was effective upon the confirmation of her successor. Letter from Sandra Day
O'Connor, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to George W. Bush, President, United
States (July 1, 2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/press/
oconnor070105.pdf.
392 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 323.
393 Id.
394 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 132:24-132:28 (2005).
395 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 323-24.
396 Id. at 324 (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132:26(I) (a)).
397 Id. at 325 (quoting Complaint at 1 24, Planned Parenthood of N. New England
v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2004) (No.03-W-00491)).
398 See Planned Parenthood of N. New England v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir.
2004), vacated sub nomAyotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320
(2006).
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Justice O'Connor summarized the applicable law as follows: "New
Hampshire does not dispute, and our precedents hold, that a State
may not restrict access to abortions that are 'necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother."'399 Two paragraphs later, she stated, "New Hampshire has
conceded that, under our cases, it would be unconstitutional to apply
the Act in a manner that subjects minors to significant health risks."40 0
It seems safe to treat these statements as equivalent-and hence to
infer that all the Justices agreed that, as a matter of precedent, the life-
or-health exception applies if pregnancy would subject a woman to
significant health risks. That unanimity contrasts with Stenberg, in
which Justice Breyer's majority opinion deployed "significant health
risks" as the controlling formula, while the four dissenters pointedly
refrained from using it.401
Let us turn now to the shift in the Court's remedial abortion juris-
prudence that makes Ayotte so important. As Justice O'Connor
explained, "the courts below chose the most blunt remedy-perma-
nently enjoining the enforcement of New Hampshire's parental notifi-
cation law and thereby invalidating it entirely." 4 0 2 She acknowledged
that this was "understandable" because the Supreme Court, in
Stenberg, had likewise invalidated Nebraska's partial-birth abortion ban
in its entirety for want of a health exception.4 03 But whereas Nebraska
had not asked for "relief more finely drawn," New Hampshire urged-
and the Court unanimously agreed-that "the lower courts need not
have invalidated the law wholesale." 40 4
In a brief discussion of remedial principles in constitutional litiga-
tion, Justice O'Connor explained that, in general, "when confronting
a constitutional flaw in a statute" the better course is" to enjoin only
the unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving other
applications in force, or to sever its problematic portions while leaving
the remainder intact."405 These practices, however, were subject to
399 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 327 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (joint opinion of Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter, JJ.)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
400 Id. at 328.
401 The change may be attributable to the fact that Ayotte, like Casey itself, involved
a medical-emergency exception, whereas Stenberg involved a restriction on abortion
methods. Or it may reflect a recognition on the part of the dissenters in Stenberg that
they could live with the "significant health risks" language, provided it could be given
a more restrictive reading than the relative-safety interpretation that Stenberg adopted.
402 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330.
403 Id. at 331.
404 Id.
405 Id. at 328-29 (citations omitted).
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two important qualifications: courts should not invade the legisla-
ture's domain by rewriting statutes, nor should they use their remedial
powers to circumvent the legislature's intent.406 The first qualifica-
tion, O'Connor concluded, should not be an obstacle to following the
normal rule: the plaintiffs conceded that "carefully crafted injunctive
relief' 407 was feasible, and "[o]nly a few applications of New Hamp-
shire's parental notification statute would present a constitutional
problem."408 The second qualification called for a severability analysis
focusing on whether the legislature would "have preferred what is left
of its statute to no statute at all."409 Accordingly, the Court held-
subject to resolution of the severability issue on remand-that the
lower courts could issue declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting
the statute's unconstitutional application4 10
On remand, the First Circuit returned the case to the district
court for further proceedings, while allowing the injunction to remain
in place.411 In February 2007, the district court stayed the case pend-
ing anticipated action by the New Hampshire legislature.4 12 After the
legislature repealed the Act in June 2007, the district court dismissed
the case as moot.4 13 As a result, we cannot be sure how the district
court would have crafted a narrower injunction prohibiting unconsti-
tutional applications of the Act. The most straightforward approach
would seemingly have been to enjoin the application of the statute in
any case in which an abortion provider concluded that the delay from
compliance with the Act's notification requirement would create "sig-
nificant health risks," and therefore that an immediate abortion was
necessary to preserve the life or health of the pregnant minor.
Ayotte thus turns out to be a compromise in which the liberal Jus-
tices agreed to follow the Court's normal remedial practices, and the
conservative Justices agreed to let the lower courts apply the "signifi-
cant health risks" test as described and applied in Stenberg. Stenberg's
relative-safety version of the significant health risks test, however, did
not last long.
406 Id. at 329-30.
407 Id.
408 Id. at 331.
409 Id. at 330.
410 Id. at 331.
411 See Planned Parenthood of N. New England v. Ayotte, 571 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270
(D.N.H. 2008).
412 Procedural Order, Ayotte, 571 F. Supp. 2d 265 (No. 03-cv-491).
413 Ayotte, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
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E. Gonzales v. Carhart: A Hemi-Demi-Semi Victory for the
Self-Defense Approach
Like the Nebraska statute in Stenberg, the federal partial-birth
abortion ban statute in Gonzales v. Carhart lacked a health exception.
With Justice Alito replacing Justice O'Connor, there was now a 5-4
majority to uphold the law.4 14 One might accordingly have expected
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion squarely to address the meaning of
Casey's "significant health risks" test, repudiate Stenberg's expansive
interpretation thereof, and adopt a narrower, self-defense interpreta-
tion of Roe's life-or-health exception.4 1 5 That, in turn, would have
made it easy for the Court to hold that Congress had reasonably deter-
mined that a statutory health exception was not necessary, on the
ground that the prohibited partial-birth procedure was never the only
available abortion method that would not seriously endanger the
mother's health.
Instead, Justice Kennedy's opinion primarily revisited a different
theme from his Stenberg dissent: that legislatures have "wide discretion
to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncer-
tainty."416 The Stenberg Court had rejected that proposition, mandat-
ing a health exception as long as "substantial medical authority
supports the proposition that banning a particular abortion proce-
dure could endanger women's health."417 The Gonzales Court took the
opposite view, holding that the "documented medical disagreement"
over whether the ban on intact D&E would "impose significant health
risks on women" 418 sufficed to uphold the federal act against a facial
challenge. 4 19 However, the Court recognized that an as-applied chal-
lenge to the Act's lack of a health exception would be proper "if it can
be shown that in discrete and well-defined instances a particular con-
dition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure prohibited by
414 In her concurring opinion in Stenberg,Justice O'Connor indicated that "a ban
on partial birth abortion" would be constitutional, in her view, if (1) it applied only to
the intact D&E procedure, and (2) it "included an exception to preserve the life and
health of the mother." Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 951 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The
federal ban at issue in Gonzales satisfied only the first condition.
415 One amicus brief in Gonzales made a sustained argument that the Court should
revisit, clarify, and narrow Roe's life-or-health exception. See Brief Amici Curiae of
Christian Legal Society et al. in Support of Petitioner at 22-27, Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-1382).
416 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 163.
417 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938 (emphasis added).
418 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 162.
419 See id. at 164.
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the Act must be used."4 20 Gonzales thus acknowledged the possibility
of unusual cases in which the ban on partial-birth abortions might
impose significant health risks on an individual woman, while insisting
that Congress reasonably found that the ban will not impose such risks
in the vast majority of cases.
Remarkably, Gonzales managed to come to these conclusions
without ever explaining what constitutes a significant health risk. In
Part IV.B of his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy framed the
question as "whether the Act has the effect of imposing an unconstitu-
tional burden on the abortion right because it does not allow use of
the barred procedure where 'necessary, in appropriate medical judg-
ment, for the preservation of the . . . health of the mother."' 42 1 That
in turn depends, "under precedents we here assume to be control-
ling," on whether it "'subject[s] [women] to significant health
risks."' 42 2 Whatever the qualification "we here assume" may portend,
this much is clear: the "significant health risks" test is the current legal
standard to which restrictions on abortion methods must conform.
But having elected to use the "significant health risks" test, Justice
Kennedy sidestepped the question of its legal meaning. He pointed
out that, in Congress and in the lower courts, "whether the Act creates
significant health risks for women has been a contested factual ques-
tion,"42 3 and found that "both sides have medical support for their
position." 4 24 After describing the conflicting medical evidence in
some detail, he went on to hold, as already noted, that in the presence
of this "medical uncertainty" Congress could reasonably have con-
cluded that a health exception was not necessary. 425 Intriguingly,
Kennedy's description of the conflicting medical testimony reveals two
very different factual disagreements. Although Kennedy's opinion
does not clearly distinguish them, it permits us to do so-and in the
process to draw some inferences about Kennedy's conception of "sig-
nificant health risks."
The first point of disagreement concerned whether the prohib-
ited "intact D&E" abortions are ever safer than the dominant alterna-
tive method, the standard (or dismemberment) D&E. The plaintiffs
presented evidence that intact D&E was safer, but this evidence was
"contradicted by other doctors who testified . . . that the alleged
420 Id. at 167.
421 Id. at 161 (alteration in original) (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N.
New England, 546 U.S. 320, 327-28 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
422 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328).
423 Id. (emphasis added).
424 Id.
425 Id. at 163.
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health advantages were based on speculation without scientific studies
to support them."426 Obviously, even under the relative-safety test,
there would be no need for a health exception if the prohibited
method never had "'safety advantages over other second-trimester
abortion procedures.' 4 2 7 Thus, this factual disagreement tells us
nothing about the Gonzales majority's conception of "significant
health risks."
The importance Justice Kennedy attached to the second factual
disagreement, on the other hand, is clearly inconsistent with the rela-
tive-safety approach. Kennedy asserted that the plaintiffs' evidence in
favor of intact D&E was "contradicted" by the testimony of doctors
who "considered D&E always to be a safe alternative." 4 28 At first blush,
this seems nonsensical. There is no contradiction between testimony
that standard D&E is always "safe" and testimony that the intact D&E
method is safer. Depending on the criterion for "significance," how-
ever, there may or may not be a contradiction as to whether intact
D&E is significantly safer. If any material risk qualifies as "significant,"
there is still no contradiction: an abortion method could be a "safe"
alternative, yet still possess materially greater risks. On the other
hand, if Kennedy understands a "significant" health risk to mean one
that poses a serious threat to a woman's health, there is a contradic-
tion. Because an abortion method that involved a serious threat to a
woman's health would clearly not be "safe," the existence of a "safe"
alternative method is powerful evidence that the statutory prohibition
does not impose "significant health risks" on women.
Justice Kennedy's defense of the Act's failure to include a health
exception confirms that this analysis is correct. Kennedy reiterated
that "[a]lternatives are available to the prohibited procedure," 429 and
highlighted the widely used standard D&E (dismemberment)
method, which the lower courts found "to have extremely low rates of
medical complications," and which experts for both sides agreed was
"safe." 430 After additional discussion, he concluded that the statute
was facially constitutional "where there is uncertainty over whether
the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman's health,
given the availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe
alternatives."431 Kennedy's thinking seems clear: if a legal abortion
426 Id. at 162.
427 Id. (quoting Nat'1 Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 479
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
428 Id.
429 Id. at 164.
430 Id.
431 Id. at 166-67 (emphasis added).
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method is "safe" for a particular woman, resort to the prohibited abor-
tion method is not "necessary to preserve [her] health," even if the
prohibited method is marginally safer.432 The same reasoning would
establish that Roe's life-or-health exception applies only when contin-
ued pregnancy is not "safe" for the woman.4 3 3
In sum, Justice Kennedy's Gonzales opinion implicitly rejects the
relative-safety approach. But in favor of what? Gonzales gives us no
explicit guidance about what counts as "safe," although it seems likely
that small statistical risks are consistent with "safe" status-and hence
are not "significant"-even if they involve death or serious impair-
ment of health.43 4 Also missing from Gonzales is any explanation of
432 Justice Kennedy also distinguished the ban in Gonzales from the one at issue in
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 77-79 (1976) (invalidat-
ing a ban on saline amniocentesis, then the most widely used second-trimester abor-
tion method):
The Court found the ban in Danforth to be "an unreasonable or arbitrary
regulation designed to inhibit, and having the effect of inhibiting, the vast
majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks." Here the Act allows, among
other means, a commonly used and generally accepted method, so it does
not construct a substantial obstacle to the abortion right.
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165 (citation omitted) (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79). The
point of this passage is obviously that the federal ban does not violate the undue
burden test by impeding women's access to previability abortions. Thus, Gonzales con-
firms that a previability restriction on abortion methods must comply with both the
"significant health risks" test and the undue burden test.
433 The Court's analysis in Part IV.B of Gonzales seems at times to conflate the
health-exception question with the distinct question of whether the Act creates an
undue burden. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164 ("The medical uncertainty over whether
the Act's prohibition creates significant health risks provides a sufficient basis to con-
clude in this facial attack that the Act does not impose an undue burden."). Analyti-
cally, the health-exception issue turns on whether the health risks created by a ban on
partial-birth abortions are "significant." The relevant comparison is between the pro-
hibited method and the permitted alternative methods. By contrast, the undue bur-
den issue turns on whether the ban will deter enough women from having abortions
to warrant finding that the ban creates a "substantial obstacle." The relevant compari-
son here is between the permitted alternative abortion methods and childbirth.
The most likely explanation for Gonzales's failure clearly to distinguish the health-
exception and undue-burden questions is that the availability of safe alternatives to
intact D&E is relevant to both inquiries. Without safe alternatives, a ban on intact
D&E would create serious health risks that might endanger women's health, necessi-
tating a health exception. Without safe alternatives, a ban on intact D&E might even
cause abortion to be more dangerous than childbirth, thus presumably deterring
many women from having abortions. In fact, however, given the availability of safe
alternative abortion methods, it seems perfectly obvious that the federal ban on par-
tial-birth abortions will not deter women from having abortions.
434 Cf Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642
(1980) (plurality opinion) ("'[S]afe' is not the equivalent of 'risk-free.' There are
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why the health exception should be interpreted to require serious
health risks rather than just nonnegligible ones. Gonzales refuses to
"interpret[ ] Casey's requirement of a health exception so it becomes
tantamount to allowing a doctor to choose the abortion method he or
she might prefer,"435 and insists that states may require women to bear
"marginal" health risks in order to protect fetal life. 4 3 6 But it provides
no rationale for these tradeoffs, nor any account of the limits within
which they are permitted.
F Justice Ginsburg's Gonzales Dissent
Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the four dissenting Justices in Gon-
zales managed to go even farther than Stenberg in the direction of a
relative-safety interpretation of the life-or-health exception. A first
clue is that Ginsburg did not quote Casey's "significant health risks"
test-even though Ayotte had placed the Court's unanimous imprima-
tur on that formulation, and Stenberg had given it a relative-safety read-
ing. Instead, Ginsburg wrote that "the Court has consistently required
that laws regulating abortion, at any stage of pregnancy and in all
cases, safeguard a woman's health."437 Her dissent's repeated refer-
ences to the need to "safeguard" women's health suggest that she
would return to Thornburgh's absolutist ruling that no trade-offs of
fetal life against risks to a woman's health are permitted. 438
Ginsburg also stressed Stenberg's argument that the life-or-health
exception entails the right to an abortion whenever the abortion pro-
vider thinks continuing the pregnancy would involve greater health
risks; and as a corollary, includes the right to have an abortion by
whatever method the abortion provider thinks appropriate "'in light
of estimated comparative health risks (and health benefits) "' in the
particular case.439 In her view, there was ample expert testimony
attesting that intact D&E is in some cases and for some women "safer
than alternative procedures and necessary to protect women's
many activities that we engage in every day-such as driving a car or even breathing
city air-that entail some risk of accident or material health impairment, neverthe-
less, few people would consider these activities 'unsafe.' Similarly, a workplace can
hardly be considered 'unsafe' unless it threatens the workers with a significant risk of
harm.").
435 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158.
436 Id. at 166 ("Considerations of marginal safety, including the balance of risks,
are within the legislative competence when the regulation is rational and in pursuit of
legitimate ends.").
437 Id. at 172 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
438 See, e.g., id. at 171-73, 181, 189.
439 Id. at 174 (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937 (2000)).
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health."440 For the Gonzales dissenters (as for the Stenberg majority),
the absence of a health exception is unconstitutional because there is
significant medical authority for the proposition that intact D&E is the
safest abortion method in some circumstances. 441 The safety benefits
need not be large (or even material); it suffices that "intact D&E car-
ries meaningful safety advantages over other methods."4 42
G. The Implications of Gonzales 's Ruling Limiting Facial Challenges
Gonzales strongly implies-but does not explicitly hold-that a
majority of five Justices think that the life-or-health exception applies
only in the presence of substantial risks of serious health impairment,
while four Justices believe that the exception applies whenever the
perceived health risks of pregnancy are "meaningfully" greater than
those of abortion. 443 What explains the majority's reticence? One
plausible explanation is that some of the Justices in the majority want
to wait until these kinds of issues are presented in the more concrete
factual context of an as-applied challenge. Justice Kennedy seemed to
signal as much in the final part of his opinion in Gonzales, which ruled
that "these facial attacks should not have been entertained in the first
instance."4 4 4 Instead, the Court held, a "preenforcement, as-applied
challenge[ ]" was "the proper manner to protect the health of the
woman if it can be shown that in discrete and well-defined instances a
particular condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure
prohibited by the Act must be used."445 The rationale for this ruling
was that "[i] n an as-applied challenge the nature of the medical risk
can be better quantified and balanced than in a facial attack."446 That
rationale-which Gonzales applied to a challenge to the federal Act's
failure to contain a health exception-would seem to apply with full
440 Id. at 177.
441 Id. at 180 (alterations in original) (quoting Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 932).
442 Id. at 176 (emphasis added); cf Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 807 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (listing "meaningful"
as a synonym for "significant").
443 The text was written before Justice Souter announced his retirement in June
2009. It remains to be seen whether his replacement, Justice Sotomayor, will prove to
be as unwavering a supporter of abortion rights as Souter was.
444 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 167.
445 Id. Although Kennedy did not refer to the medical-emergency litigation in
Casey, that would seem to be a good example of the kind of as-applied litigation he
had in mind: Planned Parenthood identified certain specific conditions that were
likely to occur and in which an abortion would be necessary to preserve the life or
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force to a challenge to the scope of a statutory life-or-health
exception.
Suppose a state enacted a statutory life-or-health exception
framed in explicit self-defense terms; for example, banning
postviability abortions "unless necessary to avoid grave danger of
death or of serious, permanent health impairment." Gonzales seems
to say that a facial challenge to this law would be improper, because it
would not be unconstitutional in a "large fraction" of the cases to
which it applies. 447 The challengers would therefore need to bring a
pre-enforcement as-applied challenge, in which they identified partic-
ular medical conditions in which an abortion would allegedly be "nec-
essary to preserve the life or health of the mother" (or, equivalently,
in which continued pregnancy would impose "significant health
risks"). The litigation could then proceed on the basis of in-depth
evidentiary submissions concerning the medical risks involved.
Perhaps the Gonzales Court is right that judicial deliberations
about health-exception issues would be facilitated by fuller and more
concrete development of the relevant medical risks through as-
applied litigation. The difficulty, however, is that Planned
Parenthood and other repeat players in abortion rights litigation may
well decide to refrain from bringing an as-applied challenge to legisla-
tion of this kind. From their perspective, such a challenge would be
very risky. If this hypothetical statute reached the Supreme Court, the
Gonzales majority would probably uphold it.448 That would encourage
pro-life activists to push hard for similar legislation in other states.
Abortion-rights advocates might well prefer to take the position that
the law is unconstitutional, and quietly advise their clients not to obey
it. Only if a state or local prosecutor actually brought criminal
charges against a doctor for performing a postviability abortion in vio-
lation of the hypothetical statute would judicial resolution of the con-
stitutional issue be necessary. 449 Although the statute's tougher
447 See id. at 167-68 (declining to resolve the conflict in the Court's cases as to the
proper burden that must be met by a party bringing a facial challenge, because the
challengers in Gonzales "have not demonstrated that the Act would be unconstitu-
tional in a large fraction of relevant cases," and thus failed to meet even the less
demanding burden).
448 This prediction is based on Justice Kennedy's dissent in Stenberg and his major-
ity opinion in Gonzales. I have hedged it because neither opinion commits him to a
self-defense standard as restrictive as the one in the hypothetical statute.
449 Something akin to this may have happened in connection with the federal
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006), the Court upheld in Gonzales.
Responding to the majority's directive, Justice Ginsburg wrote: "One may anticipate
that such a preenforcement challenge will be mounted swiftly, to ward off serious,
sometimes irremediable harm, to women whose health would be endangered by the
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language may improve the odds, experience since Roe was decided
suggests that such prosecutions are rare. The Gonzales majority, then,
both missed an opportunity to define the life-or-health exception in
self-defense terms, and made it considerably less likely that such an
opportunity would come its way again.450
Nor is it likely that the lower federal courts will find sufficiently
clear guidance in Gonzales to impel them to recognize that the Court
has rejected the relative-safety approach. Suppose, for example, that
the New Hampshire legislature had not repealed the parental notifica-
tion act that was at issue in Ayotte, and that the district court had
crafted a narrower remedy enjoining the Act's application when
parental notification would impose "significant health risks" on the
pregnant minor. What would have happened if, after Gonzales, the
State had returned to the district court requesting modification of
that injunction to make clear that only "serious" or "substantial" risks
of major health impairment qualify as "significant health risks"?
While it is conceivable that the district court could be persuaded by
the kind of close reading of Gonzales I have presented, it seems consid-
erably more likely that the average judge would stick to the risk-averse
strategy of leaving "significant health risks" undefined.
CONCLUSION
For more than thirty-five years the Justices have clung to the fic-
tion that the meaning of Roe's life-or-health exception is clear and
unambiguous. It is not: a reasonable interpretive case can be made
intact D&E prohibition." Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). It has
now been more than two years since Gonzales was decided, and so far as I can tell no
pre-enforcement challenge has been forthcoming. In part, this is because the federal
act contains an enormous loophole: it prohibits only the partial-birth abortion of a
living fetus. See § 1531(b)(1)(B) (requiring an "overt act . . . that kills the partially
delivered living fetus"). Consequently, abortion providers who prefer (for whatever
reasons) to use the intact D&E method can simply kill the fetus by means of a lethal
injection prior to the abortion. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164 (acknowledging this
"alternative"). But that's not the whole story. If the Court's composition shifted so
that there were five reliable votes for the relative-safety approach, a pre-enforcement
challenge would be mounted soon enough. As to whether partial-birth abortions of
living fetuses continue to occur in circumstances in which the abortion doctor
believes this method is significantly safer for the woman, I have no information one
way or the other. That said, what are the chances that a United States Attorney would
bring charges in such a case?
450 From a pro-life standpoint, the silver lining is that legislation adopting the self-
defense approach to statutory life-or-health exceptions (whether in conjunction with
postviability abortion bans or restrictions on abortion methods) is less likely to be
challenged in federal district court than in the past.
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for both the self-defense and relative-safety readings. In the face of
this ambiguity of its own making, the Court should stop procrastinat-
ing, engaging in sophistry, and flip-flopping, and make a reasoned
and explicit choice between these competing approaches. Or, if the
Court believes that Casey's "significant health risks" language should
be given an intermediate meaning, it should explain what justifies this
alternative and what legal test it entails.
As Part I showed, when Justice Blackmun wrote Roe's life-or-
health exception, he must have realized that the language he used
could plausibly be understood to require either that the woman's life
or health be in serious danger, or merely that abortion be safer for
her than continued pregnancy. In his subsequent opinions for the
Court, Blackmun signaled (in Colautti) and ultimately held (in Thorn-
burgh) that the latter, relative-safety interpretation was correct. But he
never claimed that Roe itself had so held. Nor did Justice Blackmun
offer any response to Justice White's argument that Roe, by recogniz-
ing a compelling state interest in fetal life, necessarily envisioned that
state prohibitions on postviability abortions could constitutionally sub-
ject women to some increased health risks (perhaps even substantial
ones). Thornburgh brought temporary clarity to the meaning of the
life-or-health exception, but by force majeure rather than reasoned
argument.
And then along came Casey. The joint opinion in Casey reaf-
firmed what it took to be "Roe's essential holding[s]," including "the
State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law con-
tains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or
health."451 But although the joint opinion undertook to re-examine
and defend "the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability,"
it was silent as to the life-or-health exception's rationale and scope.
Moreover, the joint opinion asserted that the doctrine of stare decisis
should apply to Roe's viability line, because while "[a] nyjudicial act of
line-drawing may seem somewhat arbitrary . . . Roe was a reasoned
statement, elaborated with great care."452 But again, whether or not
Roe's discussion of viability qualifies as a "reasoned statement," Roe's
451 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (majority
opinion). The Court described Roe's "essential holding" as having "three parts": in
addition to the holding quoted in text, these were "the right of the woman to choose
to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from
the State," and "the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of
the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that
may become a child." Id.
452 Id. at 870 (joint opinion of Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter,JJ.).
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unelaborated recitation of the life-or-health exception obviously does
not.
Judged by the standards recited in the Casey joint opinion itself,
Casey's cryptic treatment of Roe's life-or-health exception is indefen-
sible-indeed, illegitimate. Casey invokes the supposedly "inescapable
fact" that the "adjudication of substantive due process claims may call
upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same
capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned
judgment";453 asserts that "the Court's legitimacy depends on making
legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their princi-
pled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the
Nation";454 contends that Roe (and, by implication, Casey itself) is the
rare case in which "the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls
the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national
division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitu-
tion";455 and urges that in such cases "only the most convincing justifi-
cation under accepted standards of precedent could suffice to
demonstrate that a later decision overruling the first was anything but
a surrender to political pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of the
principle on which the Court staked its authority in the first
instance."45 6 Well and good. But what reasoned judgment underlies
Roe's life-or-health exception, and what legal principle does it adopt?
The Court has never said. How can the Court conceivably expect the
Nation to unite around "a common mandate" when the Court has
failed to specify what that mandate requires, let alone bothered to
explain how it is "rooted in the Constitution"?
Nor does it suffice to trot out the phrase "significant health risks"
from Casey as if that settled matters. True, the Casey plurality's appli-
cation of that language suggests a version of the life-or-health excep-
tion that requires an actual (but not imminent) threat of serious
health impairment. As such, the "significant health risks" test rejects
Thornburgh's absolutist version of the relative-safety test, apparently in
favor of a relatively permissive self-defense test. Absent any explana-
tion of the rationale for this middle-of-the-road outcome, however,
the joint opinion remains in violation of its own admonition that
[t] he Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow peo-
ple to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as
grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and
453 Id. at 849 (majority opinion).
454 Id. at 866.
455 Id. at 867.
456 Id.
2010] 619
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled
choices that the Court is obliged to make.4 57
Finally, there is the Court's inconsistent-and consistently ques-
tion-begging-employment of Casey's "significant health risks" lan-
guage in its subsequent decisions. In Stenberg, the Court implicitly
adopted a relative-safety interpretation when it signaled, without
explanation, that a postviability abortion must be permitted whenever
abortion is "significantly safer" than pregnancy.458 In Gonzales, the
Court implicitly adopted a self-defense interpretation when it sig-
naled, again without explanation, that a postviability abortion must be
permitted only if continued pregnancy and childbirth would not be
"safe."4 5 9 These results should surprise no one. As this Article has
shown, the "significant health risks" test is susceptible to practically
the same wide range of competing interpretations as the life-or-health
exception it glosses. Yet the liberal Justices pretend that Casey's lan-
guage self-evidently refers to all nonnegligible health risks, while their
conservative counterparts treat it as equally self-evident that it refers
only to genuinely dangerous ones. When it comes to Roe's life-or-
health exception, both factions (and Justice Kennedy, whose vote cur-
rently determines which one prevails in any particular case) have long
forgotten that it is the "duty," not only its "province," to "say what the
law is"4 6 0-especially that law was crafted by the Court itself.
457 Id. at 865-66.
458 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 934 (2000) (emphasis omitted).
459 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007).
460 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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